A trust framework for peer-to-peer interaction in ad hoc networks by Boodnah, Javesh







The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 





Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
QUEEN MARY 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
  
 
A Trust Framework for 
Peer-to-Peer Interaction 














A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
in the 










School of Electronics and Computer Science 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
by Javesh Boodnah 
 
 
As a wider public is increasingly adopting mobile devices with diverse applications, 
the idea of who to trust while on the move becomes a crucial one. The need to find 
dependable partners to interact is further exacerbated in situations where one finds 
oneself out of the range of backbone structures such as wireless base stations or 
cellular networks.  One solution is to generate self-started networks, a variant of 
which is the ad hoc network that promotes peer-to-peer networking.  The work in 
this thesis is aimed at defining a framework for such an ad hoc network that provides 
ways for participants to distinguish and collaborate with their most trustworthy 
neighbours.  
 
In this framework, entities create the ability to generate trust information by directly 
observing the behaviour of their peers. Such trust information is also shared in order 
to assist those entities in situations where prior interactions with their target peers 
may not have existed.  
 
The key novelty points of the framework focus on aggregating the trust evaluation 
process around the most trustworthy nodes thereby creating a hierarchy of nodes that 
are distinguished by the class, defined by cluster heads, to which they belong.  
Furthermore, the impact of such a framework in generating additional overheads for 
the network is minimised through the use of clusters. By design, the framework also 
houses a rule-based mechanism to thwart misbehaving behaviour or non-cooperation.  
 
Key performance indicators are also defined within this work that allow a framework 
to be quickly analysed through snapshot data, a concept analogous to those used 
within financial circles when assessing companies. This is also a novel point that 
may provide the basis for directly comparing models with different underlying 
technologies. 
 
The end result is a trust framework that fully meets the basic requirements for a 
sustainable model of trust that can be developed onto an ad hoc network and that 
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In our modern society, every individual depends on others for even the most 
mundane of tasks. The very basic need to eat in a city for example is dependent on 
the availability of food stores and eateries and the inherent belief that such outlets 
will provide nourishment that is safe for consumption. Similarly one relies on the 
transport network for travelling and on the media for keeping us informed. This 
dependence is what makes society in general work and underpins what can be 
characterised as a human or social network. 
 
There is however no absolute certainty involved when one chooses to place reliance 
on someone else. Indeed there is a degree of risk associated with the expectation that 
the individual we rely on will produce a beneficial outcome. Using the examples 
above, food poisoning can occur in restaurants and fast food outlets, buses and trains 
often run late or get cancelled and a substantial section of the media regularly 
publishes biased views that may not reflect a balanced picture of events. The 
dependence or belief on others brings forward the notion of trust. 
 
Trust as a concept is somewhat elusive (Gambetta, 2000). When used colloquially, it 
is rather easy to understand – a structured definition is not so straightforward. 
However, based on the observation of the way trust operates, one can deduce that it 
is brought about by the dependence of an individual on another within a given 
scenario to produce an outcome that is beneficial. A more precise definition will be 
provided in Section 1.1. 
 
The domain of computing also sees the evolution of similar scenarios – users place 
their trust in centralised infrastructures such as servers in order to store their personal 
data (e.g. email, pictures and files). Network administrators rely on end users to keep 
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their credentials to access the system safe to minimise the risk of infiltration and 
allow only authorised users to perform tasks.  
 
These issues are challenging in themselves but become even more problematic when 
open systems are brought to the fore. The recent trends in computing have been to 
promote the concept of ubiquitous computing (Poslad, 2009). Users have developed 
the expectation of round the clock access to computing services outside the 
conventional boundaries of the home or the office. The relentless development of 
new mobile devices has increased the momentum of a shift to an increased mobility 
for modern users. Similarly, there has also been a shift from independent computer 
systems to large scale and distributed open systems like grid computing. These 
systems all have properties that vary in time and location and it is expected that any 
decisions in such systems would have to be on the fly and in reaction to changing 
properties. 
 
The issues of trust arising in such distributed systems are wide-ranging and very 
complicated to say the least. To that effect, the work in this thesis attempts to address 
some of the issues encountered within the domain of ubiquitous computing and more 
specifically in peer-to-peer networking. The work involves the creation of a trust 
framework with features that reflect the dynamic trust relationships between 
members of a network. It is necessary however to present the precise definition of 
trust as taken by this work and the specific set of issues that the framework will seek 
to address. This is done in the rest of this chapter. 
 
Section 1.1 provides the definition of trust adopted by this thesis. Section 1.2 
provides the relevance of trust within computing. Section 1.3 briefly surveys trust 
within peer-to-peer and ad hoc networking which is the main area from which the 
majority of the work in this thesis stems. Section 1.4 provides the objectives and 1.5 
the contributions of this thesis and Section 1.6 gives an overview of the remainder of 
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1.1 Defining Trust 
 
As stated previously, a universal definition of trust is very hard to achieve. One of 
many reasons is because trust itself is contextual and may be present in many forms 
that may or may not be aggregated. For instance, John may trust Marie to win a 
medal in jogging but would be very wary of allowing her to drive his car. In John’s 
eyes, his trust of Marie is contextual and only applicable to Marie’s jogging skills. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to combine the trust of John in Marie’s jogging skills 
with his distrust in her driving in order to arrive at an overall measure of how much 
John trusts Marie.  
 
The Oxford Dictionary of Current English (2005) defines trust as the “firm belief in 
the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something.” This definition is 
perhaps the most widely accepted notion of trust in society, i.e. as a belief – for 
instance individuals put their trust in other people, machines, and computers 
countless number of times over any given day. 
 
However, in the field of computing, several academics have been rather pessimistic 
about finding a single definition for trust and have termed it as an elusive concept 
(Gambetta, 2000). Over time, some level of consensus has been reached (Kuhn 
1962), primarily on the positive effects of trust. For this work, a modified combined 
version of the definitions provided by Dasgupta and Gambetta (Dasgupta & 
Gambetta, 2000) will be consistently applied throughout the thesis.  
 
Definition 1: Trust is the belief that an entity has that the other party will act 
honestly and reliably in order to produce the outcome expected by the trusting entity, 
within a given context. Such an outcome will affect the entity’s own action. 
 
By using this definition of trust, it is possible to produce a trust framework or model 
to derive the probability that a particular entity will be behave honestly and reliably. 
However, it is necessary to define what is meant by honesty and reliability first. 
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Definition 2: Honesty is the attribute exhibited by an entity whereby it operates 
without lying. An entity is also honest when it provides true feedback about its peers. 
This feedback accurately represents past events. 
 
It may be necessary to provide incentives within a framework so that honesty is 
encouraged (Ramchurn, 2004). 
 
Definition 3: Reliability is the expectation that an entity will perform to a set 
standard over and over again.  
 
If this expectation is not met, the requesting entity may need to stipulate a specific 
standard of service that may result in a penalty if not met (Ramchurn, 2004). 
 
Definition 4: A trustor is the entity monitoring the specific action of another entity 
as per Definition 1 that may affect its own future behaviour. A trustee is the entity 
performing said action. 
 
Every time an entity successfully meets the expectations of its trustor, its 
trustworthiness increases. There is therefore a direct link between the 
action/behaviour of an entity and its trustworthiness.  
 
Definition 5: Trustworthiness is the perceived trust exhibited by a trustor in a trustee 
as a result of the aggregation of one or more successful productions of outcomes 
expected by the trustor. The crucial point here is that trustworthiness is based directly 
on the trustor’s own interactions with the trustee. 
 
There are however many opportunities, especially in an open environment for 
entities to interact with one another where they may not have had prior direct 
experience with the concerned party. In this case, they clearly lack the information 
required to affect their decision towards any potential future action. Very often, such 
entities would then consult their known peers in order to verify whether they could 
provide any information on their assessment of the trustworthiness of the concerned 
party.  
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Definition 6: When an entity provides another entity information about the 
trustworthiness of a third party, it is said to provide a recommendation about such 
party. This is sometimes referred to as indirect trust in the literature. 
 
Based on the recommendation of its peer, an entity may then decide whether or not 
to trust the third party. This decision will also depend on how much the entity trusts 
its peer to begin with. Often, there will be several peers who will have information 
about a given third party. 
 
Definition 7: The aggregation of the recommendations of peers of an entity about a 
given third party is defined as the reputation of the third party in the view of the 
trusting entity. Reputation is affected by the past action/s of an entity and is therefore 
a good indication of how said entity is likely to behave in the future. Unlike 
trustworthiness, the reputation of a third party in the view of an entity need not 
necessarily include direct interactions between the trustor and the trustee. 
 
In summary, the following notions are of relevance to the chosen definition of trust: 
 
Two entities: When multiple stakeholders are present within a given scenario, a trust 
relationship concerns the interaction between two entities at any one time . 
These can be termed as the trustor and the trustee. It is important to note that 
sometimes the entities may not necessarily denote a specific individual but could 
also represent a collective group of individuals, for example the trust between a 
teacher and his class (that the class will not copy each other’s work). For the 
purposes of this thesis however, it will be assumed that each entity is an 
individual. 
Context: Trust is contextual – this means that the actions of the trustee are only 
monitored within a given context only. These actions then determine how the 
trustor reacts within that context. 
Subjectivity: All trust is subjective as it represents the belief of the trustor. While 
the evidence available to the trustor may be deemed to be objective as it may be 
based on past actions of the trustee, there are many other factors which could 
affect the trustor’s decision such as personal ties, status in society and so on. 
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Action: The belief of a trustor in a trustee for a given action has no relevance to any 
other action, save for the action for which the trustee is being monitored. This is 
highlighted in the above example whereby John prefers Marie’s jogging skills 
over her driving. 
Uncertainty: There is always a degree of uncertainty when considering trust. 
Actions which are past and therefore confirmed are no longer relevant, except 
where they provide a basis of expectation for future actions. However, while 
past history of events can provide an indication of future behaviour, there is 
inherent uncertainty associated with it. Behaviour can change and it is often not 
under the system’s control. For example, the system’s environment can affect 
future behaviour but this is not under the total control of the system itself – 
therefore introducing uncertainty. In the above example, one may trust Marie to 
win another medal based on past performance but her future performance may 
be affected by active environment factors (such as system instances like other 
better runners) or passive ones (different running terrains, wet or windy 
conditions etc.).  
 
1.2 Trust in Computing 
 
With trust and its associated basic concepts now clearly defined, its application to 
distributed computing scenarios can be considered. Just like trust, distributed 
computing and interaction are wide-ranging and very diverse. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to be able to comprehensively address all types of networks and their 
intrinsic trust issues. However, a quick overview of the main types of issues is 
presented below in order to justify the relevance of this work.  
 
There are several actors to look at with respect to trust establishment within 
computing. The key ones are the human user, the computing resource (hardware) and 
the software providing the service required. All three have differing proportions of 
involvement when it comes to trust depending on the application being surveyed. 
Typical examples are online shopping where the human user trusts the online 
software and hardware to keep his details secure, online gambling where the 
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software is trusted to provide at least a reasonable chance of a win or even software 
to software autonomous trust for example when a user software (such as an iPhone 
(Apple, 2009) application) utilises data provided by an information system (such as 
the weather or train times). 
 
The User: This is akin to social trust where the end user (the human) gathers 
information in order to derive the trustworthiness of either a particular piece of 
software or hardware. The trust generated by a human user is understandably 
subjective and may depend on a host of factors. Examples where human trust is used 
in the context of computing are feedback systems such as eBay (eBay, 2009) and 
Amazon (Amazon, 2009) where recommendations are provided in order to assist 
other users in their purchases. 
 
Software: This is primarily in the domain of service provision in which there is the 
delegation of tasks to other systems or a reliance placed on information from third 
party systems. The key aspect of this type of trust is that the delegation or reliance 
has to take place in such a way that the overall performance of the entity is 
maximised.  
 
Hardware: In computing, hardware is usually more associated with the concept of 
security. Unlike trust, which seeks to promote a beneficial outcome and represents 
the belief towards that outcome, security is mostly concerned with making certain 
that non-beneficial outcomes do not occur and a secure system is one that provides 
strong assurances (or beliefs) to that effect. 
 
The main areas of concern in security have traditionally been in authentication 
(making sure the users are who they say they are), access control (also termed 
authorisation) and data encryption (modifying the data in a way that renders it 
useless if intercepted during transit). Security is therefore analogous to safety. 
However, most definitions of security pose it as being absolute, i.e. an all-or-nothing 
concept. For instance, a server or a workstation can be either secured or not. If it is 
not secure, then its use is not warranted. This can prove limiting in several ways. For 
example, it is amply possible to operate systems with non-critical vulnerabilities in 
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order to perform non-critical tasks. This is where trust is useful as a concept. Trust 
provides the ability to rate certain risks gradually rather than by using the notion of 
the absolute. 
 
1.3 Peer-to-Peer Interaction and Ad Hoc Networking 
 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) interaction (Verma, 2004) refers to the communication and 
sharing of data between users independently from service and resource providers. 
This is done via the use of P2P networks that employ a mechanism which allows 
every single user to provide content to others in the pool as well as utilise the pool to 
request specific content. Well-known P2P networks on the Internet are Limewire 
(Limewire, 2009), KaZaa (KaZaa, 2009) and Gnutella (Gnutella, 2009).  P2P is a 
form of distributed computing but the difference is that there is no centralised entity 
that manages the network. Instead, every user behaves autonomously and the 
decision of what and when to share rests solely with that user. 
 
Without such centralised control, trust between peers is a key concept as the potential 
for abuse is very high within P2P systems. There are several ways in which any 
potential user may cheat the system, depending on the application. It may be by 
being selfish and only downloading from the network without sharing the use of any 
of its own resources. The user may also inject disruptive data (such as viruses, fake 
files) into the network in order to dissuade other users from sharing. There may also 
be a Denial of Service (DoS) attack where the network is flooded with bogus 
requests. 
 
The interest of this work in P2P systems is purely academic and does not focus on 
the application of P2P systems for sharing what is deemed illegal content. In the 
view of this thesis, a P2P network is any network that is autonomously set up by its 
members in order to exchange files or to create a network for access to centralised 
services by a single gateway node (a gateway node is one that provides access 
between a P2P network and a backbone infrastructure such as the world wide web or 
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a central work or education server). This definition although more global deviates 
somewhat from the general perceived idea of P2P networks. 
 
The interest of this thesis in P2P interaction lies in the fact that resources belonging 
to many different entities can be pooled together in constructive fashion in order to 
achieve a common goal. The dynamics of pooling these resources give rise to trust 
issues that will be dealt with later in this work. The ad hoc network is a type of P2P 
network on which the majority of this work is based. 
 
Definition 8: The ad hoc network is a type of P2P network in which the role of 
sourcing, transferring and receiving data is done by the users of such data. The users 
of the network, known as nodes, take on the responsibility of creating routes between 
the source and the destination of the data. Further, for the benefit of this thesis, the ad 
hoc network is defined as having only local interactions as the basis of its mobile 
P2P interaction.  
 
The ad hoc network is therefore analogous to passing information along a chain, the 
so-called whispering scenario, within a closed boundary. This means that although 
remote access to an outside network may be possible via a gateway, the core of the 
ad hoc network remains local, with interactions only taking place within a set 
geographical area. 
 
Although the actual network topology may appear simple, creating an ad hoc 
network between strangers presents interesting issues, one of which is the trust that 
an entity can be reasonably expected to put in another previously unknown entity. 
 
The perceived notion of mobile networking is to find access to a wireless gateway 
node that then provides access to wired services, for example a mobile computer 
finding a wireless access point or a mobile phone latching on to neighbouring base 
stations. The trust issue in this case is very simple. As long as there is implicit trust 
between users and providers, communication can happen seamlessly and can be kept 
private. The latter notion is facilitated by encryption and authentication, i.e., 
supported in most mobile networking models. 




By removing this trusted conventional wireless gateway node, ad hoc networking 
presents the following challenges: 
 
Lack of existing trusted relationships: There is no established trust between nodes 
in the network at the initial stage of network formation leading to the need for 
discovering other neighbours to build new relationships. 
Finite resources: Nodes involved generally have finite resources and would have a 
natural tendency to selfishly preserve those resources. 
Low energy transmissions: Finite resources also mean that all transmissions must 
be low energy, relying solely on multi-hop routing in order to forward 
information, rather than attempting high power, high range transmissions which 
may rapidly deteriorate resources. 
Reliability issues: Mobile networks, by their nature, have inherent reliability issues 
normally mitigated by retransmission of dropped data. However, retransmission 
would equate to lost energy and wasted bandwidth in the case of an ad hoc 
network. There is therefore the need to always seek the best route through the 
system. 
Risk to network integrity: When decentralising network routing is used by every 
node on the network, there is an increased risk to the stability of the system 
should any node be compromised whether by choice (rogue, colluding or selfish 
nodes) or not (nodes with spent resources or captured/impersonated nodes). 
 
Ad hoc networks therefore have a variety of issues that need to be addressed in order 
for the system to exist and survive. While each of the above issues may be addressed 
separately by different solutions (such as the implementation of a robust networking 
protocol to counter retransmission needs), it is a main hypothesis of this work that a 
trust framework can successfully aid in mitigating all of the issues described above. 
While these issues may not be exhaustive (more will be provided in Section 2.2), 
they represent the most common problems that need to be overcome in order to 
achieve a viable and sustainable ad hoc network. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
 
As has been indicated, trust can be used in order to promote good behaviour in 
entities. It also provides an indication of the most trustworthy entities thus assuring 
that informed decisions are made by the concerned stakeholders. These very 
stakeholders have to work towards a common goal within an ad hoc network even 
though they may have their own goals and motivations. A trust framework provides 
the very basis on which this common goal can be achieved by offering the following: 
 
• the right motivation for nodes to work towards their common goal 
• adequate punishment for those that do not cooperate, defect or misbehave and 
attack the network. 
 
A high level aim of the work presented in this thesis is therefore: 
 
To develop a robust and resilient trust framework that promotes peer-to-peer 
interaction in an ad hoc network with a view to ensuring its sustainability during the 
whole period that it was initially required to operate for. 
 
The peers considered in such a network are assumed to be autonomous and operate 
independently of one another. However, they all prescribe to the same algorithms 
required for the framework to operate. The peers operate as per Definition 8 and a 
network composed of such peers presents the same characteristics as that of a typical 
ad hoc network as detailed in Section 1.3.  
 
For the purposes of this work, the types of interactions between peers will be 
restricted to simple data packets containing only the essential information for routing 
and trust. The added complexity introduced by varying the sensitivity of transmitted 
data content is not explored. However, thresholds within the algorithms of the 
proposed framework could be effectively varied to achieve this aim when required. 
This thesis focuses mainly on the design of a trust framework with the ability to 
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generate, disseminate, update and revoke the trust properties of peers within a given 
ad hoc network. 
To achieve this aim, the following low-level objectives need to be met: 
 
Objective 1: The framework must actively seek to derive trust information.  
 
This means that a node must be able to assign an indication of trustworthiness for an 
entity, with which it interacts or seeks to interact, based upon the history of past 
interactions with that entity.  
 
One way to achieve this is to assign a value to the entity’s trustworthiness that is 
reflective of its history of past interactions with the querying node. This value, 
depending on the method used, can be any value on a finite spectrum defined as 
ranging between full trustworthiness and complete mistrust or may be a discrete 
value that represents pre-determined levels of trustworthiness. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the former option is used. This is further explained in Section 2.3 when 
presenting the definitions of trust. 
 
Objective 2: In line with Objective 1, the framework must also allow a node to 
derive that trust value of an entity based upon the history of past interactions of a 
third party. The third party must be either commonly trusted or at least known by 
both the querying node and the target entity. This objective ensures that trust 
information flows through the network even between nodes that may not have 
previously encountered each other. 
 
Objective 3: In order to manage trust information and reputation, an enhanced 
reputation management system must be introduced that presents clear advantages 
(such as lower network overheads, reduced computation and fewer storage 
databases) over having a solely fully distributed system.  
 
This enhanced system is to be based on the notion of super-peers (peers with higher 
privileges, operating at a higher level than ordinary nodes) but seeks to decentralise 
that notion down to tiny (comprising of 5-10 nodes at the most) clusters. This 
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introduces the concept of cluster heads (Section 3.4) that take on the responsibility of 
reputation management for other nodes. 
 
Objective 4: The framework must seek to provide motivation for performing nodes 
that selflessly compute and distribute reliable trust information about their peers. 
This is not only to be dictated via an enhanced reputation but also by a higher 
importance being afforded to the recommendations of better performing nodes. A 
system of exemptions and rewards for nodes that take on the role of cluster heads is 
also introduced. 
 
Objective 5: To introduce resilience to the framework, an appropriate punishment 
system must be in place to address the likely occurrence of selfish, rogue or 
misbehaving nodes. 
 
Objective 6: The introduction of the framework must not be accompanied by 
appreciable increases in workload for the nodes, nor must it introduce crippling 
amounts of network overheads. Instead, the framework must seek to carefully 
balance the roles of each of the stakeholders such that a fair system emerges that 
ensures maximum sustainability for all members. 
 
Objective 7: Aside from the framework, the work in this thesis will also aim to 
compare and contrast the performance of other trust models without the need for 
additional design.  
 
To that end, a list of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) will be drawn up that allow 
the performance of the framework to be evaluated. Although these KPIs will be 
mostly low level indicators (primarily at the network layer), an abstraction will be 
performed that will allow these indicators to provide a good measure of performance 
at a higher level (application level for the trust framework for example).  
 
 





This thesis provides an insight into the domain of trust for mobile networking, more 
specifically in the domain of ad hoc networks. It recognises that ad hoc networks are 
inherently local interactions that present uniquely complex problems, precisely 
because of the localised structure. By using notions of trust from the social domain 
that have been formalised by other researchers (see Section 2.3), the model 
extrapolates the concept to the ad hoc network. Furthermore, this work was one of 
the first to introduce clustering within the domain of trust in ad hoc networking. In 
addition, the following contributions have enhanced existing knowledge in the field. 
 
This works presents a model that meets most of the basic requirements necessary in 
order to instigate trust within an ad hoc network (see Chapter 2) and thus allows an 
entity to effectively derive the trustworthiness of its peer both via its own experience 
and based upon the recommendation of its peers. 
 
The model also has the ability to generate trust without any a priori information 
(such as an initial common password/key or a “secret bearer”). It therefore does not 
require a seed in order to kick-start the trust-building process and models initial trust 
formation on its social counterpart by promoting initial ‘break-the-ice’ interactions. 
These initial interactions are usually different from the typical interactions the 
network may have been formed for as they serve mainly for the purpose of initiating 
contact between peers. 
 
Aside from the above broad contributions, this work has further advanced the state of 
the art in the following areas: 
 
a) Provided a means of assessing ‘at a glance’ the respective performances of trust 
models within ad hoc networks through the usage of key ratios known as KPIs. 
While these ratios are based on network and service data, they provide a quick means 
to calculate how efficient a network is running and whether there is scope for it to be 
extended. 
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b) Formally defined different roles for separate classes of node. While this work was 
among the firsts to introduce the concept of clustering for trust distribution in ad hoc 
networks, the concept of assigning specific roles dedicated to different classes of 
node is unique to this work.  
 
c) Created a simple system of weighted averages for reputation that is directly 
proportional to the trustworthiness of a node. Because the trustworthiness itself is a 
measure of how reliable the node is within the network (by virtue of assessing the 
gain, workloads and drop rates), this implies that the best performing nodes have the 
most influence over the reputation calculation of new nodes. This in itself provides a 
better backbone for a trust framework by making it more resilient against lying 
nodes.  
 
d) Evaluated the network overheads created by a trust framework both at a node and 
at the cluster level. This allowed this research to determine that no appreciable 
amount of traffic is introduced at the node level and even at cluster level. The 
performance is substantially higher than that of fully distributed nodes.  
 
e) In using routing data to generate trust, the framework also indirectly provides 
better routes for ad hoc networks.  
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter 2 presents the review of relevant literature within the field of ad hoc 
networking. It provides background to the issues and also provides additional 
information on the ad hoc network and trust. The scope of the reviewed work is 
limited to those that have chosen to adopt similar definitions of ad hoc networking. 
By comparing and contrasting the ways in which ad hoc networking issues have been 
addressed, a set of requirements is formulated that sets the basis for the proposed 
trust model in this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 provides a description of FRANTIC, the trust model proposed by this 
thesis. Various methods are proposed by the model in response to meeting the 
Objectives in this Chapter as well as the issues distilled in Section 2.5.  
 
Chapter 4 is a short chapter depicting how the trust framework can be modelled on 
real life scenarios. Some performance measurement ratios are also depicted in this 
chapter as a general way of assessing the trustworthiness of a network. 
 
Chapter 5 includes the experimentation performed on the low-level simulator NS-2 
(2009). These simulations were performed to demonstrate the response of the 
framework to data input, and whether or not the trust generation properties function 
accurately. The resilience of the framework is also tested with the use of 
misbehaving nodes.  
 
Chapter 6 proposes concluding remarks to this thesis and highlight the main 
contributions. Ways in which this current work can be extended are also proposed. 





2 Literature Review 
 
 
In the first chapter, the purpose of this research was stated as being to develop a trust 
framework with novel features for ad hoc networks in order to enable trustworthy 
interactions to take place between members of a particular network. Ad hoc networks 
were isolated as being particularly relevant for the purposes of implementing a trust 
framework based on their properties and the various challenges they present. Ad hoc 
networks are also a good representation of the way future communications will be 
shaped, with more emphasis on P2P interactions, including user-generated inputs, 
content and appraisals. This chapter therefore presents a review of the literature in 
the fields of ad hoc networking and trust implementation in ad hoc networking. A 
concise general survey of trust and its role in computing is also undertaken. 
 
In the first instance, the field of ad hoc networking is analysed (Section 2.1) and its 
characteristics are explained. The particular type of ad hoc networking suited to this 
work is also presented, as is its use in everyday life. An analysis of the various issues 
pertinent to such a network is also undertaken (Section 2.2) as well as the 
requirements needed in order to implement a prospective solution.  
 
In Section 2.3, a review of trust-related literature is undertaken. Trust, although 
extensively used as a concept, is hard to define and to put into context. Therefore, it 
is necessary to understand the origins of trust within computing and how it is 
relevant to the domain of ad hoc networking. 
 
With the relevance established, Section 2.4 reviews the state of the art within the 
very specific field of ad hoc network, with special emphasis given to those solutions 
that adopt a similar type of architecture when proposing their own models. 
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The chapter concludes with a summary of the requirements distilled from the 
analysis of the state of the art and the literature review and highlights the issues that 
are not currently addressed by existing solutions and which will be implemented 
within the model proposed within this thesis.  
 
2.1 Understanding the Ad Hoc Network 
 
The generally agreed notion of the ad hoc network (following on from the definition 
in Section 1.3) is that of an open configuration of nodes that undertake to form a 
network, usually transient, for a particular purpose. Such a network relies most of the 
time solely on the member nodes to act as hosts and routers in order to forward 
information, run user applications and share data. 
 
2.1.1 Origins of the Ad Hoc Network 
 
Ad hoc networking, from a historical perspective, can be traced back to as far as 
1968, when work on the ALOHA network (Abramson, 1970) was initiated (the 
objective of which was to connect educational facilities in Hawaii). Inspired by the 
ALOHA network and early development of fixed network packet switching, the 
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began work in 1973 on the 
PRnet (Packet Radio Network) – a multi-hop network (Jubin & Tornow, 1987). In 
this context, multi-hopping means that nodes cooperated to relay traffic on behalf of 
one another to reach distant stations that would otherwise have been out of range. 
PRNet provided mechanisms for managing operation centrally as well as on a 
distributed basis. 
 
Although many experimental packet-radio networks were later developed, they did 
not really take off in the consumer market until recently. When developing IEEE 
802.11 – a standard for wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) – the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) replaced the term packet-radio network 
with ad hoc network. Packet-radio networks had come to be associated with 
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multihop networks of large-scale military or rescue operations and by the use of a 
new name, the IEEE rightly hoped to indicate an entirely new deployment scenario.  
 
2.1.2 Ad hoc Operation 
 
Generally, ad hoc networks operate wirelessly although wired versions may also 
exist in certain circumstances. However because ad hoc networks aim to provide a 
solution towards remote connectivity and given the fact that wired hosts are 
generally connected to a fixed backbone, most ad hoc networks therefore operate 
wirelessly. This means that all hosts are equipped with wireless transmitters and 
receivers. This transmission can be either broadcast, point-to-point, steerable or a 
combination of all. Hosts communicate with other nodes using an ad hoc network 
link. A link occurs when two or more hosts converge transmission power levels and 
signal patterns within a common communication channel. This forms a dynamic 
wireless connection. A series of links that connects two nodes is known as a path. 
 
If another host decides to join this network, it goes through the same procedure of 
detecting a network and if accepted joins it. The same applies if a host decides to 
leave the network dynamically. After leaving a network, a host can either move to a 
different ad hoc network or simply not belong to any network at all. This flexibility 
makes the ad hoc network topology very dynamic and at the same time very 
unpredictable.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows an example of two ad hoc networks and the change in network 
topology that occurs by the movement of the hosts. From the network on the left, two 
hosts leave the network. One of the hosts, User3 simply leaves the network whereas 
another host, User8 joins the network on the right. This causes a change in the 
topology of both networks. The network on the left has to reconfigure itself to reflect 
the configuration of the remaining hosts whereas the network on the right has to 
reconfigure itself and adjust the arrival of the new host, User8, which is now User 9 
in the right-hand network. This type of movement can happen at any time without 
any restrictions assuming that the hosts can find the right network for them to join. 




Figure 2.1: Node movement in two different examples (left and right) of an ad hoc network 
2.1.3 Routing 
 
Routing in ad hoc networks, a transfer of information from peer to peer, has been 
well researched. An exhaustive overview of the different routing protocols used in ad 
hoc networks is provided by Royer & Toh (1999). The current methods of routing 
use the “ask the neighbour” method recursively, till they reach the destination or 
another node, which has the route to the destination. Furthermore these routing 
techniques are classified broadly into several categories. These range from Table 
Based Routing, and On Demand Routing to other forms of routing such as 
Hierarchal, Geographical, Power Aware and Multicast (Bakht, 2005). A summary 










Table-driven protocols are one of the original ways of routing in mobile ad-hoc 
networks. Each node uses routing tables to store the location information of other 
nodes in the network. This information is used to transfer data among various nodes 
of the network. 
To ensure that routing tables remain fresh, several mechanisms are adopted such as 
broadcasting "hello" messages, a special message containing route information, at 
fixed intervals of time. On receiving this message, each node updates its routing 
tables. Destination Sequence Distance Vector routing protocol (DSDV) (Perkins & 
Bhagwat, 1994), Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) (Murthy & Garcia-Luna-Aceves, 
1996) and Cluster-head Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) (Chiang et al, 1997) are 
some of the popular table-driven protocols for mobile ad-hoc networks. 
Because of the way they operate, table based protocols are not very effective as far as 
ad hoc networking is concerned. This is due to the fact that nodes in mobile ad hoc 
networks operate on restricted resources and have limited bandwidth. By maintaining 
and refreshing routing tables, nodes drain away precious resources (such as battery 
power and computational capacity) and create unnecessary overheads for the 
network. 
On-demand routing protocols 
 
With on-demand protocols, if a source node requires a route to its destination for 
which it does not have or has incomplete route information, it initiates a route 
discovery process which goes from one node to the other until it reaches the 
destination or an intermediate node and thus has a complete route to the destination. 
 
It is the responsibility of the route request receiver node to reply back to the source 
node about the possible route to the destination. The source node then uses the reply 
route for data transmission to the destination. Some of the better-known on-demand 
protocols are Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing (AODV) (Perkins & 
Royer, 1999), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) (Johnson & Maltz, 1996) and 
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Temporary Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) (Park & Corson, 1997). These 
protocols have different ways for storing known route information and for using the 
established route data. 
 
2.1.4 Ad Hoc Configuration and Structure 
 
An ad hoc network can have three types of configuration. This is dependent, to a 
large degree, on the complexity of the network itself and the number of peers that are 
included in that particular type of network. The three typical configurations generally 
encountered are single hop, master-slave and multi-hop.  
 
Single-hop devices describe point-to-point interactions between two entities without 
them having to rely on third parties to relay their messages. For such a configuration 
to be viable, this means that all nodes within the network must be connected to one 
another such that they are accessible directly from one another. This also implies that 
each time a new node joins the network, it has to ensure it establishes a connection 
with each and every node within the network. Such configurations are only able to 
work on very small ad hoc networks with nodes all scattered within operating ranges 
of one another. Examples of single hop ad hoc networks can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Single-hop configurations in small ad hoc networks 
 
The master-slave configuration is a variant of the single-hop model. In this type of ad 
hoc networks, used especially in Bluetooth networks (Bray & Sturman, 2000), every 
node within a given cell, called a piconet, is connected to its master node. This 
results in a hierarchal structure whereby the master node is responsible for up to, in 
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the case of Bluetooth, seven slave nodes. All communication is routed via the master 
node as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Master-slave configurations with all routing taking place via the master node 
(typical in small secured networks) 
 
The third type of configuration, the multi-hop ad hoc network, is the most commonly 
used in research simulations. As suggested by its name, the multi-hop network 
requires its nodes to communicate with one another via a system of routers. In the 
case of ad hoc networks, such routers are the nodes themselves. This results in a 
mesh network and offers a certain degree of flexibility within the configuration 
whereby nodes may form sub-cells within the network or even break off and form 
separate networks. An example of a multi-hop network has already been seen earlier 
in Figure 2.1 and in real life may include a wireless home or office network, a 
temporary conference network or even gaming networks via portable devices. 
 
Depending on the context in which they are required to operate, some ad hoc 
networks may have access to a fixed network backbone via what is known as a 
boundary node which then acts as an access point. The main advantages of having 
such an access point are that the ad hoc network as a whole can then have access to 
more resources such as certificate repositories in order to authenticate their users via 
the internet.  
 
However as far as the remit of this thesis is concerned, ad hoc networks are defined 
strictly as pure ad hoc networks – in other words, a collection of nodes that operate 
independently of one another, without any access to additional resources through an 
external network such as a central Certificate Authority or database. In other words, 
Master Master Master 
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nodes operate solely within the local environment where they are found and all 
interactions as well as decision-making processes at all levels are strictly local. 
 
The configuration that will be utilised in this thesis uses multi-hop networks. 
However, in order to enable clustering (a key component of the model proposed), a 
variant of the master-slave network is also used within the multi-hop architecture. 
This is only possible because multi-hop networks are very versatile and can be 
adapted in order to increase efficiency within a particular situation. 
 
2.1.5 Ad Hoc Network Design Considerations 
 
Having ascertained the configuration of the ad hoc network to be utilised, the other 
factors that would affect the deployment of a trust model onto the network must be 
considered. These factors, when varied, give rise to what can be termed as scenarios. 
It is somewhat utopian to attempt to provide a trust model that seeks to provide 
solutions to all permutable configurations and scenarios of an ad hoc network, so the 
physical constraints that would define a particular type of ad hoc network for a 
particular model of trust framework must be established.  
 
Some of the main factors affecting the type of deployment of an ad hoc network are 
detailed below. 
 
Devices in use: The limitations of ad hoc networks will be largely determined by the 
type of devices in operation. Essentially, any device with a wireless transmitter and 
receiver can operate as a node. Examples of such devices may include notebook 
computers, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), mobile phones, electronic devices in 
the home and so on. These devices vary in terms of their computational capacity, 
battery consumption and other resources. It is necessary while designing a 
framework or indeed proposing scenarios for a framework that the “weakest” type of 
device in use be considered as the benchmark by which the framework can operate. 
Chains are known to be only as strong as their weakest link and this is also true as far 
as ad hoc networks are concerned. In order to sustain itself, a network has to make 
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sure that any routing and trust protocols in place are manageable within the 
constrained operating environments of the lowest powered devices. 
 
Range: The range of the network depicts the area within which a node can send and 
receive packets from its nearest-hop neighbour. Ranges within ad hoc networks can 
vary from a few hundred metres (e.g. wireless 802.11g/n) to as low as ten metres 
(e.g. Bluetooth), depending on the type of technology in use and the power of the 
device. 
 
Size: The size of the network to be investigated is also paramount in determining 
appropriate scenarios for depiction. Again, there can be a large variation between 
small-scale ad hoc networks (for e.g. Bluetooth operating networks, with a few 
devices) to large-scale networks that can incorporate hundreds or even thousands of 
devices. The design for any instance of such networks will vary largely and each will 
thus require its own unique solution.  
 
Purpose: Although the operation of ad hoc networks may be quasi random, they are 
all set up or activated because of the need to fulfil a goal, usually through mutual 
collaboration.  
 
This is an important consideration because the purpose of an ad hoc network will 
often dictate the level of sensitivity of the data being exchanged and hence how 
crucial the trustworthiness of nodes can be. Goals of member nodes can be common, 
in which case cooperation can be expected across the board, since all are working to 
achieve a similar endeavour.  
 
Nevertheless, other ad hoc networks may operate in non-collaborative environments. 
This is a tricky concept because collaboration is required by default for an ad hoc 
network to subsist. What a non-collaborative environment implies is that the node 
requires an incentive in order to undertake its routing duties. This is typical of self-
starting networks that involve the sharing of resources. Nodes, like their human 
counterparts, will generally try to achieve the maximum gain for the work they put 
in. In fact, given the opportunity, most would leech rather than contribute to a 
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network. Hence, the goal of an ad hoc network needs to be factored in when 
determining appropriate scenarios for the application of a given framework since the 
algorithms determining the operation of the framework need to ensure that a fair 
system is in place that allows resources to be distributed equally and rewards 
altruistic nodes with added incentives and conversely punishes selfish ones. 
 
Mobility: This criterion refers to the pause time of the mobile nodes within the 
network. The pause time is generally referred to as the time between movements for 
a specific node. In other words, the higher the pause time, the longer a node is 
stationary and therefore more likely to create trust relationships with its surroundings 
and further cement that relationship over time. Again, the design requirements for a 
framework within a highly mobile scenario would differ from that with a high pause 
time. For example, highly mobile scenarios would prefer refreshing data constantly 
over bandwidth considerations purely in an attempt to keep its information up to 
date, whereas scenarios incorporating a high pause time results in fewer data 
refreshes but with a benefit of less bandwidth usage.  
 
The aim of the framework in this thesis is to encompass as wide a range of the 
factors as possible. This is very hard to achieve primarily because of the breadth of 
options available. It is not possible to design one single framework for all scenarios 
as that would entail serious compromises for e.g. having a trust framework that is 
able to compute and handle thousands of nodes will lead to the need for heavy 
processing which may not necessarily be available on low-powered devices. Besides, 
applications for the framework will vary immeasurably, so it makes sense to depict 
the specific scenarios in which the framework may be applied to in real life with 
minimal modification from its generic form, see Chapter 3.  
 
2.2 Issues Within Ad Hoc Networking 
 
There are several issues that need to be addressed in order to set up the infrastructure 
for an ad hoc network and by extension, a trust model for the ad hoc network. These 
can be categorised into two types: Physical and Trust Related. 
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2.2.1 Physical Issues 
 
Member nodes do the routing in the ad hoc network. This means all forwarding of 
physical packets relies on the performance of nodes. One of the key necessities in an 
ad hoc network is that the routing protocol used must be robust. This means that the 
number of dropped packet rates should be low, thereby maintaining a good structural 
layout of open routes for information to flow between the nodes. Robustness also 
implies that should a route failure occur, the network is able to react quickly and can 
provide alternatives. 
 
Wireless links between nodes are open and vulnerable (Cho & Swami, 2009). As 
such, they can be subject to both internal and external attacks. Internal attacks are 
caused by actions of the nodes present in the system while external attacks are 
brought upon either by foreign nodes or the external environment. 
 
Internal attacks generally involve failure of the following safeguards: 
 
• Nodes may not deliberate withhold a packet or generate a duplicate copy in 
order to dupe other nodes (Hu et al., 2003) 
• Nodes may not alter the contents of a packet they have received during 
transmission 
• They may not also intentionally drop packets 
• They may not be fair when forwarding packets, preferring some nodes over 
others (Patwardhan et al., 2005) 
• Nodes must also not provide routing information to other users that do not 
form part of the network 
• They must not introduce delays in the routing by not forwarding packets in a 
timely manner 
• They must also only move when required. A high level of mobility can 
disrupt the topology of the network which could lead to reduced performance 
or even cause its failure 
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• Nodes must not masquerade by disguising their identities, i.e., through 
providing incorrect addresses 
• Nodes must also only utilise the network when required. Flooding it with 
unnecessary requests can result in bandwidth depletion. 
 
External attacks are comprised mostly of link attacks that include passive 
eavesdropping, interference, impersonation and denial of service. Eavesdropping can 
allow access to secret information and violate the confidentiality of the network. Ad 
hoc networks are particularly vulnerable because most interactions between nodes 
may not include transmission of encrypted data as could be the case for more 
conventional wireless networks. 
 
Ad hoc networks also do not have centralised monitoring or management points. 
This responsibility is usually shared among the nodes which all act as hosts. Because 
of the lack of an established infrastructure, the usual practice of establishing a line of 
defence distinguishing nodes as trusted and non-trusted, usually through 
authentication or access control methods, is impeded. There are also no grounds for 
prior classification of nodes either as the assumption is that no a priori information 
exists. 
 
The existence of the actual network is also usually temporary and transient. Often 
this is because nodes are constantly moving and by its very nature, an ad hoc 
network is designed to be used in such situations. This means that most nodes within 
the network will often be battery powered. Access to backbone structures such as an 
electricity grid would also imply that other access could be assumed to exist such as 
an internet access point, thus making the ad hoc network redundant. Hence, the 
limited availability of power can be assumed to be almost always present whenever 
an ad hoc network is in use.  
 
Similarly because of the physical characteristics (memory, processor etc.) of the 
mobile nodes, the computational power is limited. As transistor designs are 
improved, computational power in mobile devices will no doubt increase as will the 
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locally available memory. However, most users will choose to use any extra 
resources for their personal convenience (such as storing pictures and multimedia 
messages) and this then entails that resource availability for trust or security 
evaluation will be very limited. 
 
The dynamic nature of the networks means that the network size can vary 
considerably. This means that the trust framework needs to be scalable to 
accommodate this possibility. 
 
Mobile nodes can be physically captured and therefore compromised. There is no 
scope for locking them up in secure rooms like fixed devices are. Should a host be 
compromised and go undetected, then attacks can be formed from inside the network 
as described at the beginning of this section. Hence, the design of any framework 
should avoid placing a node as an overall central entity so that the compromise of 
one entity does not risk the whole network. 
 
Compromised hosts will also mean compromised routing. Again, this is very likely 
to go undetected.  
 
While most of the physical challenges to ad hoc networks are unique in their own 
right, the biggest hurdle in establishing ad hoc trust communities is the fact that, by 
the very nature of an ad hoc network, its nodes are completely anonymous. While in 
some cases, prior interactions may have existed between some nodes, they are not 
always prevalent and members of an ad hoc community will often find themselves 
joining an initial network of complete strangers. Without the “luxury” of certificate 
authorities and peer recommendations, establishing trust becomes an even more 
challenging matter. 
 
2.2.2 Trust Issues 
 
Trust issues in ad hoc networking are closely linked to the physical issues. This is 
because most models of trust (including the one in this thesis) derive some input 
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from the way the network operates. For example, the operation of working links 
within the network has a direct impact as to how the overall level of trustworthiness 
is perceived both from an internal and external perspective.  
 
It follows that because the network has to constantly adapt to survive, there is a 
continuing threat of broken links that may not be within the influence of the network 
itself. For any given node within the network, this may mean that despite its best 
efforts, its peers may view it as untrustworthy if the links attached to it are broken by 
an intermittent connection. 
 
This gives rise to two possibilities: on the one part, it can be argued that because the 
expectation of the peers have not been met through no fault of the node’s actions, its 
trustworthiness must remain unaffected. This sounds logical since the environment 
within which the peer operates must not be an agent to its demise. Having said that, 
if viewed from the perspective of the peers, the outcome remains the same, i.e. a link 
has been broken and thus an interaction has failed.  
 
The failure of system components within the ad hoc network must also be addressed. 
This aids in promoting a robust network that can adapt to it. Therefore, the design of 
the ad hoc network and the framework for trust must accept that failure will be a 
regular occurrence and necessary measures must be put in place such that the overall 
efficiency of the network is not affected or affected with minimal disruption. One of 
the ways to achieve this is to make sure that a fully decentralised system is in 
operation as this spreads the risk of failure over a much wider remit as opposed to the 
centralised system where failure of a component at the head of the network would 
result in affecting the whole network.  
 
Another important consideration that must be had when considering trust within ad 
hoc networks is the issue in dealing with authorisation and authentication. It should 
be stressed that these are normally within the capacity of a lower level security 
system and are not normally addressed by a trust framework. For example, node 
impersonation or masquerading cannot be prevented as the assumption is that any ad 
hoc network must not be connected to a centralised infrastructure that would verify 
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credentials nor could it possess a priori information such as a common password in 
order to discern genuine entities from fake ones.  
 
However, the key to this issue is to have an appropriate trade-off. While trust models 
cannot completely eradicate such behaviour, they must be able to mitigate it. Ad hoc 
networks are transient and not designed to be set up for a long amount of time, 
already this reduces motivation for any intruder/attacker to put in the amount of 
effort required to locate and infiltrate such a network.  
 
Indeed given the two scenarios to be considered in this work (Chapter 4), the chances 
of an opportunistic intruder infiltrating the network are minimal. Even so, while a 
trust framework cannot fully prevent such intruders, the design for the ad hoc 
network must be such that it is able to recognise and punish adverse behaviour within 
the network swiftly and efficiently. This is a good way to restore the network to 
operating only with the most cooperative nodes. By keeping the safeguards simple 
and only promoting cooperation and good behaviour, trust within the ad hoc network 
can be maintained within acceptable levels for the tasks for which the framework 
was designed and within the context in which it has to operate. 
 
Having put forward some of the main issues in ad hoc networking from the 
perspective of the overall network, some requirements for a trust model for the ad 
hoc network can now be formulated: 
 
Requirement 1 
Decentralised – The trust model should be decentralised and not be dependent on 
one entity for either network or trust considerations. This includes access to central 
repositories of information. Decentralisation aids in achieving a robust network that 
can operate even when some parts of the network are affected by operational or trust 
issues (Mühlethaler, 2005; Islam, 2005). 
 
Requirement 2 
Scalability – The framework must be scalable and must be able to accommodate 
increasing amounts of nodes, assuming most are within radio range of one another. 
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This is in line with the requirement by NIST (NIST, 2006) that ad hoc network 
topologies should be easily configurable to meet specific needs and thus be scalable 
from small to large networks.  
 
Requirement 3 
Reasoning – The framework must react to changing conditions with respect to 
perceived trust levels within the network and act accordingly so as to maintain said 
trust levels within acceptable limits.  
 
The idea of reasoning using trust in distributed systems has been explored before. A 
trust management model giving autonomous entities the ability to reason about trust 
was depicted by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes (1997).  This model however was 
singularly proactive in that it did not seek to re-evaluate trust decisions once they had 
been taken. 
 
A more complex form of reasoning can be depicted in Multi-Agents Systems (see 
Section 2.3.2). However, in this thesis, reasoning is more of a reactive protocol that 
only activates only when certain outcomes are achieved (for example reacting to 
divert traffic away from an overloaded node which may have started to drop 
packets). 
 
While this may not always be possible, there may also be some benefit in 
distinguishing environmental network outages from intentional disruption. 
 
2.2.2.1 Issues with the Formation of Trust 
 
With the assumption of the unavailability of both a priori information and centralised 
repositories, it follows that trust information will have to be generated from within 
the ad hoc network such that a framework mapping their distribution can be 
generated (Shand et al, 2003). 
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Trust needs to be generated between nodes willing to cooperate and therefore the 
assignment of a trust value to entities will aid in distinguishing those that are most 
trustworthy than others (Abdul-Rahman & Hailes, 1997). During the formation stage 
of the network and with all nodes in the open, a lot of those would inevitably interact 
with one another, thus creating a history of interactions that eventually become 
relevant the longer it exists. This history attaches itself as part of a node’s 
characteristics and becomes a good indicator of the reliability expected from the 
node based on its past performance. 
 
In other instances, a node may encounter another with which it may not have had 
prior interaction (Cahill et al, 2003). Following on from typical human behaviour, 
the appropriate action would be to seek the reputation with which the interaction is to 
take place. This reputation (see Definition 7 in Section 1.1) is based on the 
interactions of others within the same system with that target node.  
 
Using reputation from other nodes introduces another set of issues in itself. For 
instance, it becomes necessary to identify where the reputation is coming from. This 
could be either a peer that is trusted by the requester node or a third-party node 
within the network that may have been recommended by the trusted node. In some 
cases, there may be localised repositories one may access in order to determine the 
reputation of a node one may wish to transact with.  
 
The other issue with obtaining a reputation from another entity is the motivation of 
said entity to provide that reputation (Capra, 2005). Good, reliable information is not 
usually free in real life and therefore it would make sense that any node providing or 
storing reputation information may need some form of payment or incentive in order 
to perform said task. 
 
To that effect, a trust framework may need to cater for several classes of nodes with 
respect to the functions they perform within the trust framework. The class of node 
may be affected by several factors ranging from the longevity of its presence within 
the network to the number of previous interactions it may have had with other nodes 
within its vicinity. 
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By creating a class of node one may deduce the reliability of the reputation 
information provided based on the source of such an opinion. 
 
The above issues thus allow for some additional requirements to be introduced with 
respect to creating a trust framework. 
 
Requirement 4 
Trust information – The framework must be able to generate trust information. This 
is to be calculated by an entity based on the past interactions of said entity with 
another entity. 
 
Although this by itself is a most basic requirement of a trust model, the information 
generated by the framework must be in a mathematical (numerical preferably) format 
such that it can be easily combined with other similar trust information in order to 
provide a more balanced view. This notion of observe and infer was also addressed 
in the SECURE project (Cahill et al., 2005). 
 
Requirement 5 
Trust recommendation – The framework must provide a way for the reputation of a 
node to be generated and held within a network based on previous interactions within 
the network. The concept of reputation allows for a node to be able to interact with a 
hitherto unknown node by requesting this information from a trusted third-party.  
 
Reputation is a common and generally accepted way of reviewing a node’s 
trustworthiness. Models utilising this concept are further reviewed in Section 2.4. 
 
Requirement 6 
Reward or payment scheme – In order to incentivise nodes to provide reputation 
information about third parties to their peers, a system of reward or payment should 
be implemented within the framework such that nodes are justly compensated for the 
extra resources they dispense in order to perform these additional tasks. 
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Quite often, this aspect is neglected in trust frameworks and cooperation is 
erroneously (in the view of this thesis) assumed (Abdul-Rahman & Hailes, 1997). 
The importance of having incentive schemes for trust frameworks was also 
highlighted by Capra (2005). 
 
Requirement 7 
Classes of node – Once the network is set up and connections have been formed 
between nodes, classes of nodes may naturally start to emerge. It would be desirable 
to make this a feature of any given framework. Nodes that operate selflessly in the 
network and therefore develop a high work/reward ratio can be given a higher status 
within the network. Other factors such as longevity of the node’s existence within the 
network may also be taken into account. Nodes which achieve higher status could 
thus be responsible for more sensitive processes within the network.  
 
While there are other models that operate with super peers or localised network 
heads (see Section 2.4.5), this work believes the best practice is to assign specific 
tasks (especially in reputation calculation) to the higher classes of node, while at the 
same time relieving them from routing networking tasks. 
 
Requirement 8 
Repositories – Although not strictly necessary, it may be preferable that higher 
classes of nodes be allowed to hold reputation information across the network. Such 
nodes can act as localised repositories allowing quick access to reputation 
information. This may also aid robustness in the network by reducing the risk of 
false recommendations being spread throughout the network. 
 
Requirement 8 is in line with the assumption in Requirement 7 that only certain 
classes of nodes be allowed to compute and store reputation information. 
Requirement 8 is in fact a by-product of Requirement 7 in that by allowing localised 
heads only to store the trust information, local repositories are being formed across 
the network that grant access quick access to reputation information. The 
geographical proximity of querying nodes also reduces overheads on the network as 
well as aid robustness as described above. 
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2.2.2.2 Issues in Trust Management 
 
Once the ad hoc network is up and running with trust distributed throughout the 
network via relations between nodes, it is important to maintain the data about the 
level of trust within the network up to date. The assignment of a trust level to a 
particular node represents a type of contractual agreement that the node is expected 
to behave in a particular manner. Any deviation from the set of expectations for that 
node must invariably result in its trust level being updated. 
 
Furthermore, during the initial stage of trust formation, there are a high number of 
unknown nodes and it is quite possible that some trust relationships would have been 
formed with so-called rogue or misbehaving nodes. The continuous assessment of 
nodes while the network is operating ensures that those relationships are rapidly 
identified as flawed and the network takes appropriate measures to negate their 
effect. 
 
In other instances, there will be times when some entities will not be able to perform 
to the set of expectations assigned to it by virtue of its trust level. This may be for 
several reasons ranging from selfish behaviour to more operational causes such as 
the scarcity of resources (for example when a node reaches critical power levels). As 
far as trust is concerned, the framework will need to re-evaluate or even isolate such 
entities for the benefit of others within the network. 
 
Therefore from a trust maintenance point of view, the following additional 
requirements would be necessary in a model of trust. 
 
Requirement 9 
Constant evaluation – The model must provide a way for an entity’s trust value to be 
varied over time. This variation must be as a direct consequence of the behaviour of 
the entity towards its peer. Each observation of the peer must therefore result in 
causing an update to the trust value of the entity such that it is always accurate when 
requested at any point in time. 
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Periodic re-evaluation is a feature of some models reviewed in Section 2.4. However, 
the manner of the reputation refresh tends to vary. The model in this work opts for 
temporal variation of reputation, including concepts such as the gradual decay of 
trust reputation (see model in Chapter 3). 
 
Requirement 10 
Isolation – In extreme circumstances, it may be necessary for an entity to be revoked 
from the network membership. This may be to several reasons, some of which may 
not be malicious in nature. For example, an entity that has run out of battery or 
whose hardware has malfunctioned will be of little use to the network as a whole. Its 
removal from the list of member nodes must be a feature of the network as otherwise 
resources may be lost on attempting to communicate with it based on historical 
information. 
 
This concept is analogous to the idea of social control mechanisms where malicious 
peers are revoked from the network based purely on observational methods and 
without relying on central databases or a given third party (Rasmusson & Janson, 
1996). 
 
2.2.2.3 Other Trust Issues 
 
There are other aspects of trust that need to be addressed within the ad hoc network. 
By creating different classes of node, the network may promote localised groupings 
of trust within the network as entities become more attuned to the types of 
neighbours they would like to congregate with.  
 
For example, there may be associations between entities based on the type of content 
they wish to share (for example a gaming network or individuals sharing music), 
there may also be associations on the basis of interaction history. Nodes may also 
aggregate if they have had interactions prior to joining the network. Although this is 
not a requirement for a trust model, it follows that should the information be 
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available, the network should make use of it as it would enhance the reliability of 
information and promote the distribution of trust more quickly around the network. 
 
Another issue that needs to be recognised is that trust is context dependent (Nguyen 
& Camp, 2008). This means that a trust value is only relevant if future expectations 
of the node are within the context within which the trust value was generated. Within 
a trust model for the ad hoc network, such distinctions may at times be necessary. In 
most cases, the context across the network will remain the same as a spontaneous ad 
hoc network will most likely be set up for a particular reason and the overall goal of 
the network would be the same (for instance a network specifically set up for a 
rescue operation). Nevertheless, a complete trust model must be able to define trust 
value within its contextual profile. 
 
Finally, with respect to the trust lifecycle, it is important that measures be in place 
when entities reorganise. This can involve them leaving the network altogether or 
changing geographical positions within the network due to having higher affinities to 
a different association. 
 
The above issues would require the following features to be available when 
considering a trust model.  
 
Requirement 11 
Selective grouping – Network associations must be allowed and encouraged within 
the network. While a fully distributed model is advocated, the presence of groups 
within the network will enhance a trust framework in two ways. Firstly, members of 
a group will find it easier to update and exchange information, as they will hold 
stronger ties. Secondly, the presence of groups may make collusion attacks more 
detectable as the model will also promote group monitoring as opposed to only node 
monitoring on an individual basis. 
 
Grouping also known as clustering is further explored among similar models in 
Section 2.4.5. 
 




Using external information – Although the assumption is made that no a priori 
information should be available when an ad hoc network is being formed, the model 
should have a feature that enables such information to be positively used to enhance 
the trust formation process. Often, there will be social links between entities prior to 
joining the network – it will be highly beneficial to include these factors in the 
determination of trustworthiness. 
 
Requirement 13 
Contextual aspect of trust – The trust values calculated and distributed across the 
network must specify the context in which they were generated. This is especially 
relevant when members of a network, although having a loose overall goal, may 
have localised specialised interests. In such scenarios, it becomes crucial that nodes 
are aware of the type of trust information they are receiving. Any such information 
would only be relevant for the peer within the context in which the trust information 
has been generated and stored.  
 
The SECURE model (Cahill et al, 2005) outline this concept that trust is only valid 
within a given context. Other models using contextual information are Capra (2004) 
and Nguyen and Camp (2005). The latter in their work seek to use contextual 
information in order to improve the trust evaluation process. Their definition of 
context is more complex than the two former works in that they consider context as 
being determined by environmental factors which influence communications 
between a client and a server. 
 
Requirement 14 
Enabling migration – Nodes may often wish to move to other parts of the network 
where they may not have had much prior interaction. The network must provide a 
way for the trust information associated with a node to be appropriately passed 
across a network as the node migrates. When utilising a fully distributed system, the 
trust information will not be held centrally. All local repositories would not hold the 
same information, hence the need for a node’s history to be made transferable in 
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order to distinguish it from a new member node as considerable effort and resources 
would have been put in for a node to achieve its trust value. 
 
Requirement 14 helps to improve the efficiency of the network in a similar way to 
the synergies provided by the use of grouping mechanisms. 
 
2.3  General Literature Review 
 
The following section will briefly review two sections of the literature that, although 
relevant to the main focus of this thesis, are not part of its core scope. However, in 
order to situate the context of this work, such a review is necessary: 
 
1. in order to understand the origins of the concept of trust (Section 2.3.1). 
2. to provide the larger picture of where the work sits by quoting other major 
bodies of work in trust that have been/are being undertaken alongside that in 
ad hoc networks (Section 2.3.2). 
 
2.3.1 Trust Literature & Social Models 
 
Having reviewed the ad hoc network as a system and the issues and challenges it 
presents when seeking to establish trust, the focus of this review will now be on the 
actual concept of trust. Trust was initially defined within Section 1.1 as were the 
various concepts associated with trust such as reputation. However, in order to 
understand its relevance in ad hoc networks, it is necessary to study its origin and the 
benefits it provides. Trust in computational models stems from trust in social and 
psychological theory and indeed, the meaning of trust itself has not changed.  
 
To that effect, a review of trust as a concept within the literature follows. This is 
deliberately kept short as the evolution of trust in social theory is not the focus of this 
thesis. The review, while not exhaustive, provides an overview of how trust is seen 
within other fields and its relevance to computational models. The transition from 
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social to computational trust is taken from previous work completed within the field 
(Gambetta, 1990).  
 
The concept of trust has been widely studied in the literature (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; 
Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975) and many sociologists have ventured definitions. 
According to Marsh (Marsh, 1994), four researchers in trust can be regarded as 
major contributors in the field: Morton Deutsch (Deutsch, 1962 & 1973), Niklas 
Luhmann (Luhmann, 1979), Bernard Barber (Barber, 1983) and Diego Gambetta 
(Gambetta, 2000). Of these four researchers, Gambetta provides the probabilistic 
definition of trust that is the most formal and therefore the most adaptable to a 
computational model of trust. 
 
Gambetta presents the following definition of trust: 
 
“Trust (or symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability 
with which an agent assesses another agent or group of agents will perform a 
particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently or his 
capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context which affects his own actions.  
When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean 
that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not 
detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of 
cooperation with him. 
 
Correspondingly when we say someone is untrustworthy, we imply that that 
probability is low enough for us to refrain from doing so.” 
 
From this definition, Gambetta uses values to depict trust. The use of values allows a 
more precise interpretation of specific circumstances in trusting behaviour. Gambetta 
uses values in the range of 0 to 1. He defines trust as a probability (as above), 
whereby 1 represents implicit trust and 0 complete distrust.  
 
There are however some limiting factors to Gambetta’s definitions. For instance, 
trust relationships are only defined between agents without taking account the 
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environment in which the agent operates. By referring to just one dimension of trust 
(predictability), Gambetta ignores the “competence” aspect. When ‘A trusts B’, 
along with the actual decision, there is also the act of relying upon B.  Social 
reasoning is complex and Gambetta’s subjective probability merges several key 
parameters and beliefs. 
 
He nevertheless makes a very important comment in his work (Gambetta, 1990). He 
points out that trust can never do worse than sustained distrust in any given scenario. 
On the contrary, it might do better, even if it is only marginally so. This means that 
agents and nodes are likely to relate much better to one another within an 
unpredictable world, should they be aware of the usefulness of trust. In fact, 
Gambetta’s work is the most relevant to this current research, especially in terms of 
its conceptual building blocks. For the remainder of this thesis, trust will be broadly 
assumed to be a subjective probability with which an agent assesses another agent or 
group of agents. The term “agent” is loosely used here and subjective probability 
refers to the individual nature of the assessment of trust, in that the probability is 
derived based on the personal, therefore subjective, observations of one particular 
node (more in Section 2.3.1.2).  
 
2.3.1.1 Types of Trust 
 
Usually, trust encompasses human personality as well as social formal systems. 
(Abdul-Rahman, 2000; Luhmann, 1979). 
 
According to McKnight et al. (McKnight & Chervany, 1996), in any social 
interaction, there are any of the following two or three entities that are involved: an 
entity, an agent with which it interacts and the environment. They identify three 
types of trust: 
 
1. System Trust (Structural/Impersonal Trust) – This refers to any trust relation 
that is not involving the property or state of a trustee, but rather the property of the 
environment within which it operates. For instance mobile users trust their network 
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to correctly encrypt and secure their conversations. This is defined as system trust in 
the network.  
 
2. Dispositional Trust – This refers to the trust of the trustor. It does not depend 
therefore on any other entity or situation. An entity’s disposition to trust is reflected 
by the initial trust it chooses to give and its reactions to feedback affecting such trust. 
(Rotter 1967; Brann & Foddy, 1987) in (Abdul-Rahman,  2000). There are further 
subdivisions of dispositional trust. Type A deals with the trustor’s belief that entities 
are generally trustworthy and should thus be treated accordingly. On the other hand, 
Type B trust takes the view that a more positive outcome is possible if one acts as if 
the trustee is really trusted, irrespective of whether the trustee is trustworthy or not. 
 
3. Interpersonal Trust – This type of trust is one that depends on the properties of 
the trustee. The latter has the power to affect how the trustor views him/her by 
exhibiting corresponding behaviours.  
 
Abdul-Rahman (2000) also introduces a final type of trust called blind trust, which 
can fall under each category of trust described above. Blind trust, as its name 
suggests, implies an extreme form of trust that persists even when there is evidence 
that discourages such trust from being maintained (Luhmann, 1988). 
 
2.3.1.2 Representations of Trust 
 
According to Abdul-Rahman, there are five different ways of representing trust. 
These are categorised namely by a relation, a subjective probability, a threshold, 
dispositional trust and a belief.  
 
Relation 
From the very basic definitions of trust, it has been identified to be a three-part 
relation to the effect of: 
 
X trusts Y about A 
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In the above example, X and Y are entities that are involved in the trust process, i.e. 
the trustor and the trustee while A is the action about which X trusts Y for. This 




In depicting trust as a subjective probability Gambetta assigned certain specific 
values for his trust semantics. These were 0 to denote complete distrust, 0.5 for an 
uncertainty and 1 for complete trust. A number of theoretical trust models have used 
this representation, sometimes including a modification whereby complete distrust is 
expressed as -1 instead of 0.  
 
However, the meaning of the values assigned by Gambetta are ambiguous to say the 
least. There can be no comparative analysis between different scenarios. For 
instance, because of the discrete trust values, two entities exhibiting different levels 
of trustworthiness may both be classed as 1. This therefore makes this unsuitable for 
proper implementation in practical computational models and may only operate as an 
intuitive method of assigning trustworthiness. 
 
Trustworthiness 
It is important to note that trustworthiness implies a property that is inherent to an 
entity. This is different to trust which is more of a varying relationship between a 
trustor and its trustee. Gambetta highlighted the difference between the two as 
follows (Gambetta, 2000): 
 
‘Trustworthiness’ concentrates on a person’s overall disposition, his motivation, the 
extent to which he awards importance to his own honesty. Being able to trust a 
person to do what he said he would, on the other hand, requires us to know not only 
something of his disposition, but also something of the circumstances surrounding 
the occasion at hand. If the incentives are ‘right’, even a trustworthy person can be 
relied upon to be untrustworthy. 
 
 




Abdul-Rahman also brings up the notion of trust as threshold, mainly based on the 
works of Luhman and Gambetta. The threshold is defined as a point beyond which 
an entity may choose to trust or not. Originally meant as a way to simplify decision-
making, the threshold is a minimalist mechanism to define trustworthiness and 
untrustworthiness.  
 
This may be useful in certain situations in practical life where an entity may only 
need to make conscious decisions with respect to a variety of possibilities, such as 
which shop to choose to buy something or which airline to fly. These are decisions 
where a clear-cut demarcation is appropriate and even desirable.  
 
However, in most computational scenarios being investigated pertaining to ad hoc 
networks, there is often the need to choose between, philosophically speaking, the 
better of two goods, or the lesser of two evils. In mathematical terms, it is necessary 
to have a mechanism in place that can distinguish between two trustworthy entities 
(for instance both displaying trust values above 0.5 on a continuous scale ranging 
from 0 to 1).  
 
Dispositional Trust 
This model proposed by Hardin (Hardin, 1993) represents levels of dispositional 
trust that is acquired via a constant re-evaluation of an entity’s predisposition to trust, 
based on experience. It is in direct contrast to trust that is bestowed arbitrarily.  
 
Using his trust model, where he assumes the trust distribution to be linear between 
0% and 100%, Hardin proposes a scheme whereby positive pay-offs occur when 
trust is not betrayed and conversely negative pay-offs occur when there is a betrayal 
of trust. This results in having two straight curves for high trust and low trust, with a 
break-even point that denotes the optimum balance usually present in the “objective 
real world”. 
 




Figure 2.4: Hardin’s trust model (adapted from Hardin, 1993) 
 
Hardin acknowledges some limitations of his work. The relative sizes of loss and 
gain are not defined and there is no mention of situational trust where different levels 
of trust would have to be applied. He also attributes the model as half-strategic with 
no “sophistication to the trustee” and ways of learning are also ignored.  
 
Belief 
The last representation of trust is the subjective notion of belief and encompasses the 
previous representations described above. This brings us back to the definition of 
trust as a subjective belief rather than a property or relationship that is existent 
between two entities.  
 
Having briefly surveyed the notions of trust within the social literature, the next stage 
of the review is to focus on other major bodies of work that have implemented trust 
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2.3.2 Parallel Research in Trust 
 
Trust within computing takes many forms with work being done in various areas 
across wired and wireless networks using hierarchal or distributed models. This work 
itself is an application of the trust concept within the wider area of distributed 
computing. In such systems, the various components of a network are spread in a 
decentralised fashion and are consistently subject to change throughout the system’s 
lifetime (Ramchurn, 2004).  
 
Examples of environments in which distributed computing is in operation are the 
Grid (Foster and Kesselman, 1998), the semantic web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001), 
web services (Seth, 2003), e-business (Kersten and Lo, 2001), m-commerce (Tveit, 
2001; Vulkan, 1999), pervasive computing environments (Satyanaranayan, 2001), 
autonomic computing (Kephart and Chess, 2003) and peer-to-peer computing 
(Ripeanu et al., 2002) of which this current work is a subset. 
  
A common computation model used in some of the distributed environments detailed 
above is agent based computing (Jennings, 2001). There is a parallel to be drawn 
between the concept of an agent as defined by the Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
community as a whole and that of a network node model. An agent is something that 
acts – computer agents “operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist 
over a prolonged time period, adapt to change and create and pursue goals.” (Russell 
& Norvig, 2010). The network node model can be mostly perceived to be a “rational 
agent”, i.e. one that acts in order to achieve the best outcome, or in the case of 
uncertainty, the best expected outcome. A common basic design for a rational agent 
is a reflex agent that fires actions in response to input environment events that are 
filtered with respect to some condition or rule. 
 
According to Woodridge and Jennings (1995), agents must display the properties  of 
reactivity (the ability to respond to changes), proactiveness (the ability to seek 
opportunities to satisfy goals) and social ability (the ability to interact with other 
agents in order to satisfy its goals).  
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Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) can be used as a formal reasoning model in order to 
implement trust. Trust in MAS revolves around individual-level trust and system-
level trust. According to Ramchurn (2004), individual-level trust exists whereby an 
agent has some beliefs (for e.g. honesty or reliability) about its interaction partners 
and system-level trust exists when the participants are forced to be honest by 
protocols and mechanisms that regulate the system. In fact, while the individual-level 
trust models allow for an agent to reason about its level of trust in its partners, the 
system-level mechanisms seek to ensure that the actions of these partners can be 
actually trusted.  
 
Therefore, formal reasoning at an individual-level can take place in three different 
ways: 
 
1. Using learning and evolutionary models: this occurs when agents reason about 
strategies to be used with trustworthy and untrustworthy partners, for instance by 
reciprocating their trust or being selfish. 
 
2. Using reputation models: this involves reasoning about the trust information 
gathered by different means either directly or indirectly through reputation models 
about potential partners. 
 
3. Using socio-cognitive models: this happens when agents reason about the 
motivations and capabilities of their partners to decide whether to believe in their 
trustworthiness. 
 
System-level trust on the other hand force agents to act truthfully via the following 3 
methods: 
 
1. Using mechanisms that promote trustworthy interaction: this involves creating 
conditions that would deactivate the operation of agents that do not abide by them. 
 
2. Using reputation mechanisms: this involves using reputation to enhance or reduce 
future interactions of agents depending on how well or not they behave. 
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3. Using security mechanisms: this involves specifying strict standards of conduct 
that agents must satisfy and consistently maintain in order to be part of the system. 
 
Individual-level trust and system-level trust can therefore be depicted according to 
Figure 2.5.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Approaches to Trust in Multi-Agent Systems  
(adapted from Ramchurn, 2004) 
 
These approaches to trust in MAS are relevant to the work in this thesis in that they 
provide the basis (and justification) for merging social-based reasoning along with 
the rigours of computational rules and processes. Agents, however, are complex 
autonomous agents. The peers depicted in this current work are not assumed to be 
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complex, although the trust framework may be expanded to accommodate additional 
complexity. However, one of the main aims of this work is as a proof of concept – 
the scope of the research will therefore be restricted to behaviours that are simple 
enough to not require complex reasoning, yet, relevant enough that they produce the 
kind of trust information required for the proof of concept. 
 
The work in this thesis also forms part of a subset of peer-to-peer networks, since it 
focuses primarily on pure ad hoc networks as defined in Chapter 1. Some aspects of 
agent trust will therefore be reflected in the properties of the peers depicted within 
the model since the work finds itself within the wider remit of distributed computing.  
 
However, before defining the trust framework, a review of the state of the art within 
the specific domain of ad hoc networks is necessary such that the proposed model is 
able to build on existing knowledge and extend it further. 
 
2.4 State of the Art: Trust Models in Ad Hoc Networks 
 
Trust models in the literature can be classified broadly in to centralised and 
decentralised models. However, centralised models tend to be within the remit of 
those models with a backbone infrastructure and access to centralised data. eBay’s 
feedback system (eBay, 2009) is a good example of a centralised trust system that 
aggregates user opinions on a central database. The information is collated by a 
central entity, processed by that same central entity and is then public for all to view. 
This is a feature of most centralised models.  
 
While centralised models offer to meet several requirements of a trust framework 
(namely Requirements 4 (trust calculation), 5 (reputation calculation), 9 (re-
evaluation of trust information) and 13 (some context of trust)), they pose several 
restrictions with regards to the other Requirements. For example, they are not 
scablable nor are they able to use additional information in order to enhance their 
information.  
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Centralised models are also very inappropriate for ad hoc networks both from a trust 
perspective and for operational reasons (as explained in Section 2.2). In fact, of all 
the literature reviewed, only one model used a centralised architecture (Davis, 2004). 
This was a scheme run by certificates whereby a node is not trusted until it presents a 
certificate issued by a central authority, with the assumption that said certificate has 
not been previously revoked nor expired.  
 
The following review of models in ad hoc networks therefore all refer to 
decentralised systems and it can be assumed that all of them therefore meet 
Requirement 1 (decentralised model) as will the model proposed by this thesis. They 
are classified according to the methods they employ. Where there is a mixture of 
methods employed, the models are classified according to the most relevant one. 
 
2.4.1 Certificate-based Models 
 
These denote models that convey trustworthiness by exchanging what they term as 
“reliable” certificates to which an entity’s identity and history is bound. Trust as a 
terminology is used rather loosely and sometimes interchangeably with security. The 
model for certification generally follows a four-part pattern namely: 
 
1. Issuing of Certificate 
2. Storage of Certificate 
3. Certificate Validation  
4. Revocation of Certificate. 
 
While the method proclaims that steps 2-4 are performed locally, that is not the case 
for step 1 which depends on a Certificate Authority (CA) to issue valid certificates.  
 
This is a very big assumption and a very significant limitation as far as the definition 
of ad hoc networks goes. For instance, a priori information is not allowed in any 
transaction that occurs between nodes, let alone the existence of pre-issued 
certificates. In this case, the usage of such certificates would immediate pose certain 
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problems whereby all nodes will have to reach a certain agreement about which 
online CAs are trustworthy or not. This is unlikely to be a trivial matter and 
furthermore the scheme is not immune from forged certificates that would allow a 
rogue node to operate at free will within the network, thereby bringing it into 
jeopardy. “Trust” schemes using certificates could simply be reclassified as an 
access-control mechanism which allows nodes to enter/leave a network based on 
credentials issued by a third party.  Models using certificates generally only meet one 
of the requirements of a trust model other than Requirement 1 (Requirement 2 – 
scalability). 
 
One such model which utilises certificates is that by K. Ren et al (2004) which 
proposes a distributed trust approach which claims to build well established trust 
reputation systems without relying on any predefined assumption. Resilience towards 
nodes’ dynamically leaving/joining and scalability are also the aim of this project.  
 
Formalisation of the model is done via a probabilistic method based on a trust 
digraph model. The authors assume that a certificate graph G(V,E) represents the 
public keys and certificates of their system, where V and E are the set of vertices and 
edges respectively. The vertices denote the binding of public keys and their IDs 
whereas the edges represent the certificates. As shown in the Figure below, a 
directed edge from a given node i (public key of node i) to node j (public key of node 
j) will exist if there is a certificate signed with the private key of i that binds the 
identifier of node j  and its public key. A certificate chain from i to j is represented 
by a directed path from vertex i to vertex j in G. Trust is therefore established 
whenever two nodes are connected and the certificate chain represents the trust 
chain.  
 




Figure 2.6: Trust chains showing directed paths between vertices indicating a certificate chain 
(Ren et al., 2004) 
 
However, before such a stage is reached, the authors define what they term as a 
bootstrapping phase – which represents the initial interaction between nodes. While 
the initial claim was that this method did not rely on any predefined assumption, the 
bootstrapping phase involves the introduction of a secret dealer to facilitate the 
initialisation process. The dealer is defined as an external entity that enjoys a long-
standing trust relationship with all the nodes that cannot be questioned. An example 
of a secret dealer would be, according to the authors, a telecommunications provider 
that is common to all the nodes. The dealer pre-computes an individual secret short 
list that it then distributes to each member node. This short list contains a node 
identifier and its subsequent public key. The node then issues its own certificate from 
its own domain and stores it locally.  
 
The bootstrapping phase therefore makes the very crucial assumption of the 
availability of a priori information from a secret dealer. Again this entails access to 
some fixed network infrastructure and also readily assumes that all present nodes 
will necessarily have a long-standing relationship with that provider. This is not only 
unrealistic but also very unlikely given the number of primary and secondary 
telecommunications providers available within any given location. Furthermore, the 
method does not provide for any alternative to the current bootstrapping phase. This 
makes this approach very weak, should a common secret dealer not be available. 
This model therefore only meets Requirements 1 (decentralised model) and 2 
(scalability). 
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Another model that utilises certificates is by Ren and Boukerche (2008). This model 
additionally meets Requirements 4 and 5 (the ability to compute trust and reputation) 
but uses a central node in order to authenticate new nodes. While this central node is 
group-based, the authentication is via public keys and utilises encryption in order to 
protect password secrecy. This may enhance security but not necessarily trust as the 
latter is achieved by promoting interaction between nodes. Furthermore, the use of 
authentication and encryption poses additional load on the network which can be a 
critical factor in open environments where limited resources are available. 
 
A variant of the certificate method is a model by employed here by Keoh et al (2003) 
revolves around a doctrine, which is a specification for trust, defined here as the 
expectation that nodes within an ad hoc network will enforce rules defined by such a 
doctrine. The latter is itself a template that is parameterised by participants within the 
ad hoc community and then made available to anyone to sign up to before joining the 
network. Information available in the doctrine includes role type specifications, user 
role assignment policies and policies governing behaviour or entities assigned to the 
roles. Each role has a defined set of credentials and when a new participant wishes to 
join the community, they have to ensure that those credential requirements are 
fulfilled. Once access is granted the new participant can then perform its role based 
on what is allowed in the doctrine. The use of the doctrine means that this model 
additionally meets Requirement 12 (additional information). 
 
Credentials are verified here again by means of public key certificates which are 
issued by Certificate Authorities (CAs) and Attribute Authorities (AAs). It is 
therefore another requirement that public key information of CAs and AAs has to be 
included within the doctrine to ensure a seamless verification process.  The 
alternative to such verification as stated by Keoh, for instance in a community where 
all exchanges are strictly P2P with no access to any fixed network infrastructure, 
entities have to rely solely on the information they have between themselves. 
However, such an alternative is not developed nor is a method of achieving it 
proposed. The assumption that at least one device will have a prevalent intermittent 
connection to a fixed backbone is justified as being the most realistic scenario.  
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Again, like most other methods, the access to offline or external data is inherently 
assumed and relied upon for the successful implementation of the community. In the 
absence of such data, the community would most likely fail as there is no specific 
strictly P2P exclusive infrastructure which can kick in as an alternative. Furthermore, 
there are several definitions such as user and configuration policies that are included 
in the doctrine but the way in which those are achieved or rather the rationale behind 
them is not clearly explained.  
 
2.4.2 Reputation-based Methods 
 
Reputation-based methods are those where the focus of the model is on generating 
reputation information for the nodes in the network and in this respect, they all meet 
Requirement 5 (calculating reputation).  
 
Schweitzer et al. (2006) describes a mechanism for propagating trust and 
consolidating it within ad hoc networks. This involves building trust relationships 
and making the entities autonomous so that they are able to make decisions without 
referring to a central network. Nodes within the network therefore request trust 
information about an unknown entity from other nodes that they already trust within 
the network. Based on the recommendations received from the trustworthy nodes, 
the requester can then update and consolidate its current trust rating for the new 
unknown entity.  These functions additionally meet Requirements 3 (reasoning), 4 
(calculating trust) and partially 9 (constant evaluation). 
 
Any change that occurs within the network for a given trust rating is propagated 
throughout the network so that tables are updated. There are three basic operations 
for this to occur which are namely simple, transitive and consensus operations. These 
operations are largely based on the work of Dempster and Shafer (Smets, 1990), 
Martucci (Martucci et al., 2004) and Josang (Josang et al., 2003).  
 
The method in this case therefore makes a few assumptions: 
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1. The recommending trustworthy nodes have some trust information about the 
new entity. However, despite the fact that for n entities within the network, 
there will be (n-1)
n
 searches for trust information, the latter may not always 
be available. This limitation particularly highlights the fact that this trust 
mechanism, although it is able to propagate and consolidate trust, is not able 
to generate trust information from scratch without having recourse to existing 
recommendations.  
 
2. Furthermore, the method does not take into account that trust information can 
decay over time. While trust changes are propagated throughout the network, 
natural decay is not taken into consideration. Even if this were to be 
implemented using the same propagation method, it could increase the 
overhead dramatically within the network, depending on how often trust 
refresh cycles are performed. 
 
3. To achieve security within the mechanism and increase confidence in the 
authenticity of a recommendation, each recommendation must be signed 
using a certificate issued by a recognised and known CA. The authors further 
recommend that such information be sent over a secure encrypted channel. 
While the above statements make the mechanism of trust propagation more 
secure, it nevertheless reduces the importance of such a mechanism to a mere 
security-enhancing feature. If encryption, CAs and certificates were to be 
readily available, then the existence of a trust mechanism on top of that is 
superfluous as relatively robust security can be obtained via existing 
protocols that have been well defined within the wireless security literature. 
 
The method therefore does not satisfy the requirements of an autonomous trust 
mechanism as it is unable to operate independently from other existing options such 
as encryption and CAs. The loose definition of trust as merely a person’s knowledge 
and confidence in another user’s behaviour and reputation, also overlaps with the 
authors’ notions of security. 
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Another trust model that uses trust metrics, this time in terms of predefined trust 
levels is the work by Liu et al (Liu et al., 2004) where the definition of trust is taken 
as the “reliability, timeliness and integrity of message delivery to their intended next-
hop”. The work by Liu et al proposes a trust model that is based on the update of 
trust levels throughout a given ad hoc network by the use of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) that are installed on all nodes operating in the network. Reports from 
IDSs, generated after suspicious activity is detected, then flood the rest of the 
network by means of trust reports, thereby causing all nodes to update their trust 
levels for given suspicious nodes. The target application here is the calculation of 
more secure routes when transmitting messages. Source nodes are able to use trust 
levels as a guide to that effect. 
 
The trust levels used in this work are discrete and are therefore only very broad 
representations of actual reputations. 
 
Ranging from compromised to highest, the trust levels are not precisely defined in 
semantic terms. While the authors term their detection systems on the nodes as 
Intrusion Detection Systems, those systems are also expected to reward nodes for 
good behaviour by increasing their trust levels. For initialisation, nodes are expected 
to have been pre-authenticated.  Those who have not been authenticated are assigned 
trust value of “Unknown” while at the same time being allowed to enjoy the same 
privileges as nodes in a higher trust category. In fact, the discrimination in the 
various categories is unclear to the extent that in real terms, the system boils down to 
a two-category trust level scenario: compromised and trustworthy.  
 
A third method that uses reputation is by Rebahi et al. (2005).  Reputation is defined 
simply as “the perception that a node has of another’s intention and norms.” 
 
Reputation is achieved by means of a module called the Trust Manager that sits on 
top of every node and monitors packet forwarding. There are four functionalities as 
detailed in Figure 2.6. 
 
There are several limitations in this model which are detailed as follows:  
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Reputation is mainly achieved by monitoring packets forward versus packets sent. 
While previous reputations are catered for, the time factor is not taken into account 
and the natural decay of trust is not considered. In fact, the reputation concept is very 
vague and the notion of confidence in a reputation does not arise. Any node can 
monitor any other of its 1-hop neighbour and distribute reputation information. This 
makes the system very weak against colluding attacks.  
 
  
Figure 2.7: The Trust Manager: a trust module including four functionalities monitoring packet 
forwarding (Rebahi et al., 2005) 
 
Furthermore, reputation is defined as any number between 0 and 1. Yet, when new 
nodes are introduced to one another, they are assigned a default value of 1, which is 
the highest possible. In other words, new nodes are being treated as fully trustworthy 
by the system whereas existing nodes may have to work to earn privileges to operate. 
Because reputation depends solely on packet data, nodes that do not forward packets 
are not treated as misbehaving, in other words, uncooperative nodes are not detected 
or punished. Collaboration is assumed at all stages of the process, from normal 
routing to malicious packet dropping. 
 
There are other methods within the literature that utilise the concept of reputation. 
Dewan et al. (2004) utilise reputation to route packets in terms of the most 
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trustworthy routes as opposed to using the usual shortest path algorithms typically 
found in most routing mechanisms.  
 
The idea of trust-based routing is also shared by Pirzada (Pirzada & McDonald, 
2004). However, in this case, the definitions of trust are rather more explicit. Trust is 
quantified by assigning weights to specific events being monitored. Weights are 
assigned by each node based on their own criteria and circumstances. Aggregate trust 
levels are determined from individual trust values of events for a specific node, based 
on the different weighting systems. The weights in this case have a continuous range 
from 0 to +1 to represent the significance of a particular event. The authors do not 
specify how these weights are assigned, only that they vary based on the type of 
application, state of the network, time and the node’s own criteria and circumstances. 
There is no predefined standard way in which weights can be reliably assigned to 
different events. This results in a large number of permutations and unless some 
consistency is proven across the mechanism, the trust values could fluctuate 
uncontrollably between its defined bounds of -1 and +1. 
 
Two other methods relying on reputation are by Liu & Issarny (2004) where 
reputation is represented numerically between -1 and +1 and Yan et al. (2005) who 
utilise experience statistics. 
 
All these methods meet Requirements 1 to 5 with Rebahi et al.’s model also meeting 
Requirement 9 (constant evaluation). 
 
2.4.3 Directed Graph Modelling 
 
The authors Theodorakopoulos and Baras (2004) define trust here as a set of 
relations between entities that participate in various protocols. The focus here is on 
the evaluation of trust evidence, dealing more specifically with the trust metric itself 
(Requirement 4). 
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In particular, collection of evidence from the network, as well as communication and 
signalling overheads, are not taken into consideration. The evaluation process here is 
basically a “weighted, directed graph” The definitions are that nodes represent users 
and edges represent the direct trust relations weighted by the amount of trust a given 
user A places on user B. All interactions are local. Because each user only has direct 
relations with other users it has previously interacted with, the process of 
establishing a trust relation between two users that have not previously interacted is 
achieved by using the direct trust relations of intermediate nodes.  
Nodes form opinions of others and this is represented on a weighted directed graph. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Opinion Space showing the formation of opinions from nodes, derived from trust 
and confidence values (Theodorakopoulos and Baras, 2004) 
 
Each opinion in this case consists of the trust value and the confidence value. The 
trust value represents the trustworthiness of a given node and the confidence value is 
defined as the belief that a node’s public key belongs to it.  
 
This method is useful in the sense that it does not require any centralised 
infrastructure in order to work. Users merely base their opinion on second-hand (or 
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2.4.4 Statistical Models 
 
Statistical models of trust are usually based on a Bayesian approach (Buchegger & 
Le Boudec, 2004) that proposes the theory for the trust framework. A recent model 
for the ad hoc network based on such a theory is by Li et al (2007). 
 
The trust management framework is proposed to be more objective than those that 
merely utilise reputation or trust based methods. They propose to use second-hand 
information to evaluate trustworthiness as opposed to relying only on direct 
observations. Along with meeting Requirements 1-5 and 9, this implies that such a 
method also utilises additional information in order to pursue its goals (Requirement 
12). 
 
The formula used for Bayesian approach is the following 
 
p(B|O) = [p(O|B)  p(B)] / Normalization Factor    (2.1) 
 
where B means belief and O denotes observation. p(B) is the prior probability density 
function for θ, p(O|B) is the likelihood function and p(B|O) is the posterior 
distribution function for θ where θ is the probability with which the subject node 
expects the object node to behave. However, because the framework of this thesis 
focuses on simple probability functions derived from Gambetta, further analysis of 
the Bayesian theory is redundant at this stage. 
 
The framework follows a four-step method θ which includes: 
1. Providing direct information to a central trust computing module 
2. Collect and process second hand information via the central trust module 
3. Evaluate a trust and confidence value based on direct and second hand information 
4. Evaluate trustworthiness from trust and confidence values. 
 
Although this method uses Bayesian theory as a differentiation from other 
conventional trust models, the claim that their framework is objective based purely 
upon second hand information is not warranted. This is because “second hand 
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information” is implied to be merely recommendation information from other nodes. 
The term is not clearly defined within the work but the implication is quite clear. 
This makes this framework no different to others that utilise reputation as a method 
because by its very definition, reputation is made up of direct observations and 
recommendations (classed as second hand information here). 
 
The framework nevertheless also includes a way to mitigate attacks by misbehaving 
nodes and therefore also fulfils Requirement 10 (isolation/banning of nodes). 
 
2.4.5 Group-based Models 
 
This type of model is designed to create sub networks within the overall framework 
based on different criteria. These sub networks are often known as groups or clusters 
(Boodnah & Poslad, 2009). 
 
Clustering in ad hoc networks has been proposed before for ad hoc networks and 
there are several existing ways in which it can be done, including methods to elect 
cluster heads. They are based on different properties of the nodes at a given time. For 
example, the connectivity-based algorithm from Gerla et al. (1995) where a cluster 
head is elected based on the node having the highest degree that is computed from 
the number of unique identifiers received from the network. Other older methods 
such as the Lowest-ID algorithm (Baker & Ephremides, 1981) are more simplistic 
whereby the node with the lowest assigned ID is elected cluster head. 
 
More recently, methods have been proposed using criteria ranging from the distance 
between nodes (Er et al, 2004) and weight-based distributed clustering algorithms 
(Chatterjee et al, 2002; Kadri et al., 2007) to geographical positioning (Seunghun et 
al., 2005). However, aside from the model by Seunghun et al. which uses certificate 
references, none of these methods and models promote the creation and distribution 
of trust. 
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Peng et al. (2008) propose a voting-based clustering algorithm that provides 
subjective trust and stability. The subjective trust from the node is accessed using a 
Bayesian method and stability is evaluated by monitoring the neighbour change ratio 
and the remaining battery power of the nodes. Subjective trust and stability are the 
two criteria via which cluster heads are elected. Although this is not a trust model per 
se, the clustering algorithm is very relevant and of interest to the work in this thesis. 
 
Aiguo et al. (2008) also propose a cluster-based trust model for ad hoc networks. The 
aim is to create inter-cluster trust by dividing nodes into clusters. They define one 
special node (as per Requirement 7 – classes of node) in each cluster to establish 
trust relationship based on previous transactions. They claim the model is scalable 
meaning it would meet Requirements 1 to 5, 8 (local repositories) and 11 (selective 
grouping). What the authors define as inter-cluster trust is really intra-cluster trust as 
the method relies upon the cluster head computing and storing all reputation 
information for all the nodes within the cluster. However the method fails to mention 
how the clusters are formed, nor how the cluster heads are elected. There also does 
not seem to be any safeguard with respect to cluster head violation. All routing also 
appears to follow a cluster-based routing pattern that would imply that cluster heads 
would get overloaded with both trust and normal routing traffic. Unless those cluster 
heads belong to a different class of device, they are bound to have their limited 
resources decrease very rapidly. As such, cluster heads could be the very first nodes 
to have to leave the network purely on operational reasons. Should this happen, then 
that particular cluster would just introduce appreciable traffic to the network 
instantly as there will be a group of nodes seeking to establish new trust relationships 
at the same time.  
 
Park et al. (2008) further extend the work of Seunghun et al (2005) in clustering by 
proposing a cluster based trust model against attacks in the ad hoc network. The 
method involves designating the node with the highest trust value as Head 
(Requirement 7) and this node is then responsible for issuing certificates to the rest 
of the cluster. When a node moves, the Head transfers the certificate the adjoining 
cluster. This feature means that the model also covers Requirement 14 (migration of 
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nodes). The model has the same limitations as Aiguo et al. as the cluster formation is 
handled in a similar manner.  
 
Furthermore, this method also attempts to detect misbehaving nodes (Requirement 
10). A process-based method is proposed where a node has to undergo through a 
series of steps when they enter the network. Misbehaving nodes are classified as 
those nodes that do not meet a certain threshold of trust and which do not possess a 
certificate. However, based on the process proposed, if a node does not have a 
certificate, there is no way for it to be able to get one issued and as such it remains in 
the loop of constantly being checked whether or not it is a misbehaving node (even 
though it may have passed the trust threshold). This is counter-productive and may 
result in a waste of precious resources.  Misbehaving nodes are also only detected at 
the point of entry. There is no constant evaluation of nodes (Requirement 9) and 
nodes with a certificate (which may be forged) appear immune from the misbehaving 
node detection scheme. 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the ad hoc network concept and examined the various 
issues that are encountered within it, more especially with respect to trust formation.  
 
A quick literature review of trust within the social domain was conducted in order to 
understand the origins of the various facets of trust formation.  
 
The various requirements extracted from the issues in trust in ad hoc networks offer a 
good basis on which to build the ideal trust framework. No framework is ever ideal 
as the very engineering concept itself is mired in trade-offs and compromises. 
However, the thesis of this research is to be able to present a model that is as close to 
ideal as can be without impacting the practicality of network itself and its proper 
function. 
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The models surveyed in Section 2.4 provided a good indication of the state of the art 
in this research area. A summary of how they fared with respect to the Requirements 
proposed can be found below. Where relevant, commentary has also been added as 
to where the framework proposed in this thesis will aim to improve the state of the 
art. 
 
Requirement 1 (decentralised network) – Decentralised models are a feature of ad 
hoc network trust models in more cases than not. As such, only 1 of the models 
reviewed did not conform to a decentralised network. The framework proposed in 
this thesis will be using a distributed model as well. 
 
Requirement 2 (scalability) – Scalability is a feature of models proposed in 
Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.4. This is a feature that will be retained in this thesis 
going forward.  
 
Requirement 3 (reasoning) – Trust reasoning is exhibited primarily by models 
using reputation models and is present in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.4. It is a desirable 
feature that will also be retained. 
 
Requirement 4 (trust information) – This forms the basis of trust computation and 
as such is present in distributed models surveyed in Sections 2.4.1 - 2.4.5.  
 
Requirement 5 (trust recommendation) – Reputation is another very important 
measure in trust frameworks and therefore features heavily in Sections 2.4.1 – 2.4.5. 
 
Requirement 6 (reward or payment scheme) – This is a requirement that has not 
been explicitly noted in any of the models surveyed. It is an important criterion to 
consider as given the choice, nodes may very well be indifferent as to whether or not 
they provide a reputation or a trust value. This is especially so for models that exhibit 
classes of nodes whereby some nodes are required to work more than others. 
Therefore, this is a requirement that will be included in the model featured in this 
research. 
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Requirement 7 (classes of nodes) – Models in Section 2.4.5 using clustering define 
a second class of node although how they are elected or how the groups are formed is 
sometimes ambiguous. The model in this thesis also includes classes of nodes as it is 
viewed as presenting a number of benefits, especially in trust formation and 
maintenance. 
 
Requirement 8 (repositories) – Ignoring repositories present on all the nodes and 
central repositories inherent in systems with CAs, only the models in Section 2.4.5 
include the storage of data at various parts in the network as this tends to be a task of 
the head of a cluster by default. It is an important aspect of the network that will be 
retained going forward. 
 
Requirement 9 (constant evaluation) – Only models in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.4 
present this feature. While some of the models in Section 2.4.5 have looping 
mechanisms for misbehaving nodes, there is no explicit evidence that the trust 
information once calculated is refreshed periodically even though no new interaction 
occurs. This is an important distinction, as the temporal signature of a trust value 
must not be ignored. 
 
Requirement 10 (isolation) – Models that take measures towards misbehaving 
nodes generally include this requirement. They are mostly found in Sections 2.4.4 
and 2.4.5. Going forward, this is also a feature to be retained. 
 
Requirement 11 (selective grouping) – Groups are associated with different classes 
of node and are exhibited by the same models as per Requirement 7. Clusters will be 
an important feature of the framework in this work too. 
 
Requirement 12 (using external information) – This is partially seen in Section 
2.4.1 with Rebahi’s doctrine and also to a certain extent in Section 2.4.4 although the 
external information in question is implied to be merely additional recommendation 
information, so not external to the network as such.  
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Requirement 13 (contextual aspect of trust) – This aspect of trust is not strictly 
defined in any of the models surveyed. However, as explained previously in Section 
2.2, the context for trust generation within an ad hoc network tends to be standard. 
However, it is an ideal feature to have and promotes versatility in the network.  
 
Requirement 14 (enabling migration) – Node migration is seen in Section 2.4.5 
where one model stipulates that its Head of a given cluster is able to transfer the 
information to another Head when a node changes its geographical position. 
However, the trust relationship between Heads is not explored and it can be limiting 
to assume that all Heads are inherently above reproach.  
 
The following chapters will now present the model generated by this research. The 
specifics of the model will be presented in Chapter 3 and the model will be shown to 
fulfil Requirements 1-11 and 14. Requirement 13 will be addressed theoretically and 
ways to satisfy Requirement 12 will be put forward as future work in the closing 
remarks of this thesis. 





3 FRANTIC: A Framework for Ad hoc 





One of the key aims in modelling trust in an ad hoc network is to remove some of the 
uncertainty surrounding interactions among nodes within the network. A framework 
provides a means to not only model the trust relationships that exist between nodes 
but also to significantly reduce the level of uncertainty that is inherent when one 
entity has to make a decision about another. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to present a model that meets the broad 
objectives set out in Chapter 1. The motivation for drawing up these objectives were 
made clear in Chapter 2 where the issues existent within ad hoc networks, and 
establishing trust within them, were presented. 
 
FRANTIC is a computational trust model that determines the trust relationships 
between nodes based on the history of interactions (Objective 1). It also takes into 
account recommendations from other nodes in order to create a reputation for the 
entity in question (Objective 2). For operational and trust reasons, the framework 
architecture adopts a clustered approach (Objective 3). This clustered approach, 
amongst other advantages, allows for nodes with a good performance and a higher 
responsibility to be rewarded and for their trust recommendations to be considered 
ahead of others (Objective 4). Finally, FRANTIC adopts measures in order to 
introduce resilience in the framework with regard to non-cooperative and 
misbehaving nodes (Objective 5) while striving to keep the interaction overhead to a 
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minimum (Objective 6).  Aside from these broad objectives, FRANTIC addresses the 
other issues mentioned in Section 2.5 via its operational measures. 
 
The rest of this chapter provides an overview of how FRANTIC operates. Section 
3.1 describes the types of behaviour that will be modelled by FRANTIC and how 
trust is generated. The calculation of direct trust derived from the observed behaviour 
will be described in Section 3.2. Following this one to one interaction, Section 3.3 
addresses the dependence on others for recommendations and for reputations. The 
architectural set-up of the framework and clustering are considered in Section 3.4. 
Finally Section 3.5 proposes how the framework deals with misbehaving and selfish 
behaviours.  
 
3.1 Modelling from Behaviour    
 
As defined in Chapter 1, trust is the expectation of an outcome from a trustor towards 
a trustee. Furthermore, the definition provided indicated that to trust an entity meant 
to expect honesty and reliability from it. Honesty is related to the truthfulness of the 
entity while reliability is the expectation that the displayed honesty will be repeated 
over further interactions in time. The expectation of a positive outcome from a party 
that is honest and reliable can only be predicted if the past behaviour of that party is 
known. The role of a trust model is therefore to capture both the reliability and the 
honesty of the agents. 
 
There is no easy way to measure this reliability and honesty other than through direct 
observation of behaviour and via the sharing of similar information from other peers. 
In order to a trust model to achieve this, such observations need to be carried out 
over several interactions. Each additional interaction enhances the precision of the 
opinion being formulated by the querying peer (the trustor). These interactions build 
up in order to provide a measure of trust that can then be integrated in the model. 
 
The monitoring of peer behaviour is not a new concept. In fact, it has always been 
present in the way humans interact and form friends or ignore enemies. However, 
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human behaviour and social models ultimately represent degrees of complexity that 
cannot be accurately represented in a computational model. The latter usually 
operates within a prescribed scope and context. 
 
So that the trust model in this work is able to distill behavioural information and 
translate it into trust, a level of abstraction is required so that the computational 
model may mimic a human model. The two concepts that need to be investigated are 
honesty and reliability. Reliability is easier to monitor because it can be concretely 
measured based on past performance and by monitoring performance. Honesty on 
the other hand is harder to capture. The truthfulness of an entity is largely down to its 
own reasoning faculties. This character is usually representative of more complex 
agents. For the purposes of this work, it is assumed that honesty accrues over time 
logically as an entity displays behaviour that is deemed to enhance its 
trustworthiness. Assuming that the peers in the model are autonomous and have no 
inputs from their human user, this is a reasonable assumption.  
 
The key aspects to be decided therefore are what the scope of the framework will be 
and within what context it will operate, that is, what types of behaviour will it 
monitor. The behaviour being displayed needs to be simple enough that its 
observation can lead to lean computation of trust information but complex enough 
that other inferences about the state of the network can be deduced in order to 
maintain its operation (e.g. whether it is under attack, which are the non-cooperating 
node amongst others). The behaviour is largely dictated by the scenarios for which a 
framework is implemented. The scenarios also dictate the level of complexity of the 
actions performed by peers and the subsequent observation of their behaviour. For a 
generic framework however, inferring behavioural information from processes 
taking place at the network layer is a viable alternative. Not only are these processes 
always present in any type of network, but by utilising network data that is already 
present, the framework can also present the added advantages of being lean and not 
introducing appreciable overhead. 
 
In order to judge the behaviour of its peer, a requesting entity needs to define its own 
measures of what a successful interaction is. This definition needs to be part of the 
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framework. The successful interaction itself is dependent on the action being 
performed and therefore the expectation that said action is performed properly to the 
requesting entity’s satisfaction. Other aspects of behaviour that need to be noted for 
the purposes of a trust model are indications of altruism (the need to do good and be 
cooperative) and selfishness (non-cooperation). Incentives and disincentives must be 
put in place via system-level trust (See section 2.3.2) in order to “force”, where 
possible, the peers to behave in a certain way. 
 
The basic data at the network layer is routing data. Route requests and discoveries 
are always ongoing in an ad hoc network. Using this information in order to infer 
trust measures, especially at the early stages of the formation of the trust model, 
bears its advantages. By monitoring routing as a behavioural measure, it could be 
argued that the system is solely dependent on the performance of the peers and 
therefore trust is only a measure of reliability which itself is derived directly from the 
performance of a peer. This is true only at the trust formation stage where the main 
purpose of the network is route discovery and network formation.  
 
Once the network is established, peers within the network can make choices about 
the type and amount of data they send, they forward for others and they receive. A 
feature of the ad hoc network is that in order for a transmission to go from a point A 
to a point B, there may be several routes involved, each of which may involve a 
different number of peers. Each of their peers at the route request stage has the 
choice of sending a route reply acknowledgement when it receives a request for a 
route. Its reply may be to either accept the route or reject it. The choice this peer has 
adds a level of complexity. By accepting or refusing a route request, it is exhibiting 
properties of altruism or selfishness, both of which affect its trust rating in the trust 
framework used in this work. If the acceptance/refusal of the route was automated 
and as a result of prevailing network conditions or even the physical state of the peer, 
then it would simply equate to the notion of performance. However, if there is a 
“conscious” decision by the peer to accept or reject requests in order to promote its 
own agenda, then this can no longer be considered as purely performance. It is 
indicative of the “conscious” state of the peer and would therefore affect its 
trustworthiness by a measure different to that of simple performance. 
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Although routing data is an initial source of data for observing the behaviour of peers 
in the framework, other data being transferred can be just as easily adapted within 
the framework. From the system-level trust, there are certain rules that can be 
modified in order to adapt to the data being transmitted. When operating in a real 
world scenario, the concept of context also becomes relevant as the needs of various 
peers will vary and the type of data and content requested will also vary. Hence the 
trust values generated will need to be in line with the context in which they 
happened. Because the formalisation of the model is based on a single context for 
simulation purposes, multi-context scenarios are not addressed here. However, the 
scope to add context information to the trust data is present. This is addressed further 
in Chapter 5. 
 
When judging success, peers in the framework are presented with two outcomes: 
positive and negative. Each outcome is added incrementally to the series of outcomes 
an entity stores for another. These outcomes and their success/failure are then 
converted into a measure of trustworthiness by an algorithm in the framework. 
Assuming completely untrustworthiness to equate to 0 and full trustworthiness to 
equate to 1, then it can be assumed that the trustworthiness of any peer in a network 
will lie on the spectrum of values ranging between these two extremes. 
 
The outcome of every interaction in the network is recorded. Depending on the type 
of interaction and the action performed, they each will impact the trust rating of the 
peer differently. For example, by showing altruism, a peer can expect a positive 
impact on its trustworthiness. Conversely, refusing to cooperate within the network 
will result in a negative impact. Algorithms within the framework then combine 
these different impacts in order to deduce that measure of trustworthiness that is then 
passed on to higher nodes such that an overall reputation value can be computed.  
 
Therefore, it can be seen that the analysis of behaviour by the framework can be very 
flexible and it can be easily tweaked in order to adapt to a given scenario. The 
measure of behaviour ultimately depicts a measure of trustworthiness. 
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3.2 Modelling Trust 
 
There are three stages in the calculation of trustworthiness by the framework.  They 
are: 
 
1. Gathering trust information: this involves member nodes storing behavioural 
outcomes for their immediate 1-hop neighbours after each successful/failed 
interaction 
 
2. Conversion: This behavioural data is then converted into a trust value by means of 
an algorithm within the framework. This trust value is known as direct trust. 
 
3. Calculating reputation: Having acquired a set of direct trust values for a given 
peer, the framework can combine these in order to produce a more balanced 
representation of a node by calculating a reputation value (See Section 3.3). 
 
3.2.1 Calculating Direct Trust 
 
In the model, in order to calculate trust, several new concepts are introduced: gain, 
workload and drop rate. Using routing information as the basis for generating trust 
information is not overly complex. However, more complex inferences can be made 
based on just this simple behaviour (see Section 3.1) and trust values can be adjusted 
accordingly to reflect those inferences. For example, balancing network traffic across 
an ad hoc network is a desirable feature to have, if not crucial at times. It does not 
have a direct impact on trust but a well-balanced traffic load will enable all peers to 
perform to the ability they choose to, rather than being congested and having to 
refuse or drop packets. The ideal situation is for all decisions made by peers to be 
fully intended and not as a result of network outages (as even these affect 
trustworthiness). This would present the most accurate depiction of trust.  
 
Consequently, a node that creates traffic for the network via route requests can have 
a negative connotation attached to it whereas another that selflessly forwards the 
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routing packets can be deemed to have a positive connotation. A node receiving a 
packet can also have a negative connotation because it benefits from the work done 
by other nodes within the network. While these “connotations” are not the sole 
representations of behaviour, taking them into account just makes the trust value 
calculated for an entity that much more relevant and fair.  
 
Connotations are therefore there to aid the fairness of the framework. In the example 
of the receiver node, it can be inferred that is accepting a packet from the network. In 
order to receive this packet, other nodes would have had to utilise their own 
resources so as to create a route for its transmission. The receiver node on the other 
hand only receives a benefit (the packet) from the network without having to input 
any resource. Therefore, the framework will deem the acceptance of this packet as a 
negative connotation, and this will have a slight negative impact on its trust rating. 
The goal here is to make sure that nodes do not ask the network to perform tasks that 
may not be necessary as any work that they ask of their peers will result in having an 
impact on their own trustworthiness. Similarly a positive connotation also introduces 
an aspect of a reward for a selfless node within the network. These connotations will 
become clearer with the following calculation of direct trust. 
 




Figure 3.1: Routing through nodes with information transfer running from A (source) to E 
(sink) and B, C and D acting as intermediaries (routers) 
 
 
Node A is the source and initiates a packet transfer to node E (sink) with B, C and D 
acting as intermediary nodes to route the packet. 
 
The following behaviours are observed: 
 
A B C D E 
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1. A node that initiates a packet transfer or receives a packet, i.e. nodes which are 
either sources or sinks, gain from such a transaction, the former by transmitting 
information, and the latter by receiving such information. In other words, they form 
the network work for their own benefit. This gain, denoted as G, is calculated by the 
following equation: 
 
GA = number of packets initiated by A. 
 
This information is obtained by all nodes within the chain each time a route request 




GE = number of packets received by E. 
 
This information is obtained during the route reply process.  
 
2. Each time a node that is not a source or a sink forwards a packet by being a router 
node it is performing work for the network and therefore has a workload  termed W. 
 
WB = number of packets forwarded by B (same principles apply for C and D). 
 
3. When a node drops a packet for any reason, this is known as the drop rate, D. 
 
DB = number of packets dropped by B (or C, D or E as per the above example). 
 
At any point in time, depending on the routes being requested, there will be several 
permutations of the above example with the roles of sources, routers and sinks 
changing intermittently such that all nodes will eventually have a combination of 
gains, workloads and drop rates. 
 
So, taking an example of node B’s view of node A: 
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PAB = {[WAB – (0.5*GAB + DAB)] / 2*SAB}              (3.1) 
 
where PAB is the overall Performance of node A as seen by node B, GAB is the 
number of packets received by B from A, DAB is the number of packets dropped by 
node A that were received by B and WAB is the number of packets forwarded by B for 
A. 
 
This is an indication of how node A has fared with respect to its overall input to the 
network. By being altruistic and performing work for the network, A will have a 
higher WAB factor than its GAB or DAB factors (assuming it is not overloaded and 
drops packets purely due to congestion – even if this were the case, then this will 
have a self-regulatory effect by having packets routed away from A temporarily 
during any decline of its performance). SAB simply denotes the overall number of 
packets that transited through A (i.e. when operating as a source, router and sink 
inclusive) as measured by B. SAB will be determined by the time over which the 
observation takes place. This time period is configurable in the framework and set 
depending on the level of activity of the network itself. It cannot be set within the 
above formula as this time period will be often determined by the higher nodes’ 
request for trust information (see cycles in Chapter 5). Networks with a high latency 
and low interaction may require a greater amount of time in order to generate enough 
packets so that an accurate representation of performance can be determined. 
 
Because the gain is only a negative connotation, the effect of the gain is deemed to 
be less serious in terms of its effect on the network than the drop rate. Therefore its 
effect is halved (gain factor of 0.5) in the above equation. This halving is arbitrary 
and can be modified to any other value depending on how relevant it is at a particular 
moment in time. Where a network is heavily congested, the gain factor may be raised 
to a higher value in order to dissuade nodes from introducing non-essential traffic to 
the network. Similarly, at periods of low utilisation, the gain factor could be lowered 
to encourage participation. Such traffic shaping, although not an objective of the trust 
framework, is a welcome by-product of its implementation as it aids in promoting a 
fairer network. 
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The workloads, gains and drop rates are divided by twice the total number of 
packets so as to provide a maximum possible performance of 0.5. This is important 
because the performance of a node is also proportional to the increment by which a 
node’s initial trust value is adjusted. Given that a node’s maximum trust value is 1 
and its minimum value is zero (with 0.5 as the middle initial level for unknown 
nodes), it is important that its trust value does not converge to either extreme too 
quickly. This convergence will depend on the amount of interactions taking place 
between nodes. In a network where S is high, then the effect of the performance must 
be adjusted accordingly.  
 
The direct trust value of a node is therefore calculated from the following equations. 
 
If 1 ≤ SAB < 10, then T’AB = {[(PAB)
5
 * TAB] +  TAB}            (3.2) 
 
If 10 ≤ SAB < 25, then T’AB = {[(PAB)
4
 * TAB] +  TAB}             (3.3) 
 
If 25 ≤ SAB < 50, then T’AB = {[(PAB)
3
 * TAB] +  TAB}             (3.4) 
 
If SAB ≥ 50, then T’AB = {[(PAB)
2
 * TAB] +  TAB}             (3.5)
  
where T’AB is the new value of trust of B in A and TAB is the initial value.  
 
The basis for these formulae is in order to achieve suitable convergence based on the 
numbers involved in the typical scenarios depicted in Chapter 4 and the simulations 
performed in Chapter 5. Understandably, this is just one way of achieving 
convergence and the values above can be modified in order to increase or drecrease 
the amount of time convergence happens and thus the sensitivity of the network in 
reacting to behavioural inputs. Convergence is made to be gradual so that the trust 
build up process also takes into account the longevity of the node in the network – it 
takes a minimum amount of time for the trust values of nodes to reach certain target 
levels (for example to be promoted to a different class of node). 
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If a generic model were used, then convergence could be achieved by using n as a 




 * TAB] +  TAB]                 (3.6) 
 
where n is a constant derived from the number of packets and the packet rate. If SAB 
is high due to a large number of packets flowing through in a small time interval, 
then n can be adjusted to take this into account. This can be fully configurable  
depending on the application in use and how fast convergence is required. One way 
to derive n would be as per equation 3.7. 
 
n = SAB / z * QAB                           (3.7) 
 
where z is a constant to be chosen by the designer and QAB is the packet rate. 
 
By using the above rules, the model also makes sure that the trust value of a node is 
not incremented artificially by demonstrating an excellent performance without 
having performed an adequate workload within the time frame, since performance is, 
by definition, a ratio. It also encourages nodes to maximise their workloads by 
forwarding a maximum number of packets because of a higher improvement in 
measures of performance. These rules are nevertheless customisable should the need 
arise, depending on how busy the network is, as described earlier. 
 
It should be noted that the maximum value of T is rounded off at 1 and the minimum 
value is rounded off at zero. This means that any trust value that happens to be ≥ 1 is 
then rebased to 1 just like any trust value that is ≤ 0 is rebased to 0. Accumulated 
“credit” is not stored. For example, a node that finds itself with a trust value of 1.45 
that is rebased to 1 does not have the extra 0.45 stored on the system to be offset 
against any future reduction in trust. This is to ensure that all nodes perform 
adequately throughout the existence of the network as opposed to being very 
productive at one instance and latent at another. 
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Once a node has obtained its new value of Trust, T’, the value is stored with the 
following information: 
 
{node_id of trustor, node_id of trustee, T’, t} 
In the above example, the data that would be stored would be as follows: 
 
node_id of trustor node_id of trustee T’ t 
B A T’AB t’ 
Table 3.1: Data set for trust showing the different types of information collected within the node 
 
t is a time-stamp that allows the user of the table to distinguish recent values from 
old ones. In the above example, if no traffic flowed though A and its trust value 
remained unchanged, then the above information would be sent with a time stamp of 
t, not t’, thereby defining the time at which said trust value was current. 
 
3.3 Modelling Reputation 
 
Having laid down the basis for a calculation trust on a one-to-one basis, the focus of 
the next section will be on how to deal with the concept of reputation. The need for 
reputation information arises when an entity has no experience of another entity it is 
about to interact with.  
 
Using the reputation of the entity provides an appropriate solution. A reputation is 
simply the aggregation of opinions about a target entity from a variety of sources. 
This reputation is calculated by the requester based on the trust information it 
receives from other nodes in the network. This makes reputation a more subjective 
notion since it will be up to the requesting node to determine whose recommendation 
it chooses to peruse and how it assesses each of those recommendations in order to 
reach a final reputation score. 
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3.3.1 Calculating Reputation 
 
For every recommendation a node receives from another node, it keeps the following 
information: 
 
{node_id of trustor, node_id of trustee, trust value of trustee, time-stamp t} 
A node may elect to keep a table for each entity it interacts with. Every time a 
recommendation is received for that entity, the recommendation is added as a row to 
that entity’s table. Using the same notations as in Section 3.2.1, a reputation R for a 
given node X is usually the statistical average of the various recommendations 
provided by other nodes. This is denoted by equation 3.6. 
 
RX =(ΣTXY) / δ                  (3.8) 
 
where Y is any node which produces a recommendation for X. δ is the number of 
nodes that provide a recommendation.  
 
This statistical average provides the reputation for X. However, this is an over-
simplistic way to provide an accurate reputation and moreover would fail. Objective 
4 as defined in Chapter 1 states that better performing and more trustworthy nodes 
must be considered more important than their peers. This gives rise to the concept of 
importance, denoted by I. Because importance would be directly proportional to the 
actual reputation of the recommending node itself, it is logical to use the reputation 
value of the trustworthiness as the importance factor of its recommendation. Thus, 
nodes with a higher reputation would see their recommendation affect the reputation 
of the target node to a higher degree. 
 
This weighted average can be calculated as follows. 
 
R’X = [Σ(T’XY1*IY1 + T’XY2*IY2 +…+ T’XYδ*IYδ)]/β              (3.9) 
 
where IY is the importance of Y and is simply defined as the actual reputation of Y at 
that point in time and β is the sum of all “importances” from Y1 to Yδ. 
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This weighted average is one way of mitigating the effect of false recommendations 
from misbehaving nodes as they would normally have low reputation scores 
themselves. The amount of time, effort and resources required for a misbehaving 
node to build up its reputation sufficiently such that it would be able to distribute 
false recommendations that would have marked impacts, acts as a deterrent. 
Misbehaving nodes are often opportunistic and the likelihood is that they would 
potentially move on to softer targets, thus reducing the likelihood of attacks on the 
network  
 
In the unlikely event of a concerted attack on the network (where other softer targets 
may not exist, thus increasing the incentive for misbehaving node to attack only the 
available targets), the system includes a rule-based mechanism in order to eliminate 
non-cooperative and misbehaving nodes (See Section 3.5.1). While it is 
acknowledged that a misbehaving node may not be detected while it is operating 
covertly by behaving as required in order to build its reputation, it can be argued that 
the work done by misbehaving nodes in building up reputations offers some benefit 
to the network for instance by offering more available paths. It is only once the paths 




One of the basic features of FRANTIC is that it implements a cluster-based 
architecture. The benefits of clusters are well-known from a networking point of 
view as they are analogous to the concept of super-peers. A trust framework can also 
benefit from using such an architecture. 
 
Clustering generally involves creating small aggregations of nodes within a 
particular geographical area. These small aggregations are then “held together” by a 
membership that is reflected in a single node called the cluster head (CH). The CH 
acts as an authority figure for the cluster and is generally the node that has existed in 
the cluster for the most amount of time and therefore also has the highest reputation 
of all the nodes.  
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3.4.1 Initial Motivation 
 
Related traffic simulations using uniformly-sized public key certificates in order to 
monitor additional overhead highlighted the advantages of using a network created 
by using a clustered approach versus a fully distributed one. The following graphs 
display the results obtained (Boodnah & Scharf , 2004). 
 
In this experiment, the main aim was solely to establish the total traffic, therefore an 
indication the total bandwidth consumed by the trust mechanism on its own. Public 
key certificates were used purely as a measure of simplification as this study was for 
overhead measurement only and not for the generation or distribution of trust or 
reputation. 
 
The system was not brought into any form of congestion to prevent dropped packets 
and the duplex links were set at an above-threshold bandwidth. Nevertheless, the 
system was also set to exhibit the worst-case scenario in order to determine the 
maximum possible bandwidth consumption.  
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Figure 3.2: Traffic generated per cluster 
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Figure 3.3: Traffic generated within the network 
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Figure 3.4: Traffic generated according to node class 
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• Simultaneous sending of certificates from individual nodes to their CHs. 
 
• All nodes request certificates from one another (in the fully distributed 
mode). This is extreme because it would be highly unlikely that this should 
happen in real life. However, it provides a useful upper bound for the 
bandwidth consumption. 
 
• The system is considered trustworthy, when all nodes within the cluster or 
network have access to the certificate of every other node within the cluster 
to which they belong. 
 
The following outcomes are detailed in Figures 3.2 – 3.5. 
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• In Figure 3.2, it can be clearly inferred that the CH approach generates less 
overall traffic within the cluster. This advantage increases as the number of 
nodes increases. However, this can only go up to the congestion limit of the 
CH, that is the maximum number of certificate requests it can accommodate 
without starting to drop packets. 
 
• In Figure 3.3, the same experiment is repeated as in (a) but this time 
increasing numbers of clusters with fixed sizes (6 slave nodes) are compared 
in both cases. Again, the CH approach generates less traffic and this time, the 
larger the network, the better the CH approach fares. 
 
• Figure 3.4 compares the amount of traffic within a cluster at the CH and the 
slave node (for the CH approach) and at each node (for the distributed 
traffic). This indicates that while the CH has to accommodate more traffic 
than its slave counterpart, that traffic is no more than what any node would 
have to accommodate in a fully distributed scenario. Hence the CH method 
allows the slave nodes to have more resources for other purposes, unrelated 
to trust propagation. 
 
• Finally, as a statistical confirmation, the average traffic per node is calculated 
for each method, confirming the superiority of the CH approach (Figure 3.5). 
 
This experiment was a very simple demonstration of the bandwidth usage of the 
clustering method. It uses assumed certificates as a measure of simplicity purely so 
that the traffic flow may be monitored between the two different set-ups. 
 
Besides networking issues, there are also several reasons why clustering is an 
attractive proposition for FRANTIC: 
 
1. Clustering can redistribute the tasks involved in trust formation and 
distribution. Normal nodes can take up the responsibility for generating trust 
information based on direct experiences, whereas cluster heads merely collect 
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such evidence and in turn generate an overall reputation for each node within 
its cluster. For distributed approaches, this would mean that all nodes have to 
generate their own reputation about all the other nodes they are involved with 
and have to compute the recommendations from their trusted peers as well. 
The clustering approach therefore decreases the amount of computation 
involved by task redistribution. Furthermore the reputation of any node 
within a cluster is more representative since it will be deduced based on 
recommendations from all other member nodes with which it will invariably 
have more interactions. 
 
2. New nodes entering the network are able to immediately have access to 
reputation information about member nodes. They do not have to wait and 
perform calculations over a given period of time in order to find out which 
nodes they can trust within the network. In distributed approaches, every time 
a transaction was initiated, this would have involved querying 
recommendation information from other peers. Even so, this can be very 
difficult for a new joiner who may not have had time to know enough peers 
in order to trust their recommendation about a given node it may wish to 
execute a transaction with.  
 
3. Assuming some cluster heads are within range of one another, it is much 
easier to exchange inter-cluster trust information for those nodes that may 
wish to perform transactions with nodes in another cluster. Recommendations 
between clusters are quicker than individual nodes having to find a long 
recommender chain in order to obtain similar information, which may not be 
as accurate. Cluster heads are also better placed to “hand over” the reputation 
information of a node as it moves from cluster to cluster, thus ensuring it 
does not have to re-initialise its reputation once it moves (this meets 
Requirement 14 from Section 2.5). 
 
4. In conjunction with Point 1, less computation overall will mean less drain on 
the resources of nodes within the network, such as battery levels. Another 
consideration is that the amount of space required for storing reputation 
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information is reduced although this may only be applicable in the case of 
very large networks. 
 
3.4.2 The Cluster Model Topology 
 
The architecture of the trust model is different to that of the network model. Within 
the network model, nodes may be connected to the cluster head as well as boundary 
nodes that may connect to other nodes in different clusters. This is essential as it 
allows the network to be continuous – otherwise the whole network would only be a 
disjointed collection of clusters. However, in the case of the trust mode, the topology 
is different. This is because the CH is responsible for tasks that the nodes are not. It 
is therefore necessary for all nodes of a specific cluster to constantly report to their 
respective cluster head and provide all information requested. The difference in 












           Figure 3.6a: Network Topology    Figure 3.6b: Trust Topology 
 
As can be seen from the above schematic, a network is divided into different clusters, 
each of which contains a cluster head (CH) that oversees the trust operations. A node 
is defined as belonging to a cluster when it has a bi-directional link to the CH. It 
follows from the diagrams above that in terms of the trust topology, nodes follow a 
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Stores routing data collected over a 
given cycle and generates trust metric 
for each neighbour at the end of cycle
ACTIVE ON CH ONLY
Collects data from Trust Generation 
and calculates Reputations, which it 
then broadcasts
ACTIVE ON CH ONLY
Provides system response to specific 
triggers by using a rule-based 
mechanism
hierarchy. Boundary nodes (that fall mid-way or are within ranges of two CHs) may 
choose either CH in order to belong to its respective cluster. CHs themselves form a 
super mesh network in which they may communicate to one another, whenever they 
are in range in order to exchange trust information for transactions between clusters. 
All nodes within the model are equal in terms of computational power and other 
resources (range of radio transmission, software etc.). This is a reasonable 
assumption as the framework is designed to work between similar devices e.g. 
between palmtops or between laptops.  
 
All nodes also include the trust component that allows the trust information to be 
generated, distributed, updated and stored. Additionally, all nodes are also able to 
operate as cluster heads if required to do so, thereby expanding the possibility of 
promotion to a cluster head to all nodes equally within the network. This trust 
component is displayed in Figure 3.7. The concepts of trust maintenance and audit 








Figure 3.7: Trust module present on each node slowing the calculation and storage required for 
reputation information 
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3.4.3 Bootstrapping the Network 
 
So far, the clustered framework has been described as if it were fully functioning. 
However, this is not always so – there are several states/phases in which the network 
may find itself, three of which are not stable. For the purpose of this work, four states 
have been identified: discovery, stable, unstable and decay. The stable state is the 
normal operating state of the network and the framework. The discovery stage is the 
one where bootstrapping of the network takes place; this is one of the most crucial 
states as it is effectively the beginning of the formation of the ad hoc network and the 
initial trust relationships. Before the discovery state is described in detail, an 
overview of the four states follows. 
 
Discovery State: This is the state of the network at the beginning of the monitored 
period where no trust relationships exist between any given nodes. It is also called 
the bootstrapping phase. However, in this case, no trusted third party is involved 
within the discovery phase.  
 
Stable State: This refers to the stage after the discovery phase has completed. In this 
phase, cluster heads have been elected and clusters have been formed with members 
clearly aware of their identities. The process of generating and maintaining trust 
evidence can therefore begin. This stage may include the exchange of sensitive 
information if required. It should be worth noting that any new nodes joining during 
the stable phase have to go through the same initiation process as others during the 
discovery phase. 
 
Unstable State: This relates to the state of the network when it is being put under 
stress. This may be either due to network issues such as acute congestion or a high 
turnover of nodes necessitating a high number of transactions when initiating new 
nodes or reallocating cluster heads. It may also be due to passive or active attacks 
from within or from outside the network. There are two options for a network in an 
unstable phase: it can either return to its previous stable point or it may move to what 
is termed the Decay phase. 
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Decay State: This is the stage at which the network disintegrates. This means that 
clusters break down and nodes become individual components again. This may 
happen when a network has been in an unstable phase for a substantial amount of 
time without being able to stabilise. At the decay phase, the nodes may choose to 
move away and join a different network or try and create a new network by moving 
back into a discovery phase. The latter can only be an option however if the decay 
phase was due to a network overload or some similar resource constraint. It is futile 
to re-organise a network that has been targeted by misbehaving nodes and has failed 




In order to bootstrap a network from the ground up (that is assuming no prior 
interaction or knowledge at all), the network must follow the social model of 
“breaking the ice”. Nodes may elect to get to know one another by exchanging 
“trivial” information such as playing a game, or exchanging news in order for them 
to have an early assessment of the reliability and therefore the trustworthiness of 
their neighbours. This also aids the early election of cluster heads. Honesty is more 
difficult to assess at this early stage, so this means that the network is more 
vulnerable. However, any network that fails at the discovery state in all likelihood 
includes a high proportion of misbehaving nodes and would not have been able to 
survive to form a stable state anyway. 
 
Once nodes have exchanged trivial services between one another (this is arbitrarily 
decided based on the framework being implemented), there should be direct trust and 
recommendation data for most of the nodes within the network. It should be noted 
that at this stage, the network is fully distributed and all nodes perform their own 
calculations for the aggregation of recommendations. There is no involvement from 
any third-party (cluster head).  
 
The election of cluster heads can take place once sufficient trust information has 
been propagated throughout the network. The voting rules for the cluster heads are 
based on the work of Guo and Li in sensor networks (Guo and Li, 2007). 
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1. Each node can only vote for another node for cluster head if that specific node is 
the most trustworthy of all the nodes within its neighbours.  
2. The radius of interaction is only one-hop. This means that all nodes only vote for 
their one-hope neighbour nodes and all votes are not forwarded by other nodes.  
3. The node with the highest number of votes is elected as the cluster head. 
4. If two nodes have a similar number of votes, then the node with the lowest node 
ID is elected as the cluster head.  
 
By introducing a voting system, the framework becomes more democratic and more 
stable. This means that only the nodes with the highest trust ratings become cluster 
heads. Furthermore, only the better connected nodes become cluster heads as they 
will be the ones with the highest number of votes. Nodes that are at the periphery of 
the network would receive fewer votes although they may have been just as 
trustworthy. Such a set-up ascertains that the cluster head is well-placed within the 
cluster and has good radio contact with all nodes that elected it as the head of their 
cluster. 
 
Once a cluster head is elected, it becomes responsible for collecting reputation 
ratings about all nodes within its clusters. Direct trust calculation is still done by each 
member node but the cluster head does the computation of reputation. This has the 
advantage of giving the reputation a more objective value, as it becomes a single 
value for each of the nodes within a cluster. A node’s reputation thus becomes an 
attribute of the node, as opposed to being constantly and subjectively redefined by 
each node it encounters. 
 
The cluster head calculates the reputation a node based on the recommendations on 
every other node within the cluster that has previously interacted with that node.  
 
Just like member nodes, the cluster head calculates reputation values at the end of a 
given time period. There are two ways to achieve this. The first option is to have 
defined periods at which reputation is computed. While this may seem like an 
orderly way of getting reputations, it has one serious flaw. By allowing all nodes to 
send their data at the same instant to the cluster head, the risk of congestion is 
Chapter 3 – FRANTIC 
 
92 
increased and may result in packets being dropped, thereby resulting in the cluster 
head receiving inadequate or incomplete information. There is also the possibility of 
a second wave of congestion as the cluster head then proceeds to flood the cluster 
with the reputation tables. Not only is this a waste of resources, but it may also 
involve nodes receiving redundant information about nodes they may not have a one-
hop relationship with. 
 
Therefore, for this model, a second option is better where the time frame for collating 
reputation information is staggered. This means that the cluster head can compute 
reputation information as they come in and does not broadcast it across the cluster. 
Instead, the cluster head stores the information and only replies to nodes that provide 
fresh data or that request such information. For example a node that provides an 
updated recommendation on a node may then be issued with the new computed value 
of the overall reputation of that node and may then use that new reputation figure as 
the basis of its initial trust value for calculating further direct trust values while 
interacting with that target node.  
 
Once the CH has calculated the reputation values, they are then stored. The 
following information is recorded (example below assuming node X interacting with 
nodes A, B, C, D and E). Comp refers to the reputation computation process. 
 
Comp t  
node_id trust values received reputation time 
X TXA TXB TXC TXD TXE RX t seconds 
Comp t + n X T’XA T’XB T’XC T’XD T’XE R’X 
t + n 
seconds 
Table 3.2: Data table showing the information stored by the Cluster Head for a particular node 
when receiving trust data from other members 
 
If no trust values are received for X during a given time period n, then the cluster 
head updates the table with a value of X that reflects the temporal decay of trust. In 
FRANTIC, this temporal decay is defined as being half of the difference of the trend 
previously noted for node X (this is arbitrary and can be adjusted to suit the 
sensitivity of the framework to temporal decay).  
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Therefore, taking the example shown above, if no trust information is received from 
node X at Comp (t + 2n), then the cluster head decreases the reputation of X by |(R’X - 
RX)|/2. The modulus of the value is always taken to account for a drop in reputation 
which would have produced a negative value and thus actually increased the 
reputation of X. This is not possible as the temporal decay in trust always results in a 
decrease in reputation by definition.  
 
If no information is obtained from its peers at Comp (t + 3n), then the same process 
is carried out and the reputation of X is further reduced. This process carries on until 
either the cluster head receives new trust values for X. This temporal decay of trust is 
useful because it caters for two situations which are that either the node has left the 
network or it has adopted a latent role. Either way, it is imperative that the node is 
weeded out gradually as a latent node may also mean that it is a misbehaving node 
that is observing the network for a possible attack. The benefit of the doubt falls to 
the latent node – hence why it is weeded out gradually rather than swiftly. The 
framework promotes false negatives over false positives when detecting misbehaving 
nodes. This is because nodes are always given a chance to redeem themselves 
(should the latency have been without specific intent). If the system is set up so that 
misbehaving nodes are swiftly removed, this may also create the situation where a 
large number of “good” nodes are excluded due to network latency issues caused by 
factors outside their control.   
 
3.4.4 Incentives and Dangers 
 
This is an aspect of trust frameworks that is generally overlooked. For a framework 
to be viable, nodes need to have the predisposition to be altruistic, i.e. behave like 
rational agents (See Section 2.3). Similarly traffic from each node should be 
therefore continuously monitored in order for a sustainable trust framework to 
develop and for trust to propagate around the network. But for this to happen, nodes 
need to have some form of incentive in order for them to invest their resources into 
achieving these tasks.  
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All nodes need some sort of trustworthy framework within which they can operate in 
relative safety. Relative being the operative word, because safety, like security can 
almost always be improved – hence the need to find a compromise and stick to it. 
 
If nodes were to operate in a fully distributed mode, they would all need to be 
responsible to obtain direct evidence from their peers, to query their neighbours for 
recommendations, to assign weights to those recommendations, to gauge newcomers 
and to use computing resources to calculate trust metrics intermittently.  
 
FRANTIC solves part of the problem already through segregating tasks. Member 
nodes are responsible for acquiring direct experience, while cluster heads take 
responsibility for collecting recommendations, creating reputations and distributing 
these around the cluster as well as maintaining and auditing trust over their cluster. 
The cluster heads are only able to perform these tasks because they have been freed 
from other tasks such as the responsibility of having to query nodes to obtain 
recommendations or to monitor the network to obtain direct evidence. These are 
incentives in themselves. Furthermore, unless they misbehave, cluster heads are 
immune from non-cooperation accusations. In mathematical terms, this means that 
the values of G (the gain) and D (drop rate) for a cluster head are always nil. This 
means that other nodes cannot accuse a cluster head of non-cooperation as the very 
measures by which non-cooperation is determined have been disabled. This is yet 
another incentive for the added workload that they perform in order to keep the trust 
framework running. The performance of cluster heads must always remain optimal 
as far as possible, hence most routing requests for instance may bypass it if there is 
the option of an alternative route.  
 
Member nodes on the other hand have a much simplified task in terms of generating 
trust evidence. They only need to compute a single metric and send this to the cluster 
heads, based on their observation over a given time-period.  
 
The way the performance is measured is also an incentive for nodes to contribute 
more to the network. The algorithm has been defined in such a way that nodes which 
route the most packets generate the highest performance values and may therefore 
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increase their reputations in less time. The advantages of an increased reputation are: 
firstly the possibility of being promoted to cluster head once the current one retires or 
is revoked and secondly to have the luxury of making the network work for it 




Because the cluster head is a major player in FRANTIC, it may also prove to be its 
Achilles’ heel should the network be attacked. That is one of the reasons why cluster 
heads are not required to perform routing tasks for other nodes. They will only 
participate in routing when they are the sources (i.e. broadcasting information to 
other nodes) or sinks (receiving trust information from other nodes). By limiting its 
participation in the network (other than for personal and trust management services), 
the probability of the cluster head being involved in a DoS attack, for instance, is 
thereby decreased. 
 
If the cluster head is compromised, then a mechanism needs to exist for it to be 
detected. It is one assumption that all nodes are equal in terms of computational 
power and other resources and that they are all equipped with a trust mechanism. 
This means that, for member nodes, although a lot of the functionality is not always 
used, they still have access to it when needed. This is how cluster heads are 
monitored. For example, every time a node issues its trust value to the cluster head 
and in turn gets returned a reputation table, it should always compare its previous 
table with the new one before overwriting it. Because there is only one new set of 
data, it is not possible to perform standard deviations, however, any big discrepancy 
can easily be detected through simple thresholding.  
 
If such a discrepancy is noted, then the node should not overwrite its first cycle. 
Instead, it should verify whether or not this happens again at the following cycle by 
comparing the new reputation table supplied by the cluster head, much in the same 
way that the cluster head monitors variations. If the discrepancy repeats itself, then 
the node may trigger a vote by broadcasting a vote-table to the rest of the network. 
This table contains only the node_id of the requester and a vote column in which 
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replying nodes may respond by a 0 or a 1. A 1 indicates confidence within the cluster 
head, a 0 indicates the opposite. If there is a majority of 0s, then the cluster head’s 
authority is revoked and the node with the next highest reputation is elected. 
Remaining member nodes then send their trust data to the new cluster head. 
 
This method is devised in order to make sure that cluster heads perform as they 
should. Another situation that may induce a vote of no confidence is when the cluster 
head does not respond to reputation requests or not broadcast or reply to reputation 
tables/requests in a timely fashion.  
 
A measure which may also increase the robustness of the cluster head is to elect a 
deputy cluster head which operates like any other member node, except that it 
receives the full list of reputation tables, black lists and variation lists (see Section 
3.5) at every cycle as a back-up in case the cluster head ceases to operate either due 
to mechanical faults or because of an attack/capture. It may also make the transition 
between cluster heads more seamless, once the existing cluster head decides to leave 
of its own accord. 
 
3.5 Trust Maintenance 
 
Although part of trust maintenance involves updating reputation values for nodes as 
per Section 3.4, in this section is concerned more with specific situations that may 
arise that may require specific trust maintenance to be performed. Generally, trust 
maintenance refers to the processes that are performed in order to update reputations 
across the network during its stable phase. In contrast, a trust audit (Section 3.5.1) 
refers to processes that take place when the network is either in the unstable phase or 
is being threatened into the unstable phase by current events. 
 
First, a few trust maintenance scenarios that commonly arise are described and then 
how the model deals with them will be explained. 
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1. A new node wishes to join the network during its stable phase. Once the discovery 
phase is over, the network may still allow newcomers to join the cluster – these join 
the one they are geographically closest to. When a new node presents itself to a 
cluster by broadcasting a hello message to all cluster members (a hello message 
generally only contains the node_id), the cluster head registers this new node on its 
table and assigns it a mid-level trust rating of 0.5 and broadcasts this information to 
the rest of the cluster. This means that the node is neither trustworthy nor 
untrustworthy. This is to give the node the maximum possible chance to integrate 
itself into the cluster and to increase its trust value and overall reputation by 
contributing to the functions of the network.  
 
A new joiner is the only event when the cluster head will broadcast reputation 
information without first being queried. This is understandably to alert its cluster 
members of the presence of the new node and its reputation so they can create a slot 
within their tables for this new node. It is important for the cluster head to send out 
this broadcast message confirming the acceptance of the new node, instead of all 
nodes just adding the new node once they receive the hello message. This is because 
a cluster head may also choose to reject a certain node, based on several reasons. 
One reason may be because of possible congestion issues within the cluster or 
because the cluster may have reached its maximum target size. 
 
If the node is accepted within the cluster, it then starts to behave just like other nodes 
during the trust generation exercise. If it is refused entry, it will then have to move, 
in order to find a cluster willing to accept it. Another option may be to elect itself as 
a cluster head and to wait for other nodes to join it. However, this may be a more 
difficult option since it will have a low rating compared to other cluster heads and 
may not be an attractive option for new nodes. 
 
2. A node wishes to move to an adjacent cluster. If a node wishes to change clusters, 
it needs to send a hello message to its new cluster head but this time with the node_id 
of the cluster head whose cluster it has just left. The new cluster head then sends an 
Rrep message (which is a reputation request) to the adjacent cluster head.  However 
this can only happen if the two cluster heads are within radio range of one another, 
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i.e. forming part of their own super mesh network. The former cluster head may 
reply with the reputation value of the transferring node. The reason why direct radio 
contact is preferable is to prevent any reputation requests from being intercepted and 
forged along a transmitted route between cluster heads. If the two cluster heads are 
not within range of each other, then the node has to follow the exact procedure as a 
new node and build its reputation from scratch. Such an occurrence however is very 
unlikely because nodes will not move to adjacent clusters that are within radio range 
of one another. Instead it is very likely that they will move out of the network. They 
will then be treated as new nodes in whichever network they choose to join. 
 
3. A node leaves a network. The node does not need to do anything when it leaves 
the network. It will be automatically phased out by a gradual decay of its reputation. 
 
4. A cluster head wishes to leave the network. Once a cluster head decides it wants to 
move away from the network, it sends a transfer request to the node within the 
cluster with the highest reputation. This transfer request will contain the following 
data: 
 
{node_id of outgoing CH, dead value, time stamp} 
 
The dead value is seen as an indication that the cluster head no longer wishes to be 
one. It sets a value of 0 within the table for the dead value. Only a prospective 
replacement receives this message. It is not broadcast to the whole cluster. If the 
replacement decides to accept the position, it replies with a similar message, but this 
time with its own node_id and a dead value of 1. Once the outgoing cluster head 
receives this information, it broadcasts it to the rest of the cluster and the new cluster 
head then takes over the operation of the cluster. The outgoing cluster also transfers 
across the reputation tables for the cluster as well as other maintenance tables such as 
variation and black list tables (see Section 3.5.1). 
 
These are a few of the common events that may happen within FRANTIC with an 
indication of the various rules set in place in order to accommodate such events. The 
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next section deals with the Trust Audit which is a more serious form of maintenance, 
especially when the network comes under attack or faces non-cooperation. 
 
3.5.1 Trust Audit 
 
There are various instances in which a trust audit will need to be performed. Put 
simply, a trust audit is trust maintenance in a state other than the stable state (usually 
the unstable state). This means taking corrective action in order to prevent a stable 
network from becoming unstable or to try and stabilise a network which has already 
been made unstable. A trust audit is important because it is what characterises the 
resilience of the model and defines how it can face known trust issues within ad hoc 
networks. 
 
FRANTIC uses a set of rule-based mechanisms to deal with audits. These may be 
customised depending on how severe a threat appears to specific networks. The 
threshold values within rules may be either arbitrarily defined or set as a result of a 
study on various threats to the network. 
 
It can be notoriously difficult to identify an attack, especially when it is not 
particularly vicious in nature. Hence, it is better to err on the side of caution by 
taking an early corrective action for any node that seems suspicious. While this may 
create a higher than normal incidence of false negatives, it will also help in the early 
detection of attacks or non-cooperation and thereby help preserve the network. 
 
The following are actions that are taken by the model, based on a pre-defined set of 
rules. It should be noted that some of the rules have threshold values that are set on 
an ad hoc basis but are configurable based on the specific requirements of the 
scenario within which the framework has been deployed. Generally, the more risk 
there is to the network, the more stringent the rules will be. 
 
1. The reputation of a node falls below 0.2. This is the set threshold for early 
corrective action. It has been set by default at 0.2 as this level is just below mid-way 
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between a node that is completely untrustworthy (0) and one that is neither 
trustworthy nor untrustworthy (0.5). What failing to stay at or over a reputation of 
0.2 involves in FRANTIC is a temporary ban for the node. In practical terms, this 
means that the node_id of said node is dropped from the reputation table that is sent 
out in reply to member nodes. The effect this has is that this node will then be barred 
from using the network as it will not be considered as being part of the cluster and 
therefore part of the network. This is a temporary ban from the cluster head and it 
only lasts for a given time period n. Once the period is over, then the cluster head 
broadcasts the node’s reputation within all its tables at the next request. The 
reputation assigned to the node is the one which it had prior to its reputation falling 
below 0.2.  
 
2. The reputation of a node falls below 0.2 for a second time. This time, the node_id 
is deleted from all tables and the node is therefore ejected from the network and its 
node_id is broadcast to all adjacent cluster heads to be added to a special table for 
barred nodes. 
 
3. The reputation of a node falls below 0.1 within a single cycle. This is very rare and 
either depicts a very selfish node or a node that has been dropping packets 
voluntarily out of malice. The same procedure as point 2 is employed, with no 
chance for the node to redeem itself. 
 
4. A node issues false recommendations, whether highly favourable or highly 
negative for another node. In order to cater for such eventualities, the cluster head 
keeps a record of the variation, λ, of actual trust values from individual member 
nodes from overall reputation. The table below shows an example. In this case, the 
reputation of node X is used to monitor the variance of the trust values supplied by 
nodes A to E. There will be a similar table for all reputations that are calculated. 
 
comp n 
node_id trust values supplied reputation Stand. Dev. 
X TXA TXB TXC TXD TXE 
RX σx 
variation λXA λXB λXC λXD λXE 
Table 3.3: Variation of trust values during a trust audit 
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The standard deviation is also calculated as σx using the following equation: 
 
σx = sqrt.[(1/N)*{( λXA)
2
 + ( λXB)
2
 + ( λXC)
2
 + ( λXD)
2
 + ( λXE)
2
}]          (3.10) 
 
where N is the number of recommendations obtained for X (in this case: 5) and sqrt. 
denotes the square root. 
 
If any λX  value is found to be more than 1 standard deviation away from the mean 
value RX,, then the node is marked on the black list table. This is valid for all 
recommendations that that particular node may make. If the difference in value 
exceeds the standard deviation again, whether in the same cycle or not, then the node 
is barred from the network. It does not matter whether there were artificial 
increments or decreases to the actual value. It should also be noted that the black list 
table, which also includes a list of barred nodes is permanent and is passed down to 
future cluster heads as mentioned previously. 
 
These are therefore the main situations in which trust audit may be deemed necessary 
in order to ensure survival of the network. Although some of the rules may appear 
too stringent, it is necessary to err on the side of caution when operating in open 
networks as the risk to the network is much enhanced. Besides, any wrongly barred 
node has a chance to redeem itself such that there is no danger of the network being 
depleted of good nodes due to a too stringent trust audit mechanism. There is an 
issue with barred nodes in that they may spoof their identities in order to attempt to 
rejoin the same or a different cluster. Because the environment is open and identities 
are not authenticated with central repositories, the threat for this to happen is 
significant. This may not necessarily be an issue as the framework processes would 
automatically result in the node being ejected again, much as it was the first time. It 
is all based on the principle that it does not matter who the node is but rather what 
they do that bears more significance.  
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3.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has detailed how FRANTIC, a framework for decentralised trust 
modelling, operates. This model allows an entity to determine how much it can trust 
another entity it wishes to interact with.  
 
FRANTIC, as presented in this chapter, meets Objectives 1 to 5 from Chapter 1, with 
Objective 6 to be presented in Chapter 5 and Objective 7 in Chapter 4.  
 
The model provides nodes with a way to calculate direct trust that encourages 
fairness and promotes reliability and honesty. It also provides a way to calculate 
reputation. 
 
For reasons depicted in Section 3.4, the model also utilises clustering as part of its 
architecture and provides for the election of cluster heads democratically via a voting 
method. Cluster heads allow for the segregation of duties that offers significant 
operational advantages, see Section 3.4.4. 
 
Finally, in order to meet Objective 5, the framework proposes a rule-based 
mechanism in order to introduce resilience by punishing nodes that prove to be 
selfish or misbehaving.  
 









In Chapter 3, FRANTIC was presented as a novel model for trust within ad hoc 
networks that allows nodes to reduce the uncertainty of interacting with other nodes 
within the network. With the bulk of the theory proposed, it is necessary to verify the 
validity of this approach.  
 
In order to verify the validity of the framework through empirical methods (Chapter 
5), the scenarios for which the tests are undertaken must be defined. In this short 
chapter, these scenarios are presented along with the specific issues they present.  
 
4.1 Model Configuration 
 
In order to be viable for use in an ad hoc network, the framework needs to exhibit the 
following general properties, from a practical viewpoint: 
 
• Lightweight. There must be no significant addition to the existing network 
overhead. In other words, the framework must be “lean” through using existing 
‘in-band’ data as far as possible and minimising the use of additional traffic, ‘out-
of-band’ data that loads the network more and can even provoke congestion. 
There should also be no significant additional demand on storage capabilities. In 
this case, the framework minimises the need for additional data by using routing 
information as part of the trust generating process. Furthermore, the segregation 
of duties between the cluster head and the member nodes address the issues 
posed by the storage of trust data. 
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• Easy and rapid deployment. The framework application should be easily 
accessible to all devices and be able to work on the proposed target devices. The 
trust module added to nodes is simple and can be quickly adapted in order to suit 
specific platforms.  
 
• Scalable. The framework should be usable in both small (fewer than 20) and 
larger (more than 100) networks without needing any modifications. Very large 
networks (300 and above) are not necessarily included in this particular 
requirement since those would usually be found in instances where security 
architectures attached to backbone structures would be available (for example 
wireless computers on a university campus). The operation of the framework is 
restricted to self-starting ad hoc networks only, i.e. those whose nodes have had 




FRANTIC scenarios are designed to implement the following range of properties 
(see Chapters 1 and 2): 
 
• A network consisting primarily of mobile devices such as mobile phones, PDAs 
or notebooks. The framework needs to be able to cater for devices with the least 
operating capacity and resource constraints, e.g., a typical mobile phone. 
Although homogeneous rather than heterogeneous device capacities can make a 
network easier to manage, this framework should also be able to operate with 
different types of devices. 
 
• Device networks range from a few metres to at least a few hundred metres using 
802.11x technology in the upper band. This means that next-hop neighbours will 
be able to locate one another relatively easily within a restricted space such as 
the waiting room of a train station or airport. 
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• A medium-sized network that can range from fewer nodes (more than 20) to 
around 100 or more nodes. 
 
• Nodes may either have a collaborative or non-collaborative purpose. Based on 
the scenarios being described, users may elect to behave either way with the 
framework having to maintain fairness in the system. 
 
• A network with low to medium mobility, i.e. nodes with high or medium pause 
times. This is a necessary requirement since for any viable trust formation to 
take place and propagate through the network, the level of transience has to be 
low. In other words, the framework proposed here will prioritise resource-saving 
over information refreshing. 
 
With these properties in mind, the following two scenarios are proposed for the 
implementation of FRANTIC. 
 
These scenarios are extracted from real life and as such pose a level of complexity 
that is outside the scope of this work as discussed in Section 3.1. The purpose of 
these scenarios is to propose ways in which the framework may be implemented in 
real life such that it is able to utilise some behavioural aspects of these scenarios in 
order to generate trust. The behaviours that make these scenarios relevant for the 
framework are listed at the end of each section. 
 
4.2.1 Disaster Recovery 
 
This scenario is one that has contributed much in spurring the development of ad hoc 
networks. A typical example could include a situation where several emergency units 
from various departments (fire, ambulance and police) have to communicate how 
best to deal with a disaster scenario.  
 
Often emergency response teams enter areas of poor wireless coverage from central 
carriers. This may be because the emergency is underground or it is in a remote 
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location or the sheer demand on the network actually renders the existing 
infrastructure close to useless. Furthermore, the majority of communications required  
to coodinate a rescue effort is bound to be local to the area and thus not really require 
in the input of centralised networks. In this respect, it is of crucial importance for 
devices to develop mutual trust in an effort to promote peer groups that may then 
network in terms of how best to approach a situation. The risk factors in this case are 





A self-starting ad hoc network is required at a disaster site. For discussion purposes, 
this is assumed to be in the form of a terror attack within a city centre. We assume 
conventional methods of communication such as mobile phones are not operational 
due to over-demand or because the infrastructure has been severely damaged. In 




1. Victims of the terror attack (survivors) 
2. Opportunists. These form part of scavenger groups that are there to extract 
maximum personal benefit from a crisis situation irrespective of what may be 
happening around them. Activities include looting and pilfering. 
3. Disruptors. These are perpetrators of the said attack themselves or their 
accomplices. Often, tactics involve luring in more people by a first attack, then 
carrying out a second attack for maximum damage to life and property. 
4. Helpers. This group includes all emergency services and voluntary organisations 
that are there solely for the benefit of victims. 
 
Clearly, there are four major categories of stakeholders within this trust scenario, 
each with very different motives or needs. In this particular example, victims are 
likely to be passive and therefore act as the object of the operation, rather than take 
Chapter 4 – Model Evaluation 
 
107 
any active part within it, which leaves three very specific groups of people with 
conflicting interests. 
 
The overall site can be depicted as per Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Schema for the disaster site showing the location of two service providers electing 
base areas (determined as safe) 
 
Assuming that two safe areas have been set up, service providers will normally be 
operating within those areas to reduce the risk to their personal life. It is the duty of 
emergency services to then bring elements of the disaster (victims or rescued vital 
property) to the safe zones. Service providers range from on-site first aid medical 
teams to voluntary organisations providing shelters and so on.  
 
In this context, safe areas can be easily identified as trustworthy clusters. This is 
possible because safe areas will be usually designated as such and hence easily 
identifiable from visual cues. Models that work within trust management are those 
that can be effectively bootstrapped, otherwise it becomes necessary to use trust 
established out of band. For service providers operating within the disaster zone, 
suitable networking and being able to trust fellow members of the “Helpers” group is 







SERVICE PROVIDER SERVICE PROVIDER 
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“Disruptors” group. One of the major issues within this frantic scenario is that it is 
very difficult to verify people as who they say they are. Because of limited network 
communication, off-site identification confirmations are not possible. Therefore, it is 
imperative to build on the local information available through more localised 
networking between the multiple clusters of aid people. 
 
Initial recognition between clusters in this scenario is mostly visual, for instance via 
logos on vans or uniforms and may be used as a bootstrapping mechanism for later 
exchanging information about rescue operations. The existence of masquerades is 
possible – however, post initial recognition, misbehaving individuals would be 
recognised by their negative actions thus triggering remedial responses as 
appropriate to safeguard the rest of the organisation. By virtue of the hierarchal 
structure of most organisations, each cluster will very likely have a commanding 
figure, and a deputy, holding senior positions, thereby negating the need to have 
cluster head election.   Instantiation of the ad hoc “community” therefore is relatively 
trivial. The focus shifts to how to maintain relationships between the different 
clusters to ensure that vital or confidential information is not being passed on to 
members of groups with motives other than search and rescue.  
 
A typical play-out of the scenario would be as follows: a new voluntary organisation 
turns up at the site. Assuming the organisation is not a well-known one, its intentions 
may appear obscure to others. In order to ascertain the integrity of the members of 
that organisation present on site (forming a cluster), other clusters will have to assess 
its trustworthiness. There is a range of non-networking tasks that need to be 
performed at a rescue site. These can be assigned to new joiners in order to evaluate 
their integrity. Once they reach a certain trust threshold, they can then be integrated 
into the existing ad hoc network operating between older clusters. By making sure 
that new joiners have to validate themselves before they are privy to information 
private to the cluster, the risk of the network being corrupted by non-aid groups is 
relatively small. Opportunists especially will not lose time in trying to collude and 
earn trust in order to earn side benefits from the disaster site. By their very nature, 
they thrive on making the most out of a confusing situation on the spur of the 
moment.  
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A more severe threat would be from Disruptors who have a motive to break down 
any rescue effort. However, even their motives would be highly inhibited if they 
were required to have to earn trust before being allowed into the unsafe zone or 
networking with clusters within the safe zone. 
 
A variant of this type of scenario is the military or battlefield scenario where soldiers 
may communicate with their battalions via self-starting networks within enemy 
territory.  
 
This particular scenario is one that is medium in size (from several dozens to the low 
hundreds), with a common goal, utilising sensitive data, high range (200-400m), 
medium-powered devices. Mobility would vary dependent on the scenario being 
enacted. Battlefield scenarios may expect to be more mobile than disaster recovery 
ones as the latter are often focused around the disaster area and hence likely to 
operate within a specific area, of limited range. 
 
The application of a trust framework to a military context however is more of the 
domain of low-tech militia as opposed to the high-end military operations such as 
those commandeered by the USA. It is assumed that fighters on the ground do not 
have access to satellite information, nor are they equipped with GPS devices. Data 
transmission is not encrypted either as each end user does not possess equipment 
adequate enough to deal with it.  The focus of trust management therefore relies 
heavily on peer evaluation. In a militia scenario, there may not be visible cues as to 
the identification of friend or foe and combatants may need to rely on 
recommendations from peers in order to evaluate the level to which they should trust 
whomever they network with on the field.  
 
This scenario presents the following advantages: clustering has in a sense already 
happened due to the different types of stakeholders available. Bootstrapping of the 
network can also be assumed to be fairly complete as the emergency response team 
will be coordinating with their known bases and it is highly likely that smaller rescue 
teams would be headed by a trusted peer, who can then naturally act as a cluster 
head. 
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Therefore in this scenario, the focus would be more on detecting selfish nodes and 
attempting to detect and promote interactions only with collaborative nodes. This can 
happen using the rule-based mechanisms present in the framework. In order to assess 
how quickly they work, nodes in the framework can be made to drop packets quickly 
and the response times noted. This behaviour is typical of Disruptors who would 
seek to bring down any rescue effort. The ability of the framework to deal with them 
can thus be measured. 
 
In terms of context, this scenario proposes a common goal for the participants of the 
ad hoc network. The use of context information is not as important here because all 
Helpers would be seeking to trust other Helpers based on their ability to aid their 
terror victims. The major goal here would be coordination of the rescue effort and 
the type of messages being relayed would also be voice messages or text messages 
signalling the location where resources are required. The success or failure of each 
request for transmission of such messages is analogous to the request of routing 
messages involved in this framework and they can be inferred to provide similar trust 
information. This therefore makes the experiments performed in Chapter 5 at a low 
level relevant for a higher level via abstraction. 
 
4.2.2 Travellers’ Web 
 
The expectation from ubiquitous computing is that many people now expect to be 
able to communicate with one another at all times, especially when travelling and 
having to wait in airport lounges, cafes, train stations and cabins and so forth.  
 
While most will now have the ability to do so thanks to the different types of 
networks available to them (ranging from wireless LANs to cellular networks), they 
may also want to interact locally with fellow passengers. With the amount of 
multimedia content now available on typical cellular phones and tablet computers, 
such interactions may involve anything from sharing music files to playing games 
with one another.  
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The rationale behind promoting this type of network is that although most users will 
have access to online resources such as web gaming or downloading, a high 
percentage of them will prefer networking with their local counterparts as this type 
of interaction is often free, as opposed to significant charges that may be levied on 
value-added services by telecommunications providers. Indeed, downloading music 
or even playing games online from your mobile can prove costly to the average user. 
Faced with the increasing capabilities of cellular phones (which are rapidly turning 
into mobile multimedia devices), networks now have no option but to limit the 
amount of data that can be transferred over the air. Along with this restriction, in 
many situations, no networking coverage is available at all (as is currently the case 
for underground travel in the UK). 
 
Nonetheless in order to be able to interact and share resources with their peers, nodes 
will need to be made trustworthy (at least to some extent) by a trust framework. 
Again, using the basic factors detailed previously, such networks will be medium 
sized (typically in the dozens of participants or even lower) using low-powered 
devices (generally PDAs or cellular phones) with a medium range and low mobility 
(passengers in a train for instance, although on the move will be stationary with 
respect to one another).  
 
In this case, users may be able to select a certain service level they wish to provide or 
receive. For example, some may wish to receive news from fellow passengers’ PDAs 
which may have previously synchronised with an online source. Others may elect to 
play games, or indeed share files or music. Each of these service levels has different 
trust requirements because the level of involvement of each user, and therefore the 
level of risk, is different. Clusters of users can be formed between those that fall 
within a particular level, which for the sake of argument, can be termed “privacy” 
levels. In other words, newsreaders can be pooled into a relatively low risk category 
and share their resources that way. Once they have managed to exchange 
information, their trust reputation will go up vis-à-vis each other. They may then 
elect to move to a more sensitive privacy level and opt to play games with each 
other. It should be noted that users that allow interactions at more private levels 
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automatically include those within lesser levels. For instance, a gamer can also 
interact within a news reading cluster.  
 
Such a scenario therefore constitutes one more example where a trust framework can 
be effectively applied in order to manage a number of users who wish to cooperate or 
pool resources for common usage. The focus in this type of scenario is on service 
provision, whereby different participants will have varying needs for several services 
and the trust requirements for these services will vary too. In effect, this models the 
concept of giving contextual information to trust. 
 
A variant of the travellers’ web scenario would be the exhibition scenario (Boodnah 
& Poslad, 2009). The scenario depicted by the model here is that of a large 
exhibition centre where users are spread out over a relatively large area but at the 
same time are bound within a confined space (the perimeter of the exhibition centre). 
Because of the way exhibition centres are laid out, there is the natural tendency for 
clusters to be formed based on people’s locations. These clusters will generally be 
either specific stands where people congregate or areas of the exhibition centre 
relative to the interest of a certain section of the visiting population (e.g. car 
technology for male visitors and beauty products for female visitors – these can be 
subdivided into further segments).  
 
This particular scenario is interesting in that it presents two options for 
bootstrapping: a cluster-head can be naturally assumed for a given cluster (in the 
scenario above, this can be the exhibition manager of a particular stand, a large 
trustworthy client or even exhibition centre hosts), or an election can take place in 




An outline of the scenario that can be depicted in the travellers’ web can be as 
follows. One can consider that the formation of a temporary network aboard a train 
to be an effective way to manage devices that may wish to interact with one another. 
As mentioned before, although a train may be mobile, its passengers are often not 
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with respect to one another, so clusters will tend to form naturally within and 
between carriages. Newcomers and leavers are depicted by passengers getting on and 
off the train at stations. In this scenario (unlike that of the disaster recovery), 
stakeholders can be simplified as belonging to two main groups: willing participants 
(good nodes) and disruptors (bad nodes – these include those unwilling to cooperate 




In this scenario, the key stakeholders would interact in the following way. 
 
Upon departure from the originating station, participants may start to interact with 
one another by seeking others that may share the need for the same or similar 
services.  
 
The interaction of nodes looking for a particular type of service will naturally result 
in natural aggregation. In this case, clustering of nodes may form not only based on 
geographical positions (such as carriages or seats etc.) but also based on their service 
needs. 
 
The existence of different service levels with varying trust requirements presents a 
good opportunity to allow entities to interact on a low-risk basis (by using non-
sensitive services) in order to establish initial trust relationships. Once the latter are 
in place and relationships as well as reputations evolve within the network, entities 
would naturally move on to the natural election of cluster heads and from thereon 
diversifying the portfolio of services they feel ready to request and share.  In this 
particular scenario, it may be worthwhile to note that instantly recognisable entities 
such as on-board train staff may operate passive devices that help in the 
establishment of the trust communities within compartments. However, for the 
purposes of this work, this assumption, although probable in real life, is not made.  
 
Disruptors in this scenario would primarily come in two forms: entities wishing to 
leech resources from the network (thus being non-cooperative) and those wishing to 
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inflict intentional harm to the network with a view of either stopping its usage or 
gathering any form of sensitive data such as the service usage patterns of participants 
with a view to using such information commercially (for instance in targeted 
advertising).  
 
Although there are two distinct types of disruptors here, the framework will treat 
both in the same manner, ultimately resulting in both types being evicted from the 
network. It may be argued that actively disruptive nodes should be removed more 
pressingly but the resources required to distinguish an actively disruptive node would 
be mostly found on centralised trust models with online access (for instance to only 
allow authorised nodes), so this is not possible here.  
 
Nodes within this scenario have limited mobility with respect to one another. There 
is the need for the network to acknowledge new entrants and leavers as well as those 
nodes that may seek to migrate to different parts of the train. 
 
Contrarily to the Disaster Recovery scenario, in this instance, one cannot assume that 
clusters have been predetermined or that the users may have previously interacted. 
One could argue that some passengers may know each other by sharing the same 
commute but this is not always the case. 
 
There is the possibility to mimic the data transfer in this case by seeing how long a 
hitherto unknown network creates a trust framework by allowing interaction between 
peers. Although the actual content being shared will vary, and with it the context 
within which trust is acquired, the model can still provide a good indication of how 
trust can aid in selecting appropriate partners for sharing and pooling resources. By 
using low level data to create the trust relationship, the framework can then allow 
users to share more complex content once the relationship has been formed. This 
makes the framework relevant for use even in such a complex scenario. Even though 
the individual contexts within which the trust has been acquired will vary, one can 
argue that it remains sufficiently similar for collaboration to take place. For example, 
one may trust a user to share cached news on the same level that one may trust said 
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user to play an online game or share non-sensitive data such as user playlists or even 
music files. 
 
With these two scenarios defined (with some of their trust aspects to be verified in 
Chapter 5), Section 4.3 now focuses on defining some performance metrics in order 
to produce meaningful data that can provide the potential user of a framework 
relevant information with regards to its effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
4.3 Key Performance Indicators 
 
Having depicted two general scenarios under which FRANTIC may be called to 
operate, the following section proposes a few novel ways in which the 
trustworthiness of a network may be assessed. These metrics are general and have 
not been produced uniquely to assess FRANTIC. The very existence of these metrics 
is to allow direct comparison of frameworks by very general attributes. This work 
can be considered laterally to the main argument of this thesis and offers an 
additional independent contribution to the state of the art in this area. 
 
There are two main types of metrics that can be generated. One is a service 
environment metric and the other a service specific metric. Service environment 
metrics generally depict resource availability whereas service specific metrics further 
define the particular characteristics for an individual service. 
 
4.3.1 Service Environment Metrics 
 
One of the key measures of a service environment (Kalasapur et al., 2006) is service 
density which is an indication of the ability of the environment to support user tasks. 
This is given by the ratio of the total number of services to the total number of 
requests.  
 
Service density = {nt / nr}                 (4.1) 
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In order to meet all user requests, the density should be at least 1.  
 
In FRANTIC, the number of requests for reputation a cluster head can process within 
a given time divided by the actual number of requests from member nodes can be 
defined as the cluster density. Using the concept of cycles as depicted in Section 
5.2.1, the cluster density, Cn, for a given cycle n is given by: 
 
Cn ={Rt / Ra}                              (4.2) 
 
Where Rt is the total number of requests that can be accommodated by the cluster 
head and Ra is the actual number of requests received.  
 
When Cn falls below 1, this means that the cluster head is over-subscribed. This may 
be because it has exceeded the maximum number of nodes it can accommodate 
within its cluster or it has received an inordinate amount of requests for reputation 
due to heavy network traffic.  
 
Another metric which provides an overview of how clustered the framework is is 
network density, Nd. This is simply the ratio of the total number of nodes, Tn, to the 
total number of clusters, Tc. 
 
Nd = {Tn / Tc}                                                                                                           (4.3) 
 
The network density is helpful at the discovery state. A low network density is likely 
to translate into faster trust establishment and thus faster cluster head election, with 
the stable state being reached sooner. This is because smaller clusters are able to 
compute their interactions within a shorter period of time. Also, the fewer nodes in a 
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4.3.2 Service Specific Metrics 
 
One of the services in which a measurable impact of trust can be determined is in 
route discovery. The success rate of route requests can be determined by Sr. 
 
Sr = {Qs / Qr}                  (4.4) 
 
Where Qs is the number of successful route requests and Qr is the total number of 
route requests.  
 
With the trust framework in operation in the stable state, a new success rate, Srt, can 
be calculated in much the same way as above. 
 
Srt = {Qst / Qrt}                  (4.5) 
 
The impact of the trust framework can then be calculated from the following 
 
Imr = Srt – Sr                   (4.6) 
 
Where Imr is the impact of the framework on routing requests. 
The impact of a framework can be an objective way in which to measure the 
efficiency of that framework for a given service, in this case route discovery. While 
route discovery is not the prime motivation of a trust framework, it is an important 
consideration in an ad hoc network and good routes are central to the survival of the 
network. 
 
Another instantaneous metric that can provide an indication as to how the framework 
is faring in terms of its trust service availability is the quick ratio. 
 
Quick ratio = An / At                   (4.7) 
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This is the ratio of the number of good nodes, An,  to the total number of nodes, At. 
The higher the ratio, the better equipped the network is to perform constructive tasks 
pertinent to the existence of the network. The quick ratio does not differentiate 
between non-cooperative and misbehaving nodes. This is because the end product is 
the same: non-availability of nodes to perform routine tasks and because this is a 
measure of service availability, this differentiation is not required. 
 
Trust audit is a much needed feature of trust frameworks and measurement of audit 
capacity is useful. To this end, the audit impact, Ima, can be measured as per equation 
4.8. 
 
Ima = [(Ab1 + Al1) – (Ab2 + Al2)] / (t2 – t1)               (4.8) 
 
Ab1  is the number of bad/misbehaving nodes (trying to harm the network with intent) 
at time t1 and Al1 is the number of latent nodes at the same time frame. The same 
notation is used respectively for time t2. It can be seen that the impact of the 
framework on trust audit is measured by the reduction (or increase) in the number of 
non-performing nodes within a given time period. It is different to the quick ratio 
which measures trust service availability at a given time (snapshot). The impact is 
measured over a given period and focuses exclusively on the ability of the 
framework to weed out non-performing nodes. 
 
There are other ratios that could similarly be developed for a host of services that 
may be expected to run on an ad hoc network. However, route discovery, trust 
service availability as well as audit capacity are the key metrics to consider in a trust 
framework. These metrics correspond to the network being established, trust being 
established, and maintaining trust. These ratios are also non-specific and could be 
applied across a range of trust frameworks built on different technologies and using 
different techniques. These ratios make such frameworks directly comparable in an 
objective way. Such assessment of frameworks is novel. It is hoped that these ratios 
may offer the building ground to develop standard ratios that could be used across 
the trust design field in order to compare methods and assess efficiency. 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter proposes ways in which trust frameworks can be adequately assessed. 
Two different real-life scenarios are proposed on which the application of a trust 
framework would greatly enhance the delivery of services. 
 
In the first instance, a disaster recovery scenario is envisaged. This is the more 
dynamic of the two in that nodes are expected to move relatively frequently in and 
out of clusters. However, the initial establishment of clusters proves to be more 
straightforward purely due to the range of services on offer and the ability to seek out 
trusted individuals easily. The increased mobility of nodes is therefore tempered by 
the strong bases clusters and their cluster heads provide. 
 
In the second scenario, nodes tend to be less mobile. Interaction within the cluster is 
expected to take precedence as nodes aggregate around those with which they share 
common themes. They are therefore unlikely to move on until acted upon by external 
factors (such as the need to get off at a train station or moving on to the next exhibit 
at a trade fair). The more challenging aspect of the second scenario is in effect the 
bootstrapping mechanism whereby nodes have to interact “blindly” at first in order to 
establish a rapport.  
 
The third part of this chapter moves on to a more general way of assessing trust 
frameworks. It proposes a series of key metrics, analogous to those in the financial 
services, in order to enhance comparison between frameworks. The development of 
key metrics also allows potential users of a trust framework to assess its efficiency 
quickly. While these metrics are not foolproof, they provide an adequate snapshot of 
the state of the network at any point in time and can also help assess the performance 
of the framework over a given period. 
 
Chapter 5 will now deal with some empirical assessments of the framework by 
looking at performance both within and between clusters. An assessment of the way 
in which FRANTIC meets the objectives initially set out in this thesis will then be 
made.











In order to determine whether the model depicted in Chapter 3 is viable, it needs to 
be verified and tested. This can be done in several ways, ranging from simple 
experiments to confirm whether or not its operations are as expected, to more 
elaborate scenarios designed to confirm that the framework is able to perform within 
more realistic situations. To do this, a set of experiments has been designed in order 
to verify the several key aspects of FRANTIC and to ascertain that the process of 
generating, distributing and maintaining trust within an ad hoc network is 
successfully implemented and that a display of resilience against malevolent 
behaviour is also present. The experimentation is laid out in Section 5.3. 
 
These experiments are then validated against the set objectives and requirements 
from Chapters 1 and 2 respectively. This can be found in Section 5.4. 
 
Most of the simulations have been performed on a Network Simulator, NS-2 (NS-2, 
2009), with some modifications brought in where needed. The detailed specifications 
of each implemented scenario precede each experiment. 
 
In order to facilitate the understanding of the experimental layout, a tabular roadmap 
of the experiments and their aims is presented in Section 5.2. Further to that, an 
evaluation summary is also given prior to the discussion in Section 5.4 to aid the 
mapping of objectives and requirements to the experimentation. 
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This particular section of the experimentation involves purely testing the model and 
its algorithms to make sure they work as intended and that the outputs are as 
expected. The aim is to make sure they are no anomalies present within the design, 
and if there are, that they may be investigated and corrected. Once this is ascertained, 
the remainder of the experiments will show that the trust model, when applied, is 
effective. 
 
In order to calculate trust values and reputation values in a timely manner so that 
they can be accurately represented graphically, the cluster heads in FRANTIC will 
be programmed to calculate the reputation in cycles. This means that at the end of 
every cycle, all nodes send their trust data to the cluster head that then computes the 
individual reputations. However, safeguards must be put in place because by 
allowing all nodes to send their data at the same instant to the cluster head, the risk of 
congestion is increased and may result in packets being dropped, thereby resulting in 
the cluster head receiving inadequate or incomplete information. There is also the 
possibility of a second wave of congestion as the cluster head then proceeds to flood 
the cluster with the reputation tables. Not only is this a waste of resources, but it may 
also involve nodes receiving redundant information about nodes they do not have a 
one-hop relationship with. 
 
The cycles are therefore staggered. This means that the cycles for the cluster head 
and member nodes are out of sync with one another. At the end of every cycle, the 
cluster head calculates reputations. However, it does not proactively broadcast those 
in order to minimise bandwidth usage. Instead, the cluster head stores the 
information and only replies to nodes that provide fresh data during the next current 
cycle.  
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Cluster heads only keep a maximum of four cycles’ worth of data with the fifth one 
replacing the first and so on. This is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Cycles stored by the Cluster Head up to a maximum of four. The oldest set of data is 
then removed as new data comes in 
 
For each recommendation it receives from a cluster member, the cluster head keeps 
the following information: 
 
{node_id of trustor, node_id of trustee, trust value of trustee, time-stamp t} 
 
Each time it receives a recommendation about a node, the cluster head stores it in the 
table for that cycle, within a given row for that node. Any other incoming 
recommendations that fall within the same cycle are then added to the same row.  
 
At the end of the cycle, the cluster head calculates the average of the 
recommendations it has received for a given node and produces the reputation value. 
 



























Cycle 5 Cycle 2 Cycle 6 
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5.2.2 Testing Roadmap & Experimental Plan 
 
Experimental testing is key in order to determine the validity of a framework in 
performing assigned objectives and requirements. To that end, a set of experiments 
has been devised that aids this purpose. There are several stages in a trust framework 
and these relate namely to the trust formation within the network, its distribution to 
the other nodes and hosts and its maintenance over time. Also relevant to the trust 
framework are the issues of efficiency and resilience. As an aside to testing, some 
comparative metrics are also calculated within Section 5.3.6. The list of experiments, 
along with their high level aims, is given in Table 5.1. 
 




Initial Algorithm Testing 
Experiment A 
The aim of this particular experiment is to firstly check 
the functioning of the trust algorithm defined in Chapter 
3. 
The experiment also serves to show the trust formation 
process within a single node, interacting within its 
cluster. It is possible to see the evolution of trust in 
response to the behaviour of the node as it deals with 
requests from its neighbours Trust 
formation Section 5.3.1 
Initial Algorithm Testing 
Experiment B 
This second experiment is designed to test a different 
feature of the trust algorithm within the same 
experimental set-up of Experiment A. 
The aim is to confirm that the framework can adequately 
reverse the trust build up process in response to negative 
feedback from a node’s behaviour, i.e. that is able to 
respond to good as well as bad feedback on varying 




Experiment A looks at the trust distribution process 
within a cluster. Having observed the impact of the 
framework on a single node’s reputation, this experiment 
is to verify whether this impact is replicated across the 
cluster, i.e. whether reputation is being accurately 
propagated. In order to do this, all members of the cluster 
are monitored based on random inputs. 
Trust 
distribution 
Section 5.3.2 The aim of Experiment B is the next step up to determine 
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the distribution of trust within the whole network. With 
the previous experiments depicting behaviours in a 
single node followed by that in a single cluster, 
Experiment B extends the concept to the whole network. 
The network chosen here is one represented by a 
travellers’ web scenario with 4 interacting clusters. To 
aid graphical representation, the varying reputations of 
each of the 6 nodes in each cluster are averaged out such 
that the average cluster reputation is presented. The aim 
here is to show distribution and evolution of reputation 
across the network (this has already been shown for 
nodes and individual clusters, so the data is not shown 
again here for clarity). 
Section 5.3.3 
Maintenance Testing 
This experiment offers different data inputs at various 
cycles in order to show the trust maintenance process at 
work within a normal trust lifecycle.  
Part of this experiment is similar to what was 
implemented in Experiment B of Section 5.3.1, however, 
in this case, other inputs are also addressed such as the 
need for the framework to respond to non-cooperation 
and data loss as well as displaying the concept of trust 
natural decay. 
This experiment is performed on a single node and 
scalability of similar behaviour across the network is 




Node Analysis (Network 
Overhead Simulation) 
Having investigated the trust lifecycle, the aim is now to 
test whether the framework operates efficiently. This is 
achieved by monitoring the network overhead generated 
from the trust processes. 
In this experiment, the impact is assessed at a node level.  
Trust 
framework 
efficiency Section 5.3.4.2 
Cluster Head Analysis 
(Network Overhead 
Simulation) 
The aims for this experiment are the same. However, in 
this case, the impact on the cluster head is noted as it is a 
very important element in the trust formation process and 
is likely to handle more traffic than its lower peers. 
Section 5.3.5.2 
Threat Testing (Trust 
Auditing) 
This experiment measures the response of the framework 
to misbehaviour – a term used encompassing various 
types of attacks (whether intentional or not) that would 
Trust threat 
audit 
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Experiment Performed Aims of Experiment 
Related 
Trust Aspect 
result in detrimental impact to accurate reputational 
representation. The isolation of nodes indulging in 
misbehaviour is one expectation of the framework. 
 
Also of interest is the investigation of a node when faced 
with a temporary Denial of Service attack. The aim here 
is to show that the framework allows such nodes to 
rebuild their reputation, especially those that are active 





While these are not experiments as such, the aim is to 
show that it is possible to have an idea of the state of the 
network by using pre-defined metrics. Assuming similar 
data is available from other networks, these metrics can 
enhance comparability between models running on 
different types of architectures, where direct 




Table 5.1: Experimental roadmap 
 
With the experimental roadmap clearly defined, the actual testing and the results are 
shown in Section 5.3. 
 
However, along with a list of the experiments and their aims, it is important to decide 
on an experimental plan, i.e. which sets out the list of Objectives or Requirements 
the testing refers to. In this case, the categories of experimentation are more relevant 
than the experiments themselves. Table 5.2 shows these categories and the 





Trust formation These experiments should meet 
Objective 1 by showing that a node can 
effectively derive an indication of 
trustworthiness based on interactions. 
Objective 4 can also be partially met if 
Trust formation must show reasoning 
(Requirement 3) as well as trust 
information (Requirement 4). 






good behaviour is shown to be rewarded. 
Trust distribution These experiments which denote the 
propagation of trust within the network 
must meet Objective 2, thus allowing for 
reputation information to flow in the 
network even for nodes that may not 
have previously met one another. 
Based on the way the model operates, 
these experiments must also fulfil part of 
Objective 3 – a set number of databases 
are used to store reputation information 
which are smaller and fewer. 
Objective 4 can also be partially met if 
good behaviour is shown to be rewarded. 
This must meet Requirement 2 
showing that the features of the 
model are scalable from clusters to 
the network and potentially larger 
networks. 
Distribution of trust also involves 
meeting Requirement 5 on trust 
recommendation and reputation.  
Requirement 11 on selective 




The aim here is to meet Objectives 1-4 as 
trust maintenance encompasses all 4 of 
them, including reputation and trust 
management as well as a system of 
rewards and exemption in the case of the 
cluster head. 
Requirement 6 must be met by these 
experiments as it must show nodes 
being rewarded by performing well 
for the network. 
Requirement 8 on local repositories 
can be shown to be present here as 
the data moves between nodes and 
clusters. 





These experiments are designed to meet 
Objectives 4 and 6. The efficiency of the 
system must be shown as well as the 
advantages over a fully distributed 
system. 
This must show that the cluster head 
receives limited additional overhead 
if at all because of the incentives 
available to it (Requirement 6). 
The experiment must also meet 
Requirement 7, with a special 
experiment highlighting the cluster 
head and thus showing different 
classes of node. 
Requirement 8 must also be fulfilled 
as local repositories are key to better 
efficiency. 
Trust auditing Trust auditing relates to Objective 5 and These experiments are key to 






the experiments are designed to show 
some resilience from the framework 
along with the existence of an 
appropriate punishment system. 




This analysis is designed to meet 
Objective 7, which is to enhance 
comparability of trust models. 
This analysis is designed to meet an 
Objective relating to general models 
and therefore is not relevant to a 
specific requirement for this 
particular framework. 
Table 5.2: Experimental plan 
 
5.3 Experimental Testing 
 




Aim of Experiment: This experiment is conducted to mimic the trust formation 
process within a given cluster in the Travellers’ Web Scenario. The trust information 
is distributed throughout the cluster. 
 
Strategy: Participants in the Travellers’ Web scenario would upon joining exchange 
unimportant data in order to create some interactions that would allow trust build up 
to start. Routing data at the network layer is just as useful in that respect and this is 
what is used in the simulation with NS-2. In order to monitor the trust formation 
process, the evolution of trust within one node is monitored. 
 
Data Set Selection: Routing data is perfectly adequate for this use as the framework 
only needs to analyse the behaviour of the node in response to the traffic inputs. As a 
single node is being observed, static CBR over fixed links is the best way to control 
the experiment and provide targeted inputs to the node. Bursts of data flow are a 
good approximation of how data would be expected to flow within the scenario as 
Chapter 5 – Performance Assessment 
 
128 
random requests are received from users of the network (for example a file download 
would result in a data burst across the node, followed by no data, if no other user 
requests are noted). 
 
Methodology: The network is set up, with one cluster (Cluster A) as per Figure 5.2 
below. Cluster A is defined as the set of participants within the Travellers’ Web 
scenario that are looking to exchange information within 1 carriage. The experiment 
is performed within only one cluster at this point in time in order to ascertain how the 
trust evolves within a member node within the cluster. This is purely to verify that 
algorithms work as expected. Nodes 1-6 are the member nodes of the cluster with 
CH, designated as cluster head. At this point in time, cluster heads are assumed to 
have been designated and are a trusted entity in the network as the focus is on the 
trust distribution rather than bootstrapping. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Intra-cluster testing set-up – a Cluster Head is designated with 6 nodes being 
monitored at any one time 
 
As per previous specifications, the assumption that the model operates in cycles of 
100s will be maintained. This assumption is valid for the rest of the experiments 
within this chapter, unless specified otherwise. The cycle of 100s is chosen for 
operational reasons here but cycle durations can vary depending on the level of 
mobility within the network and how fast trust needs to be established and 
distributed. 
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Nodes are expected to collect data on their one-hop neighbours as expected with the 
data being fed to the CH at the end of every individual cycle. In this particular 
experiment, it will also be assumed that all bi-directional links between nodes are 
fully functional and that no packets are dropped by any node. The effects of trust 
decaying over time are also ignored in this experiment such that the reputation of a 
node will remain constant if no trust data is collected about it within a given cycle. 
 
This experiment is designed to investigate the effects of traffic flow on node 1 as 
viewed by the CH. The experiment will be run for 1200s or 12 cycles. During this 
period data flow through node 1 will be manually controlled by initiating the flows at 
specific periods in time. However, the amount of actual data flowing though the node 
within those specific periods will remain random. All packets sent are of fixed size, 
with UDP (User Datagram Protocol) being used to simulate CBR (Constant Bit Rate) 
traffic. Because these simulations are run on a low-level simulator, no actual service 
is depicted. Within the real life scenario however, the information exchange would 
be relevant to the service being requested and distributed. 
 
Based on the design of FRANTIC, in this case, because the node under investigation 
is node 1, only nodes 2 and 6 will be involved in the trust rating process since they 
are the only 2 nodes being on a one-hop link to node 1 (excluding the CH which has 
one-hop links to all nodes within its cluster). 
 
Using concepts defined within Chapter 3, the following traffic (Figure 5.1) was 








(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Flow end 
(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Role of node 
0-100 0 0 0 none 
100-200 fid_1 125 150 router 
200-300 0 0 0 none 
300-400 fid_2 350 375 router 








(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Flow end 
(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Role of node 
400-500 fid_3a 410 430 router 
400-500 fid_3b 450 470 source 
500-600 fid_4 530 570 router 
600-700 fid_5 620 660 sink 
700-800 fid_6 710 730 router 
800-900 fid_7a 815 840 source 
800-900 fid_7b 850 870 sink 
900-1000 fid_8 930 970 router 
1000-1100 fid_9 1000 1040 source 
1100-1200 0 0 0 none 
Table 5.3: Input to trust framework for node 1 showing the effect of various types of traffic 
flows on the reputation of the node 
 
Fid are the traffic patterns generated within the network. For example, the generation 
of packets between 125 and 150 seconds after the simulation start is known as fid_1. 
The role of the node is simply defined as its purpose within the selected fid. For 
example in Table 5.3, all the traffic data relates to Node 1. Different traffic patterns 
are sent through the node under investigation. 
 
One can therefore see that during the course of the simulation, Node 1 behaves as 
source, router and sink altogether. When behaving as a source, the traffic originates 
from Node 1 and conversely when behaving as a sink, the traffic ends at Node 1. 
When Node 1 merely routes data for other nodes, its role is denoted as being a router. 
 
Having run the experiment, the values outputted by the CH in its table for node 1 are 
then plotted against time cycles as per the graph in Figure 5.3. 
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Variation of Reputation of Node 1 as viewed by Cluster
 
Figure 5.3: The variation of reputation of Node 1 following the inputs of various flows of traffic 
at each cycle 
 
Findings: The above graph is a clear display of how node 1 is able to build its 
reputation in the eyes of its peers by behaving correctly within the network. It can be 
seen that the reputation of the node increases as it accepts traffic requests for others 
and falls slightly when it asks the network to perform work for it (this only happens 
in the absence of work being done for the network concurrently). For example when 
the node operates only as a sink or as a source during a given time period and does 
not perform any relaying duties that would have counteracted the negative impacts of 
the source and sink roles. 
 
Therefore, in the case of new node that would have joined the Travellers’ Web 
scenario, one can see how its reputation would have evolved if it had performed the 
mundane tasks associated with network routing. Having acquired a reputation and 
therefore a history within the network, it would then be able to interact more freely 
and increase the complexity of the information being exchanged with its peers and 
get rated accordingly. 
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There are a few points that should be noted: 
 
 The reputation of the node does not change when there is no traffic passing 
through it. Although in FRANTIC no traffic would have been equivalent to its 
reputation undergoing decay, this feature will not be implemented in this 
particular experiment to highlight the effects of how the node’s actions have 
repercussions on their reputation. 
 
 Further analysis of the graph confirms that the cycles where the node gained the 
maximum in terms of its reputation were where it routed more traffic. Two long 
CBR-data packed cycles between 500-600s and 900-1000s confirm this 
hypothesis to be true as the graph shows the steepest gradients at those points. 
 
 Furthermore, the effect of the node imposing its own load on the network (by 
acting as a source or sink) is noticeable, but because the node has a drop rate  of 
zero and has otherwise behaved altruistically, such effects are minimal as can be 
evidenced from the low gradients of the drops in reputation. This is because the 
negative impact due to the gain of the node is less significant than the positive 
impact received by the network due to its workload. This was incorporated in the 
design so as to provide an incentive for nodes to cooperate to the network. 
 
However, contrary to the gain, the drop rate has just as aggravating an effect on 
reputation as the workload has a positive one. This is illustrated in the following 
experiment with data being fed as per the table below. All assumptions remain the 
same at this point. 
 
Experiment B  
 
Aim: This is to investigate the effect of having a high drop rate on the reputation of a 
node. This behaviour mimics that of Disruptor nodes within the Travellers’ Web and 
even the Disaster Recovery scenarios.  
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Strategy: The same set-up is used as previously, except that the nature of the traffic 
passing through the node under investigation and its subsequent behaviour towards 
that traffic are altered in order to meet the aim of the experiment. 
 






(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Flow end 
(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Role of node 
0-100s 0 0 0 none 
100-200s fid_1 130s 180s sink 
200-300s 0 0 0 none 
300-400s fid_2 310 350 sink 
400-500s fid_3 410 450 router (drop all) 
500-600s fid_4 510 560 router (drop all) 
600-1200s 
(7 cycles) 
0 0 0 none 
Table 5.4: The traffic input to the trust framework in order to show the significance of nodes 
dropping traffic whether by intent or not 
 
Methodology: Again, this is similar to the previous experiment. The difference is in 
the type of traffic being sent and in the behaviour of the node. 
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Variation of Reputation of Node 1 as viewed by Cluster
 
Figure 5.4: Variation of reputation of Node 1 after traffic input in order to show the effect of a 
node dropping packets 
 
The overall result from this flow is displayed in Figure 5.4. 
 
Findings: This experiment illustrates the characteristics of a typical Disruptor node 
in the Traveller’s Web scenario. In the first two cycles where data is exchanged, the 
node only behaves a sink and does not forward any packets at all. This results in its 
reputation dropping as consistent with the algorithm punishing selfishness. However 
the drop is not steep because the selfishness of the node is not severe and also 
selfishness is not as bad as losing data although both would eventually result in 
reputation loss. The first two cycles therefore exemplify the Disruptor node when it 
is operating non-cooperatively (one of the two types of Disruptor nodes identified in 
the scenario). 
 
The intentional Disruptor is modelled in the second set of cycles between 400 to 600 
seconds. Here it can be seen that the node has been made to expressly drop all the 
data it has been sent. This is a worst-case scenario that is not likely to happen, unless 
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in the most severe of attacks or if a node has a technical failure. However, this is 
displayed here to show that the model can respond to nodes exhibiting high drop 
rates by lowering their reputations accordingly.  
 
After 600s, the node’s reputation falls below 0.1 within a single cycle, and it is 
banned from the network with its reputation thereby registering as from 700s 
onwards and no traffic being routed through or by it since it is no longer allowed to 
participate in the network. This is an insight of trust auditing at work (more on this in 
latter sections of this chapter). 
 
These two experiments clearly demonstrate that the two types of stakeholders 
identified within the Travellers’ Web scenario can be appropriately modelled. By 
analysing how reputation varies at the node level and the varying degrees of 
feedback the framework provides in response to altering behaviour, the parallel 
between individuals’ behaviour within the scenario and the system response can be 
drawn. 
 




Aim: Further to the experiments performed in 5.3.1, the aim here is to see whether 
the model appropriately scales the algorithm such that the reputation of all the nodes 
are accurately depicted as was the case with Node 1 previously. 
 
Strategy: The same strategy is employed, except that this time the monitoring is 
extended to cover all 6 nodes within the network.  
Data Set Selection: This is again the same as for Section 5.3.1. However, with 
regards to the number of nodes in the cluster, 6 nodes have been picked. This is 
because this is potentially the maximum number of people that would be in close 
proximity for data exchange and is derived from the Bluetooth piconet design where 
a master can only have a maximum of 7 slaves and therefore 6 users were chosen as 
being just under the maximum. 
Chapter 5 – Performance Assessment 
 
136 
 Methodology: In order to do this, the same cluster of 6 nodes (Figure 5.2) is set up 
with a cluster head. The experiment is then started as per section 5.3.1 using the 
same assumptions. However, instead of focusing on only one node, traffic is 
generated across the whole cluster. 
 
In this case, random flows of traffic are generated across all nodes so they may act as 
routers, sources and sinks during various cycles. The experiment is run for 1200s as 
previously and the reputation of all nodes as calculated by the cluster head is then 
plotted as a function of time.  
 
Findings: Figure 5.5 shows the variation of reputation within the cluster. This shows 
that in a particular cluster, trust relationships exist and evolve based on the behaviour 
of nodes previously explored in 5.3.1. 
 
Different nodes within the cluster see their reputations evolve based on the random 
flow of traffic they experienced.  
 
In this experiment, 4 nodes were classed as good nodes within the scenario (as per 
the 1
st
 experiment in 5.3.1) and 2 nodes set up as Disruptors (as per the 2
nd
 
experiment in 5.3.1). Of the two, one was a clear non-cooperative node (Node 4) and 
the other was an intentional Disruptor that also attempted to masquerade as a good 
node by temporarily contributing to the network (Node 3). However, as can be seen 
from Figure 5.5, the framework effectively distinguishes the Disruptors from the 
good nodes, with a clear disparity between the reputation values at the end. 
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Figure 5.5: Reputation of nodes within cluster A with 6 nodes depicted in the cluster being fed 
very differing random traffic flows 
 
This experiment therefore not only shows that a cluster can evolve into its own mini 
trust network but also that ultimately the framework is able to recognise Disruptors 
based on their actions. This ability is highly relevant in both scenarios explained in 
Chapter 4. However, it should be noted that here, only the evolution of the trust has 
been explored. The rule-based mechanisms that punish misbehaving nodes is not 




Aim: Having ascertained trust distribution within a cluster, the natural progression is 
to investigate the reputation model at work within a plausible actual scenario. This 
would involve looking at the propagation of trust within several clusters 
concurrently. 
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Strategy: In this case, sticking with the Travellers’ Web scenario, a simulation of a 
2-carriage train is undertaken with the formation of four clusters each containing 
exactly 6 nodes. A 2-carriage train is assumed so that inter-cluster communication is 
possible and within range. The number of participants equates to 24 which would be 
an acceptable number in a real life situation for an off peak suburban train. Again, 
the aim is to use network routing information in order to deduce the trust information 




Figure 5.6: Representing the layout of clusters in the Travellers’ Web scenario. For clarity, the 
traffic patterns are only shown at a particular moment in time. Non-CH traffic is dotted 
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Data Set Selection: This is largely the same as for Section A. However, the number 
of nodes being used here is designed to represent a typical scenario in a train 
carriage. While there is no expectation of there being only 24 passengers in 2 
carriages of a train, it is more plausible to suggest that only around 24 passengers 
may be making use of the localised networking abilities of their devices.  
 
Methodology: Again, the same methodology is employed as previously with each 
node in each cluster having varying types of traffic running through it and the cluster 
head calculating the subsequent reputation for each node. For convenience, these 
types of traffic are not depicted here as it would involve the reproduction of 24 
separate tables. What is under investigation here is the variation of reputation over 
time within the clusters. In order to have a quick preview of the reputation of a given 
cluster, statistical averages of the reputations of all the nodes at given points in time 
are performed and these are then recorded on a graph. 
 
Findings: Figure 5.7 shows the average reputation of nodes per cluster. While 
specific inferences are not possible from statistical averages, the plot does show that 
reputation varies across all clusters. All flows have been manually initiated between 
nodes using random CBR and some nodes have been purposely designated to have 
high drop rates in some cases and high workloads in others so as to have fairly 
defined statistical representations.  
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Figure 5.7: Statistical Averages of Cluster Reputations based on the simulations of the 
Travellers’ Web scenario 
 
The clusters all have different statistical averages purely due to the random nature of 
the traffic flows and the different conditions imposed on some of the nodes (to act as 
a particular type of stakeholder). This results in sometimes large variations between 
cycles. Going back to the Travellers’ web scenario, one could infer that Cluster A for 
instance would be able to exchange more sensitive information between the nodes 
than Cluster B, especially within the middle part of the simulation.  
 
5.3.3 Maintenance Testing 
 
FRANTIC needs to be able to perform trust maintenance, in that trust values need to 
be updated accordingly over time and it should also be able to respond to threats or 
non-cooperating nodes. There has already been one instance where the cluster head 
bans a node whose reputation happens to drop to less than 0.1 within a single cycle 
(Section 5.3.1). However, there are also other instances of maintenance where the 
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mechanism will have to react to reputation variations in nodes without necessarily 
banning them.  
 
Aim: It is a vital factor of FRANTIC that it should be able to emulate, to a certain 
degree, the concept of humanised trust, i.e. nodes that have behaved “badly”, i.e. by 
overloading the network, losing data or being uncooperative should be allowed to 
redeem themselves. In this particular set-up the concept of trust decay over time is 
also factored in.  
 
Strategy: A single node in the network is investigated while the mechanisms of the 
network that deal with trust decay as well as allow nodes to make up their reputation 
after they have been damaged are switched on. For this experiment, the Disaster 
recovery scenario is used with the node being targeted as a member of the Helper 
stakeholder group. Helpers are generally nodes that are on site to help Victims and 
therefore deemed to seek to behave selflessly at all times.  
 
Data Set Selection: This is the same as for Section 5.3.1 as the experimental set-up 
is similar. 
 







(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Flow end 
(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Role of node 
0-100s fid_1 30 60 source 
100-200s fid_2 125s 150s router 
200-300s fid_3 260 300 sink 
300-400s fid_4 350 375 router 
400-500s fid_5 410 460 router(drop all) 
500-600s fid_6 530 590 router(drop all) 
600-700s banned banned banned banned 
700-800s 0 0 0 none 
800-900s fid_7 815 840 router 







(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Flow end 
(time stamp in 
seconds) 
Role of node 
900-1000s fid_8 930 970 router 
1000-1100s 0 0 0 none 
1100-1200s 0 0 0 none 
Table 5.5: Input to trust framework for node 1 in order to determine the response of the 
framework when aiming to maintain trust 
 
Findings: The Helper node is initially made to behave as a source, router and sink in 
order to make sure it is working properly and at the 5
th
 cycle is made to start 
dropping packets in order to lower its reputation. This happens up until the point the 
node passes the 0.25 threshold value for the cluster head, at which point it receives a 
ban. As per the model, this is only a temporary ban that lasts for only one cycle. This 
drop in performance from the node (by dropping packets) which lowers its reputation 
needs to be modelled because frequently in disaster recovery scenarios, Helper nodes 
will find themselves in situations where they are overloaded, whether it be at a 
human level (having to attend to victims) or at a networking level (receiving too 
many requests for information transit). If there is no chance for a node to redeem 
itself, then the framework will quickly isolate said node from the network 
permanently and this can seriously hamper any recovery operations. 
 
Instead, as can be seen in Figure 5.8, the ban results in a break in the graph whereby 
no values are recorded for the reputation of Node 1. By banning the node 
temporarily, the system provides it with an opportunity to address any internal or 
external pressure that may have been affecting its performance. These temporary 
“breathers” may well be necessary in a high-pressure environment as a disaster 
recovery scenario is likely to be. 
 
Once the node completes its ban cycle, it is reintegrated into the network and its 
value is reset to 0.25. In its first cycle after being reintegrated, this node experiences 
no traffic. However, this may not necessarily mean that it is a sign of non-
cooperation. It could well be because of its low reputation value, other nodes may 
not be keen on using it as a router. To cater for this is why in this is a special case, 
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the cluster head does not apply the decay principle to the reputation calculation as the 
node has only just come back from a ban. Besides, in order to apply a trust decay 
decrease, the cluster head would require the difference in reputations from the 
previous interaction which it does not have as the said node did not have any 
interactions during the time it was banned. 
 
As it goes through the next two cycles (between 800-1000s), the Helper node 
redeems itself by increasing its workload and therefore increasing its own reputation. 
During the last two cycles however, it does not experience any traffic and this time 
the cluster head ages its reputation by factoring in the decay principle and its 
reputation value is seen to fall. 
 






















Figure 5.8: Redeeming reputation – Node 1 
 N.B. The break in reputation starting at 600s indicates that the node was banned. 
 
Having thus ascertained that the model responds as required to a host of different 
data inputs administered under controlled conditions in both sets of scenarios, the 
impact of other parameters can now be studied such as verifying how accurate the 
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model is when detecting rogue nodes, or how effective it is in using network 
resources. 
 
5.3.4 Network Overhead Simulations 
 
One of the primary considerations of adding a framework onto an existing network is 
the effect, positive or otherwise, that addition has. Often, by adding functionality or 
features, there is a certain compromise to be made in terms of reduced resources 
available to do other tasks, thereby resulting in some networking tasks not being 
performed (such as packet drops). This then affects the overall performance of the 
network and therefore would render the addition of any feature highly questionable.  
 
5.3.4.1 Node Analysis 
 
Aim: In this case, it is proposed that the effect FRANTIC’s architecture has on the 
network should be verified in 2 folds.  
 
Strategy: First the impact of any additional overheads created at the node level, then 
at the cluster level, is studied. In this way, it is possible to isolate any congestion 
points and possibly refine the model to address such issues. The impact on the 
overall network will simply be a scaled up version of the average impacts on a 
cluster. Because of the topology of the design the largest concentration points will be 
around the cluster head, if at all. As stipulated before, this is mitigated by staggering 
node trust reports at various stages of a particular cycle. 
 
Data Set Selection: The arguments for data selection are the same as for Section 
5.3.2, Experiment B. The other criteria noted here are the pause times, which denote 
the amount of time a mobile user is expected to stay stationary – just under 2 minutes 
was deemed a good approximation, especially for someone moving in the pattern of 
the Random Waypoint Model. The node ranges are 250m, allowing some nodes to 
get out of range if required. The node speed, while high for a human user, is chosen 
Chapter 5 – Performance Assessment 
 
145 
here for experimental purposes only. Slower speeds, coupled with the nodal range, 
may not have accurately reflected mobility, given the defined cycle and pause times. 
 
Methodology: For this part of the experimentation, the following parameters are 
assumed within NS-2. 
 
Simulation time: 1200s 
Cycle time: 100s 
Number of nodes: 42 (6-7 clusters depending on prevalent configuration) 
Simulation area: 1000m x 1000m 
Pause time: 100s 
Movement: Random Waypoint Model 
Nodal range: 250m 
Capacity: 2Mbps 
Application: CBR 
Speed: 10 m/s 
 
These values are typical of currently available hand-held devices and the simulation 
area has been set wide enough so they can reflect both the Travellers’ Web and 
Disaster Recovery scenarios. 
 
The overhead is also defined as the number of routing packets (received/transmitted 
or issued) through a node. The corresponding reputation overhead is then the sum of 
the routing overhead and the number of all reputation-only packets.  
 
The simulation was carried out as required above for 1200s with varying loads of 
traffic through the 12 cycles that comprise this experiment. This was a generic 
simulation that would be equally applicable to all stakeholders in the two scenarios 
depicted in Chapter 4. The graph below pertains to the traffic through one node only 
within a cluster. Data was analysed at the end of each cycle as opposed to on the fly. 
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Figure 5.9: Overheads generated by the framework when determining reputation at the node 
level.  The reputation overhead includes the routing overhead 
 
Findings: As far as the node is concerned, it can be seen that the overhead added by 
the trust mode by virtue of its reputation mechanism is not appreciably higher than 
the routing overhead. The reputation overhead values include the routing overhead, 
so it can be seen that the additional overhead added by the reputation mechanism is 
only a fraction more than that added by the routing procedures alone. This means 
that the node generates minimal additional overhead when operating within the trust 
framework. Furthermore, these simulations were carried out with test packet sizes. In 
real life scenarios, especially in the Travellers’ Web scenario, the size of the service 
packets being transferred is likely to be much higher than the size of the control 
packets for the trust mechanism anyway, so the fractional increase the framework 
introduces will be even lower. Hence, this particular simulation should be seen as a 
worst-case scenario as far as the normal node class is concerned. 
 
It should be noted that the overhead is not uniformly higher at all cycles because 
some cycles have varying traffic patterns with nodes coming in and leaving the 
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network. Hello messages are also included within the overhead calculation for the 
reputation model. It should also be noted that this is for the overhead at the normal 
node only, not the cluster head class of nodes. This will now be dealt with in the next 
section. 
 
5.3.4.2 Cluster Head Analysis 
 
Having looked at the traffic flowing through one single node, it follows that the rest 
of the nodes within a cluster will follow the same pattern; in fact, this has been 
confirmed via further simulations, but in view of the results being very similar to 
Section 5.3.4.1, these have not been displayed here. The cluster head however is 
different because it operates on different terms in contrast to its member nodes.  
 
Aim: To investigate the effect of the framework on the cluster head with regards to 
overheads generated. 
 
Strategy and methodology: As for normal node, but with the algorithm modified 
since as mentioned previously, cluster heads do not need to perform routing for other 
nodes, unless absolutely necessary. They are not penalised with the gain system in 
place for other nodes since they are required to do other duties for the cluster, namely 
storing reputation tables, calculating and updating new reputation values, distributing 
updated values to its members and monitoring and taking corrective action against 
non-cooperative or misbehaving members. 
 
Data Set Selection: This follows the same argument as for Section 5.3.4.1 for the 
nodal analysis. 
 
Findings: The following graph therefore gives an indication of the routing vs. 
reputation overhead for the cluster head. Again this is a generic simulation applicable 
to both scenarios in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 5 – Performance Assessment 
 
148 
As it can be seen, the reputation overhead in this case highly outweighs the routing 
overhead, at least in a much more pronounced manner than was the case for the 
normal node class. This may seem like a gross disadvantage of being a cluster head. 
However, in order to set things in perspective, the average reputation overhead of all 
the member nodes is then plotted in comparison. The overall reputation overhead 
(which includes the routing overhead) of the cluster head is lower than the overhead 
of its member nodes. This is to be expected as the cluster head has other duties to 
perform and having to operate in lesser traffic is an incentive on one hand and also 
makes sure the cluster head is not congested. It is important that cluster heads, once 
established are relieved of routine routing issues wherever possible in order to 
preserve their resources towards the computation and storage of the trust data within 
their respective clusters. 
 




















Average Node Reputation Overhead
 
Figure 5.10: Overheads within clusters when seeking to determine reputation information. The 
reputation overhead includes the routing overhead for the Cluster Head 
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5.3.5 Trust Auditing 
 
As described within Chapter 3, trust audit involves the actions taken by the 
framework in order to counteract any actions by nodes that may be seen to be 
detrimental to the proper operation of the network. Such actions may not always be 
misbehaving in nature but most may result in taking the network from its stable 
phase to an unstable one, which is why it is essential for it to develop some 
safeguards.  
 
FRANTIC was designed with node cooperation in mind and aims to emulate the 
natural tendency to trust which is normally inherent among most human beings. It is 
therefore not claimed that the model is immune from all forms of attacks – in fact it 
is very hard for any model to be able to make such a claim, even those using 
hardcore security authentication and encryption mechanisms, aided by trusted third-
party authorities. Security and trust can almost always be breached if the attacker is 
relentless enough, so the aim here is not to deflect all forms of attacks, but merely to 
ascertain that the model can identify early symptoms of impending node, cluster or 
network failure and take measures to remedy the situation. 
 
5.3.5.1 Threat Analysis 
 
There are several scenarios which wireless networks may come across that may be 
detrimental to its operation. Some of these are not intentional (such as congestion), 
but should nevertheless be remedied. The main threats to an ad hoc network are 
briefly described below. 
 
5.3.5.1.1 Lying Nodes/Black Hole Attacks 
 
This occurs when misbehaving nodes propagate false information within the 
network. For instance, during a route discovery process, they may choose to send 
route reply acknowledgements for routes they do not have. What does happen is that 
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once the packets are routed through that node, it cannot forward them on and simply 
drops them. 
 
It is expected that FRANTIC will be able to deal with such situations because the 
one-hope neighbours of the misbehaving nodes will be able to detect that packets 
have been dropped en-route and they will lower their reputation ratings accordingly. 
Within the next cycle, depending on its performance the misbehaving node will then 
either be temporarily or even permanently banned. Because a misbehaving node will 
most likely also not forward any packets, this will compound the effect of its drop 
rate on its performance resulting in quicker punishments. 
 
5.3.5.1.2 Intentional Packet Drops 
 
In this case, the node continuously drops all the packets it receives. There is no 
attempt at lying in order to induce fake trust, the node just drops all packets and does 
not send route error messages when it does so. This type of behaviour is again easy 
to detect in FRANTIC based on the close monitoring of its one-hop neighbours. This 
will then result in the node being punished via a ban. 
 
5.3.5.1.3 Denial of Service Attacks 
 
In this instance, a node or a series of nodes may target a particular victim within the 
network and flood it with many packets in order to generate a denial of service 
attack. While such attacks can be hard to detect, the way in which the framework’s 
algorithm is designed caters for the fact that nodes may node flood a network for a 
sustained period of time.  
 
There are two reasons why the motivation for flooding is reduced. The first is that 
there are equal benefits to be had in the attacked node doing an accelerated 
workload. In fact, by flooding the node, they will be increasing its trust rating. There 
will of course come to a point where the link capacity may be exceeded and the node 
will start to drop packets, but this will be outweighed by the number of packets it has 
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forwarded. So, the likelihood of the attacked node being excluded at the next cycle is 
rather small. Furthermore, denial of service attacks will need to originate from nodes 
and will artificially increase their gain without adding appreciable workload, 
assuming the majority of their time is spent operating the attacks. This will result in 
the reputation of the attacking nodes being reduced. A prime candidate for denial of 
service attacks are cluster heads purely because of the central role they occupy 
within the cluster’s reputation hierarchy. However, cluster heads are not meant to be 
included in natural routing paths unless absolutely necessary, so a lot of the requests 
to use the cluster head as a forwarding node will actually be deflected to alternative, 
possibly longer, routes. Even if the routes are longer, and may affect effectiveness of 
the network to a certain extent, it is necessary to ensure that the cluster head does not 
become the weak point of the framework. 
 
Another effect of a node being under attack is that the surge in forwarding requests it 
receives will eventually start to reflect upon its limited resources. In other words, its 
battery level may start to drop or it may not be able to perform internal tasks due to 
excessive processing power being consumed by the increased routing. In this case, 
the node has a choice of shutting itself down as a router temporarily. While this may 
reflect selfishness and may result in the cluster head decaying its reputation over the 
next cycle, the attacked node will be relatively immune to this if it resumes normal 
operation after the maximum number of four cycles has passed and it is weeded out 
of the network. This “pause” time in its routing operations will cease all denial of 
service attacks and it may then resume normal operation, safe that the attacker may 
have then moved on, up until the point where the latter’s reputation is driven down to 
the point where is then banned or ejected from the network. 
 
5.3.5.1.4 Collusion Attacks 
 
These types of attacks are performed by several nodes operating together in order to 
fulfil a common goal. An example of a collusion attack is when several nodes 
provide fake recommendations about each other, in order to artificially raise their 
reputation and then proceed to launch an attack on the network once they are trusted. 
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Another form of collusion is when rogue nodes work together in singling out a 
victim node and generating fake recommendations about the latter and reducing its 
reputation value such that it is then ejected from the network or shunned by its peers. 
They then proceed to do the same to another node until they then control a particular 
part of the network. 
 
Collusion attacks are the hardest form of attacks for the model to deal with. In fact, 
because of the nature of ad hoc networks, any attempt at being effective in 
counteracting a certain type of attack invariably renders one vulnerable to a different 
type of attack. This is the case here. While FRANTIC is expected to fare relatively 
well in the previous types of attacks described, it may not be able to repel a very 
strong collusion attack made of several nodes. However, this is not only 
representative of this model. Many types of ad hoc networks and trust frameworks 
would fail if faced with a certain amount of colluding nodes. This is because 
colluding nodes are very hard to detect and their effects are further amplified in 
nodes that base their operation on recommendations from trusted peers. While the 
network is able to weed out singular outbursts of rogue nodes, a coordinated attack 
may find a cluster overwhelmed in terms of numbers. In any case, if the number of 
rogue nodes closely matches the number of altruistic nodes, then there is a higher 
chance for the network to fail purely because of the specific coordination of 
colluding nodes. 
 
There are other types of attacks that do happen in ad hoc networks but the above are 
the most common types that will be perpetrated within self-starting networks such as 
FRANTIC. This is because the lack of rigid authentication protocols in networks 
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5.3.5.2 Threat Testing 
 
Aim: This is to measure how effective the model is when faced with attacks detailed 
in the previous section and what its accuracy is when trying to detect misbehaving 
nodes from honest ones. 
 
Data Set Selection: This is again the same as for Section 5.3.4.1, with the exception 
of the variable pause time, explained within the Strategy section. A larger number of 
nodes are used this time with more clusters as there is the need for some of them to 
be misbehaving nodes and thus to be eliminated from the network. 
 
Strategy and Methodology: In order to simulate threat scenarios, the same 
simulation set-up is maintained as in Section 5.3.4. The difference now is that a 
variable pause time is set and nodes are allowed to move according to the random 
waypoint model, i.e. at a constant speed determined randomly using a uniform 
distribution between 10 to 20 m/s. This is more suited to the Disaster Recovery 
scenario where node movement in and around the disaster area and to and from the 
safe zones are to be expected, unlike the Travellers’ Web where similar movement is 
restricted by the physical settings of the scenario. 
 
The number of nodes is set to 60 this time allowing for the formation of about 10 
clusters depending on the configuration of the network at any particular point in 
time. CBR is still used, with packets being sent at a rate of 1 packet every 0.25s and 
a constant bandwidth of 2Mbps.  
 
In the first scenario, a varying number of Disruptor nodes will be implemented which 
drop most of the data packets they are sent, typically anywhere between 80% (lower 
band) to 100% (higher band). The routing protocol being used is DSR, with no 
routing packets dropped at this point. This is so as not to make detection of the 
misbehaving nodes too obvious. If the misbehaving nodes drop all packets they are 
sent (routing and data packets included), then they will be weeded out of the network 
by the cluster head very quickly as their reputation will rapidly fall below a threshold 
level within a cycle or two. 
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Findings: The following experiment shows the results obtained from the average of 
4 series of 10 simulations performed, with a pause time of 50s for the nodes, and 
increasing the number of misbehaving nodes in order to verify the amount of time it 
took the network to detect and isolate them. Figure 5.11 shows the results of those 
simulations. They represent the totality of the nodes in the network and are not 
depicted on a per cluster basis. 
 




























Figure 5.11:  Banning of misbehaving nodes by the framework after their reputation is 
determined to fall too drastically thereby triggering the rule-based mechanisms 
 
This graph shows that it takes roughly about 6 cycles for all nodes to be properly 
eliminated from the network. It should be noted that it has been assumed that there is 
no collusion between nodes and that the Disruptor nodes do not drop all packets. 
Because their dropping rate varies and because they perform some workload in terms 
of routing for the network, they are able to sustain a good reputation for longer. 
However, these are extreme situations; misbehaving nodes will often drop all packets 
indiscriminately resulting in a quicker ban from the network.  
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The next set up is that of a single Helper node within the network undergoing a 
denial of service attack. The graph shows that although the reputation of the node 
decreases at times and it even undergoes a period of reputation decay for around 
200s to protect itself from a surge of forward requests, it is still able to strive in the 
network. The only drawback would have been a drain on its resources which 
FRANTIC cannot dictate. It is the user’s choice and an indication of their freewill as 
to how long they wish to tolerate heightened data rates before refusing to forward 
any more packets. 
 



















Denial of Service Attack
 
Figure 5.12: A Denial of Service Attack showing that the node undergoes a fall in reputation as 
the attacks force it to drop the traffic flowing through it 
 
It should be noted that although the Denial of Service attack appears to have a 
positive effect on the reputation of the node, this has come at a cost. It has lost its 
resources in maintaining a high data rate, such that packet drops did not have a big 
influence on it. Between cycles 100 to 300s, the node dropped more packets than it 
forwarded, resulting in its reputation falling. At the end of cycle 700s, the node has 
refused any more packet forwarding. This means that no trust information is reported 
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to the CH during the next two cycles, resulting in a natural decay of its reputation. 
When it resumes normal operation at 900s, the node is able to increase its reputation 
by behaving altruistically. 
 
The above increase in reputation however would not have been possible without 
honest nodes reporting about the correct packet forwarding taking place. This then 
assumes that at least the recipients of the forwarded packets (the node’s one-hop 
neighbours, other than the attacker/s) are honest in reporting trust ratings to the 
cluster head. If the neighbours are also part of the network of nodes perpetrating the 
denial of service attack, then it is highly likely that the node will not survive in the 
network since this would be akin to a collusion attack. Therefore, another important 
factor to consider is the relative ratio of Helper nodes to Opportunists and Disruptors. 
Generally, this ratio is favourable to the Helper nodes but in those situations where 
this is reversed, then because of collusion, it is very likely that the likelihood of 
reaching good nodes decreases. 
 
5.3.6 Analysing Service Metrics 
 
In Section 4.3, several service metrics were identified that allow for a snapshot 
evaluation of trust frameworks to be performed. These were both service 
environment and service specific centred.  
 
In order to verify whether the metrics indeed paint an accurate picture of the state of 
the network at a particular time, the KPIs were calculated for a few of the 
experiments previously performed at specific time periods and the relevance of the 
KPI to the state of the network was determined. Because the experiments were 
controlled, the service environment metrics are not required, so the focus will be on 















Node Analysis Scenario from Figure 5.5 (Node 3 only) 
Sr 0.82 300 Discovery 
to Stable 
In this initial stage, it can be seen that the 
success rate of route requests is relatively 
high as nodes seek to discover one 
another. 
Srt 0.98 500 Stable At this point, the network is stable with 
established trustworthy routes being 
chosen. 
Imr 0.16 N/A Stable In the absence of other pressure from its 
environment, the impact on the framework 
on the measurable improved efficiency of 
routing can be determined. 




0.95 300 Stable This is the QR for Cluster B. It is a very 
high ratio and this is reflected in the 
higher average mean reputation values. 
The QR does not distinguish between 
different types of “bad” nodes, so any 
non-performing nodes are automatically 
classed as “bad”.  
QR 0.83 500 Stable Again for Cluster B. This shows the ratio 
has dipped. This could be an indication of 
a network issue (overload) or the presence 
of non-cooperative or misbehaving node. 
A lower reputation value confirms this to 
be the case. 
QR 0.91 700 Stable This is the QR for Cluster A. With a high 
QR, the average reputation may be 
predicted to be higher – however, actual 
results show that it is lower than expected. 
This is an important distinction to make – 
the QR predicts the trust service 
availability of the network, not 
instantaneous reputation values, although 
often, both track each other. In this case 
however, although the trust service ability 










of the network is predicted by the QR as 
favourable, the mean reputation is lower 
than expected because the network has 
just come out of a cycle where “bad” 
nodes may just have been weeded out. 
Nevertheless, the QR accurately predicts 
the trust serviceability of the network as 
the mean reputation values immediately 
recover past the 700s time stamp.  
Maintenance Testing from Figure 5.10 
Ima 0.005 
(for initial 
value of 25 
misbehaving 
nodes) 
200-400 Unstable The audit impact is not a snapshot 
measurement but rather a measurement of 
performance over time, hence the range 
over which it is measured. This 
demonstrates that the network’s audit 
capacity is reduced and takes longer to 
operate when there are a large number of 
misbehaving nodes (QR of 0.58) 





200-400 Unstable This is twice the audit impact of the 
framework when operating with 25 
misbehaving nodes. It is a lot more 
effective when the QR is in its favour. 
(QR of 0.83) 




nodes of 25) 
400-600 Unstable to 
Stable 
Once the framework identifies the good 
nodes from the bad, the QR rapidly 
improves from 0.58 to 0.92 and the 
network returns to stability. 




nodes of 10) 
400-600 Unstable to 
Stable 
The same resolution is seen in the 
framework for the more favourable 
scenario of 10 misbehaving nodes with the 
QR improving from 0.83 to 1.00. This is 
brought about by the permanent banning 
of the nodes due to highly erratic 
performances identifying them as 
misbehaving. 
Table 5.6: Applying Metrics to Evaluation Scenarios 
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As can be seen from the above table, the trust metrics (KPIs) provide good guidance 
as to how the network is likely to behave (trust service availability) or how it has 
behaved (audit capacity). Interpreted properly, they can offer sound indications of 
whether a network is exhibiting signs of distress, whether due to network issues or 
trust issues.  
 
In real life scenarios, there will be also scope to utilise service environment metrics 
to also aid in reaching inferences about a target framework or the state of the 
network.  
 
The applications of such KPIs, once adopted as convention, are widespread and may 
be used at least initially to classify and review trust models as they are developed. 
  
5.4 Discussion   
 
The purpose of the experiments in this chapter is to ensure that the algorithms of the 
model work as expected and as per the specifications in Chapter 3. Furthermore, 
based on the simulation data supplied, the model should also reflect possible 
instances of the scenarios depicted in Chapter 4. It is not possible to address the 
complexity of all the scenarios but only certain instances. While implementing a full-
scale physical set-up was outside the scope of this work, parallels from the 
simulation data should highlight the relevance of the trust framework in the scenarios 
proposed. For example, clusters in disaster scenarios could easily depict a specific 
service (Fire, Ambulance etc.), similarly within the Travellers’ web, natural clusters 
could form within the carriage of an intercity train, or as previously suggested among 
participants of similar interests at trade fairs.  
 
In order to determine the success of the framework, it is important to revisit the 
Objectives of the research as mentioned in Chapter 1 and determining whether those 
Objectives have been met as well as the Requirements from Chapter 2.  
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5.4.1 Meeting the Objectives 
 
Objectives 1 & 2 - The very first objective is that the framework must be able to 
accurately derive trust and reputation information. In so far as the experimentation is 
concerned, this holds true as well for all the experiments in this current chapter. As 
an example, looking at Figure 5.3 from Section 5.3.1 on the variation of the 
reputation values of Node 1, it is clear that based on the observation data being 
parsed (in this case the routing data at the network layer), the model reacts as 
expected. The reputation of the node is shown to increase at the points where it acts 
as a router for other nodes. This effect is more pronounced the higher the number of 
packets that it successfully transmits. Furthermore, where the node acts as a source 
or a sink with no routing, the overall gain it achieves from the network results in its 
reputation being flat or decreasing slightly. This again accurately depicts the 
relationship between gain, workload and reputation thus showing that the algorithm 
within the framework is operating as required with the desired effect on the 
reputation of the node as seen from the cluster head, and by extension, the remainder 
of the cluster. 
 
Objective 3 – The advantages of cluster heads from a networking point of view are 
well documented in the literature and have furthermore been proved in Section 3.4.1 
in initial experimentations. However, further to this networking benefit, the 
overheads associated with the implementation of trust models such as FRANTIC had 
not been adequately proven. To that end, the experiments in Section 5.3.4.1 and 
5.3.4.2 with regards to Node and Cluster analysis should strengthen the argument 
that clustering also provides additional benefits within a trust framework. For 
example, looking at the overhead generated by the reputation mechanism in Figure 
5.8 from the point of view of a single node, it can be quickly inferred that no 
appreciable overhead is generated by the trust framework. This is partly due to the 
lean nature of the framework itself and partly due to the fact that the framework is 
able to utilise existing routing data in order to form an opinion on trust. 
 
Furthermore, with respect to the overhead generated within a whole cluster, it is also 
noticeable in Figure 5.9 that although the trust framework introduces some additional 
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traffic mainly due to the various requests for recommendation that have to go to and 
from the cluster head. This would still be less than what would have been generated 
if the architecture had been fully distributed. This is because in the absence of the 
cluster heads, all nodes would be required to compute and store reputation 
information for their neighbour nodes, potentially increasing the overhead generated 
many folds. 
 
The lack of crippling overheads therefore also enables the framework to meet 
Objective 6 and the role segregation introduced by the cluster head versus node 
member relationship allows the various stakeholders to perform their respective roles 
and a fair system to emerge. 
 
This fair system leads into the fulfilment of Objective 4. The key concepts of gain, 
workload and drop rate in order to determine the performance of a node are crucial in 
introducing fairness to the model. They act as a safeguard to prevent nodes from 
exploiting the network for their own selfish purpose and also propose an appropriate 
trade-off between work and rewards. By incorporating the concept of importance 
within the determination of reputation by the cluster head, better performing nodes 
are further rewarded as their recommendations are classed above those of non-
performing or new nodes. This means that the longstanding well-performing nodes 
have a better say in determining how the trust profile of a node is determined. In 
using this experience from its most longstanding nodes, the framework also reduces 
its exposure to attacks and selfishness from new or misbehaving nodes.  
 
However, reducing the exposure may not be solely enough to negate the effects that 
may be brought on by misbehaving or selfish nodes. In order to meet Objective 5, 
the framework has to show resilience to such behaviour. By operating a rule-based 
mechanism, it aims to do just that as presented in Chapter 3. This mechanism is 
further evaluated in threat scenarios in Section 5.4.5.2 where the network is flooded 
with misbehaving nodes. The framework reduces the incidence of misbehaving 
nodes to zero within 6 cycles. While 6 cycles may appear a lot, it should be noted 
that the behaviour of the misbehaving nodes in this instance was not made overly 
obvious. For example, the misbehaving nodes were not instructed to indiscriminately 
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reject all route requests or drop all packets received. They were programmed to 
perform some work for the network in order to hinder detection. It should be noted 
that most misbehaving nodes tend not to incur a high computational expense in order 
to disrupt a network and are therefore more likely to be banned within a shorter 
space of time.  
 
Objective 7 is addressed in a theoretical evaluation of the performance of trust 
frameworks, see Section 4.3. This is because this objective was to create a list of 
KPIs that allows direct comparisons of trust models and this has been done in 
Section 4.3 in theory. There can be no empirical validation of Objective 7 as by its 
very nature, framework assessment via KPIs is theoretical. 
 
5.4.2 Addressing the Requirements 
 
As stipulated in Section 2.5, FRANTIC attempts to address most of the requirements 
present in the domain of ad hoc networking and trust. It should be noted that the high 
level objectives specified in Section 5.4.1 were mostly derived from an analysis of 
the issues inherently present when attempting to create a trust framework for the ad 
hoc network, therefore a high degree of overlap in meeting the respective aims is 
expected. 
 
Requirements 1 & 2 – The basic requirements for the model to be decentralised and 
scalable are fully met by design. FRANTIC operates on a fully decentralised basis. 
The notion of cluster heads, although operating with a hierarchal architecture as far 
as intra-cluster trust traffic is concerned, still remain fully distributed inter-cluster 
wise (for trust) and both intra- and inter-cluster wise for networking.  
 
There is no upper limit on the number of nodes that can be accommodated by the 
framework although from a practical point of view, based on the scenarios depicted, 
anything higher than 100 nodes may prove improbable in real life, but certainly not 
impossible. 
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Requirements 3 – 5 – These are addressed by Objectives 1 & 2 as described in 
Section 5.4.1. 
 
Requirement 6 – This is the basis of Objective 4 and as such is appropriately met by 
the framework.  
 
Requirements 7 & 8, 11 – These form part of the functioning of the cluster head and 
are met by design. Cluster heads form a separate class of node from ordinary nodes 
as far as the trust framework is concerned. They are also able to store local 
information about reputation from all the nodes in their cluster thus creating local 
repositories across the network.  
 
Requirement 9 – This is a feature of the cyclic way in which reputation is calculated 
by the cluster head in each cluster. These cycles provide the assurance that reputation 
information for all nodes are up to date by default and not just for resilience or 
defence purposes. 
 
Requirement 10 – This is met partially for misbehaving nodes in that there is 
provision within the network for isolating nodes that misbehaving. As described 
previously, actual malicious behaviour involves a more complex degree of reasoning 
not explored in this work. 
 
Requirements 12 & 13 – These are not met by this framework. However, 12 forms 
part of suggested future work in which this current work could be extended and 13 
has been addressed theoretically in the literature and background. There is no 
motivation for implementing 13 as a feature of the network as the emphasis for the 
behaviour leading to trust information was to be derived from simple mechanics of 
the target node. As such, it is assumed that all trust information falls within the same 
context, which is true in so far as network traffic is concerned.  
 
Even in cases where the context in which trust is generated varies (as is often the 
case in the case of the Travellers’ Web scenario), there is still the possibility to create 
a trust network as the context within which the peers operate remain similar at a high 
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level, even though they may in essence be different. As explained before, if trust is 
built up within the context of sharing music, it is expected that such trustworthiness 
may be extended to other contexts such as sharing cached news without any adverse 
impact on the validity of the trust information.  
 
Having said that, context within trust is indeed an important concept and extending 
the scope of the research to address more complex computation of trust is part of the 
future direction this research can take within latter publications. 
 
Requirement 14 – The clustered framework allows for a node to migrate from one 
cluster to another and measures are also in place for its reputation to be transferred to 
its new cluster as long as both cluster heads are within direct radio range of each 
other. In effect, cluster heads transfer the node’s reputation information to their new 
geographical cluster so they don’t have to start building a reputation profile from 
scratch. It can only happen when there is direct radio contact between cluster heads 
as this is to ensure that no interception takes place while such sensitive information is 
in transit. However, it was also noted that it is rare for nodes to merely move to 
adjacent nodes without valid reasons (unless it was purely for operational efficiency) 
– if nodes were to move, they would most likely continuously travel across several 
clusters or leave the network altogether.  
 
The framework therefore appropriately addresses the issues presented in Chapter 2 
with one recommendation for further study.  
 
FRANTIC is also adequately modelled and proves the basics of its operation, both 
from a node and cluster perspective. The implemented algorithms behave as 
expected.  











This chapter presents a summary of the research carried out and highlights the 
contributions of this work as well as the possible avenues for further research.  
 
As computational systems become more ubiquitous and P2P interaction increases, 
the demand for self-starting networks will also see a rise as people look towards 
other means of communicating and sharing without having to incur additional costs. 
An ad hoc network is one of the ways to achieve that. Aside from catering for the 
general public interaction, an ad hoc network could also adequately improve 
communication in disaster scenarios where traditional methods of communications 
fail. This can happen by the use of a trust framework that allows peers to find the 
most helpful routes in order to disseminate recovery information. 
 
With this in mind, the need for entities to find reliable and honest partners with 
which they can interact becomes increasingly pressing. Trust is inherent in everyday 
life and it is a concept that, though hard to grasp, is responsible for most of the tasks 
performed in today’s society. Its transition from the social domain to the computing 
domain has nonetheless not been so straightforward purely because computers are 
yet to reach the level of complexity typically associated with human behaviour. 
However, by building upon this very lack of complexity, it is possible to install trust 
frameworks onto ad hoc networks such that it aids the decision making process of the 
entities within it.  
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The chief benefit of FRANTIC is that it can provide an entity with the means to 
assess behavioural evidence in order to form an opinion about the trustworthiness of 
another entity. Furthermore, when an entity’s previous interactions with its target are 
few, the framework can draw on the recommendations of others with more 
interactions in order to calculate the target entity’s reputation.  
 
Along with being able to provide resilience by isolating misbehaving nodes, 
FRANTIC also presents an adequate way of organising the trust information 
generated within the network that presents some synergies regarding overheads 
generated. This is done by clustering the framework such that classes of node are 
formed which are able to segregate their duties in order to better perform on their 
own specific tasks. By distributing this trust information in local repositories across 
the whole network, FRANTIC also enhances its robustness against attacks. Any part 
of its infrastructure being taken over in an attack will not necessarily result in the 
whole network failing as the partitioning into clusters means that some parts of the 
network still remain dependable and trustworthy and can continue to function as 
before. 
 
6.2 Research Contribution 
 
With these advantages in mind, the following points are a summary of the main 
contributions of this thesis.  
 
1. As described in the state of the art, no current trust model is able to meet all the 
requirements for a trust model for an ad hoc network. While this model does not 
claim to meet all the requirements either, it is nevertheless a novel framework 
that meets most of the basic requirements. While it can be argued that some 
models which fulfil fewer requirements may do those better than one which 
fulfills most of them, it would be impractical for one particular network to be 
loaded with several trust models when one could do the job adequately. The 
amount of additional resources consumed in loading additional frameworks 
would more than negate any benefit accrued in having some requirements met in 
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a superior manner. The model allows an entity to effectively derive the trust 
value of its peer through two key stages: 
 
- via personal experience 
- through recommendations from its peers when it has no prior experience of its 
trustee. In particular, this experience has been gained objectively from its peers 
within its vicinity and is the sum of all of their recommendations. 
 
2. FRANTIC generates trust without any a priori information. While there are 
several models in the literature that claim to bootstrap trust information, most 
still require a seed in order to bootstrap the process. This seed may be a common 
password or it could even assume a priori information or even existing trust 
relationships between nodes. The FRANTIC method is to initially start off the 
network with trivial routing in order to kick-start the trust formation process. 
Only when this is set up and running is it proposed that cluster formation and 
cluster head election take place.  
 
3. FRANTIC is also an autonomous system and is able to work independently of 
any form of backbone structure. It requires no access to centralised servers or 
repositories in order to function. 
 
4. The framework also operates a rule-based mechanism in order to implement 
resilience against misbehaving nodes. Aside from the above broad contributions, the 
framework has further advanced the state of the art as follows. It has: 
 
a) provided a means of assessing ‘at a glance’ the respective performances of 
trust models within ad hoc networks through the use of key ratios known as 
KPIs. While these ratios are based on network and service data, they provide 
a quick means to calculate how efficient a network is running and whether 
there is scope for it to be extended 
 
b) formally defined different roles for separate classes of node. While this work 
was the first to introduce the concept of clustering for trust distribution in ad 
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hoc networks, subsequently adopted by other researchers, the concept of 
assigning specific roles to different classes of node is unique to this work.  
 
c) created a simple system of weighted averages for reputation that is directly 
proportional to the trustworthiness of a node. Because the trustworthiness 
itself is a measure of how efficient the node is within the network (by virtue 
of assessing the gain, workloads and drop rates), this implies that the best 
performing nodes have the most influence into the reputation calculation of 
new nodes. This in itself provides a better backbone for the trust framework 
by making it more resilient against lying nodes.  
 
d) evaluated the network overheads created by a trust framework both at a node 
and at the cluster level. This allowed this research to determine that no 
appreciable amount of traffic is introduced at a node level and even at a 
cluster level, the performance is substantially higher than that of fully 
distributed nodes.  
 
e) in using routing data to generate trust, indirectly provided better routes for ad 
hoc networks.  
 
6.3 Further Work 
Most of the work contained in this thesis has focused on implementing a framework 
via managing trust. Like all research, this is not completive and there are several 
other avenues that can be pursued in order to extend this work. 
As part of validating the framework, simulations were carried out. Further work 
could be done in extending the implementation to the physical domain by using 
actual handsets and PDAs in order to mimic the implementation of the model. One 
practical way of doing that would be to install specific software onto each mobile 
terminal that allows trust evaluation of peers and allows it to maintain trust 
information which it can use at various levels.  
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In so far as trust generation is concerned, simulations (both software-based and 
physical) can be carried out on using various other bootstrapping mechanisms in 
order to find a most suitable one. Currently the method has its own mechanism 
which involves gradual trust build-up through experience, followed by a voting 
process for the election of cluster heads. However, this may not be totally suited to 
all networks, where faster start-up times may be necessary. The crucial and 
determining factor of all self-starting networks is the bootstrapping mechanism and it 
is vital that this part of the process happens with optimal results as the success or 
failure of the network during the latter stages is dependent on it to a very large 
extent.  
In determining trustworthiness, the framework utilises network data that is 
essentially part of all the internal data to which the nodes have access. However, as 
per Requirement 12, it may be highly beneficial for the model to be able to assimilate 
external data in order to enhance the accuracy of the reputation being computed. 
More often than not, this external data would require access to a backbone structure 
(such as the web) or a similar type of repository (such as a credit rating agency). 
However, there may also be local external data that may be fed into the framework 
that may enhance the quality of the trust information being produced. For example, 
in the exhibition scenario mentioned in Chapter 4, the size of the stall or the number 
of people visiting the stall may be a factor that aids the reputation of a particular 
merchant. Similarly, the displays could be rated according to their extravagance and 
this may have a direct impact as to how big the company is and therefore how 
reliable.  
Another improvement to the current framework is to add contextual data such that 
different classes of trustworthiness can be stored based on how they were obtained 
and in what context they are relevant in. Although there is an argument in this thesis 
for not using contextual information, more complex systems using high end devices 
that operate a larger variety of applications on an ad hoc network may well require it. 
With these improvements in mind, it is quite likely that trust models that work 
autonomously will soon find their way by getting adopted into real applications. 
Already, they exist on backbone structures, but with the advent of new device types 
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(such as the Apple iPad), ubiquity in computing is going on a whole new level that 
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